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Summary 
This thesis builds on the research tradition of Cultural Economics, particularly of its 
empirical strand. The thesis includes four articles that each analyse empirically a 
different facet of production of cultural services. Together they contribute to the two 
main themes of the thesis: features of production technology and applicability of 
different empirical methods in analysing production of cultural services. 
The four articles proceed in "chronological" order. The first article deals with problems 
shared by the subsequent studies - measurement of inputs, output(s) and quality of 
production - and employs neo-classical single-output cost functions and Structural 
Equation Modeling approach together with a cross-sectional data set of museums. The 
second article follows the earliest strand of cultural economics and examines, in a 
context of Baumol's cost disease, the assumption of stagnant productivity growth. The 
analysis utilises two index number approaches, Törngvist Approximated and Generalised 
Divisia Indices, and a panel data set of orchestras. The third article looks at the scale 
properties of production as well as tests the assumption of allocative efficiency by using 
non-linear single-output cost functions with a panel data set of theatres. The fourth 
article focuses on cost-efficiency of museums and utilises non-parametric Free Disposal 
Hull method and a cross-sectional data set of museums. 
The main findings of the thesis indicate, first, that production technologies of museums, 
orchestras and theatres vary substantially. The production technology of museums is 
shown, in a single-output setting, to exhibit homotheticity and homogeneity with respect 
to output as well as substantial increasing/decreasing scale economies, depending on the 
output measure. Analysis in a multiple output context reveals that on average a quarter 
of museums are cost-inefficient and private museums are more likely to be inefficient 
than the publicly owned ones. The production technologies of orchestras and theatres are 
alike with respect to single-output production as well as non-homotheticity and non- 
homogeneity of production technology. They differ as to the scale properties - orchestras 
exhibit diseconomies while theatres are characterised by scale economies - as well as 
relative usage of labour input. Production in orchestras is characterised by stagnant 
productivity that is a result of scale effect cancelling out technical change. Theatres are 
shown to be moderately allocatively inefficient. As to the methodology, the thesis 
suggests that particularities of cultural institutions have to be taken into account. These 
particularities involve problems related to measurement of inputs, output(s) and quality 
of production, definition of production technology as well as problems arising form data. 
Methods employed in price-quantity space, allowing in-efficiencies of production and not 
imposing a priori assumptions on production technology are argued to be most applicable 
ones. 
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I Introduction 
1 Background 
Since the seminal study by Baumol and Bowen (1966) "Performing Arts - The Economic 
Dilemma: A Study of Problems common to Theater, Opera, Music and Dance" there has 
been increased interest in analysing production and consumption of arts. ' According to 
Throsby (1994) this interest, labelled often as cultural economics, breaks down into four 
main research traditions: ' studies on markets of arts works, labour markets for artists, 
public subsidies to the arts and markets of performing arts. 3 
The studies on markets of arts works are generally based on a notion, that works of art 
differ from other commodities. 4 Each work of art, moreover, differs form every other arts 
work: Throsby (1994) points out, that the "original art objects (paintings, pieces of 
sculpture, and other artifacts) are ... an extreme case of a 
heterogeneous commodity. "5 
Because of this, the demand for arts works is generally conditioned, besides the price, 
consumer income, financial market characteristics, to aesthetic quality, while the supply 
is determined by prices and costs of production. 6 In the markets the motives of buyers 
are generally assumed to range from "demand for art purely as decoration to demand for 
art as pure [financial] asset" (ibid. ), that finalise either in decentralised primary markets 
or concentrated secondary markets, that are dominated by international auction houses. ' 
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The secondary markets, and particularly the rate of return of arts works as a financial 
investment, have inspired a great variety of empirical analyses. The focal point in these 
analyses has generally been to compare the rate of return of arts works and other 
investment goods such as real estate, bonds or shares. The comparisons have most often 
been based on the data set, or its extensions, by Reitlinger (1961) on secondary market 
transactions of arts works in major auction houses from 1760 till 1961 and data on given 
local markets for other investment goods. ' 
The analyses have generally found great variability in the rate of return. 9 For example 
Baumol (1986) concludes in his study, that investing in most arts works, in most time 
periods, leads to losses rather than profits, due to "the fickleness of taste whose 
meanderings defy prediction. "" This view is supported also e. g. by Frey and 
Pommerehne (1988), who bluntly conclude, that "it is no easier to make speculative 
financial profits in art than anywhere else". " The few studies that find art as a lucrative 
financial asset include e. g. Bryan (1985) who utilise the Shotheby's Art Index for the 
period 1970-1984. The observation by Bryan (1985) that "the returns in the art market 
were lucrative for the pure art speculator" are not, however, surprising given the 
extraordinary rise in art prices during the 1980's. 
The peculiarity of markets is also the starting point of the studies on labour markets for 
artists. Throsby (1994) points out that "the popular image of the artist, whether actor, 
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musician, painter, or poet, as a flamboyant bohemian devoted only to realizing a creative 
dream and oblivious to financial concerns is a portrayal far removed from the philistine 
economic man who lies at the heart of conventional economic models of labour market 
behaviour". Thus, the studies, rather than employing rigorous economic models, center 
mainly on describing the determinants of supply as well as income levels and 
distribution across the artistic labour force. 
The studies on labour supply generally suggest, that labour supply in the arts is 
characterised by multiple job holding, and that "pursuit of art at the expense of income 
is widespread" (ibid. ). The studies on income levels and their distribution, in turn, reveal 
according to Throsby (1994), first, that mean earnings among artists are lower than 
"other workers of similar educational and professional standing", second, that "age- 
earnings profiles are steeper for artists than for workers", and third, that "artists' incomes 
are more variable than those of other groups, both across time for an individual artist, 
and across artists at a given point in time". 
Of the determinants of income level and employment, training and talent have been 
regarded as the most important ones. For example Frey and Pommerehne (1989) as well 
as Wassail and Alper (1992) have emphasised the importance of training, whereas Towse 
(1992) sees education to serve "as an insurance policy". The role of talent in determining 
success in an artistic career was underlined by Rosen (1981), who noted that differences 
in talent result in differences in earnings. 12 This result, together with the notion that 
3 
consumption of arts is often characterised by scale economies, suggests that few talented 
artists - "superstars" - dominate the markets and receive the highest earnings. 
13 
The early studies on public subsidies for the arts rely on the well established economic 
theories. The seminal study by Baumol and Bowen (1966) on performing arts bases the 
need for public subsidies, or private donations, on market failure argument as well as on 
the idea of "cost disease" that plague performing arts institutions. The market failure 
arguments suggest, that due to positive externalities, public good characteristics, and 
production having natural monopoly characteristics, arts should be subsidised, since the 
markets do not produce optimal allocation of resources. 
The cost disease - or alternatively Baumol's disease, B-B thesis, income gap or earnings 
gap - in turn, suggests, that performing arts is prone to an ever increasing gap between 
costs and revenues. This argument is based on the idea of a two-sector unbalanced 
growth model, in which the performing arts sector is characterised by labour intensity 
and price elastic demand that prevents increasing ticket prices. 14 These two 
characteristics, combined with the notion that the productivity growth of performing arts 
sector lags behind the other sector of economy (due to lack of technical progress), yields 
a situation in which performing arts institutions face an increasing gap between costs and 
revenues. Baumol and Bowen (1966) argue, that "the economic pressures which beset 
the arts are not temporary - they are chronic... [and] if things are left to themselves 
deficits are likely to grow". 
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The market failure arguments as well as the cost disease have both inspired a vast 
number of studies. 15 Most of the studies have elaborated the different market failure 
arguments together with the B-B thesis and discussed their applicability in different 
markets. The findings of these studies have generally supported the relevance of both - 
market failure arguments and cost disease - as to legitimise public subsidies. The 
relevance of the market failure arguments has been, furthermore, underlined in so called 
impact studies that have focused on demonstrating the positive externalities of production 
and consumption of arts. These studies have centered either on local level activities - e. g. 
Myerscough (1988) as well as O'Hagan et al. (1989) - or positive externalities at country 
level. An example of the latter is Seamann (1992), who went as far as to argue that in 
1991 the US cultural sector constituted six per cent of the GNP and employed more than 
two and a half per cent of the US labour force. 16 Moreover, Seamann (1992) found 
various positive non-monetary externalities that were mainly based on the idea of 
production and consumption of arts being as such meritious. 17 
Besides the market failure arguments, also the ideas of government failure and 
information asymmetries have been put forward as to legitimise public subsidies. '8 These 
two arguments have been employed mainly to explain existence of non-profit producers 
of performing arts. 19 The former suggests that a government fails to provide adequate 
level of arts with the prevailing tax rate, and thus, publicly subsidised non-profits emerge 
to satisfy the excess demand. The latter argues that since information asymmetries 
between producers and consumers of arts are likely, non-profits should be subsidised in 
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order to secure high quality provision to consumers. For example Hansmann (1980) has 
argued that since "a for-profit firm has both the incentive and the opportunity to take 
advantage of customers by providing less service to them than was promised and paid 
for, the non-profit firms emerge to provide services in the amount and quality agreed 
on. " Of these two - government failure argument and information asymmetries - only the 
government failure argument has been empirically examined. The government failure has 
been examined mainly in terms of the so called willingness to pay studies that aim to 
assess the public's willingness to pay for the external benefits of the arts contrary to 
taxpayers liability. Examples of such studies are e. g. Throsby and Withers (1986) as well 
as Morrison and West (1986). 20 
The research tradition on the markets of performing arts has conventionally been based 
on the notion that demand for performing arts resembles demand for arts works, since 
aesthetic judgement is an essential element of any production. Demand is, however, 
assumed to differ dramatically from arts works, since performing arts does not 
materialise as artefacts to be sold in secondary markets. An exception to this are 
recordings of live performances, enabled by recent technological advances, that have 
created a mass market for such products. 21 Notwithstanding these mass markets, 
performing arts productions remain a transient phenomenon: even the most elaborate 
recording cannot reproduce a live performance. The demand for a given live performance 
is, thus, conditioned to the quality of the given artistic experience. Besides this, demand 
is generally conditioned to ticket prices, and income. 
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The empirical studies on demand have centered mainly on price and income elasticities 
and have been based on the assumption that output of performing arts institutions is best 
measured by attendance (tickets sold). The empirical studies on price elasticities, e. g. by 
Moore (1968) and Felton (1994), suggest - contrary to Baumol and Bowen (1966) - that 
demand for performing arts is relatively inelastic. Cross-elasticities between different 
types of performing arts - theatres, symphony orchestras, dance groups and opera - are, 
however, significant e. g. according to Gapinski's (1986) study on London West End in 
1970's. The studies on income-elasticities, e. g. by Withers (1980), in turn, show - rather 
expectedly - that demand for artistic experiences increases with income. 22 The sole 
application in which quality is examined as a determinant of demand is by Throsby and 
Withers (1982): the study found demand to be inelastic with respect to ticket price, but 
"strongly responsive to variations in quality" measured by standard of script, acting and 
production. 
The supply of performing arts is generally defined, as any other production, in terms of 
a producer transforming labour and capital inputs into outputs. The producer is 
characterised, according to theoretical models on market structures of performing arts, 
most often as a monopolistic non-profit producer that cannot finance its activities with 
own revenues. 23 This is the case e. g. in the two most referred to models on non-profit 
producers of performing arts by Hansmann (1981) and Holtman (1983). Hansmann 
(1981) portrays performing arts institutions as monopolistic non-profit producers that 
maximise attendance, quality or budget. The producers, furthermore, charge an admission 
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fee for their services - production of which require relatively 
high fixed costs - as well 
as do not increase their ticket prices due to relatively high demand elasticity and 
restricted demand of "high culture". Basing on this, Hansmann (1981) concludes that 
producers of performing arts must acquire private donations - that are depicted in the 
model as voluntary relinquishes of a part of consumer surplus - as well as to be entitled 
to public subsidies. 
Holtman (1983) assumes in his public utility pricing model that demand for performing 
arts is stochastic, implying that producers decide both capacity and price prior to 
knowing the actual demand. The non-profit producers that operate in the markets are 
assumed to pursue a social objective that maximises the expected consumers' willingness 
to pay minus total costs. This leads the non-profit producers to set a socially optimal 
price that covers operating costs, but no capital costs. This resulting low price (admission 
fee) necessitates rationing that is operationalised by different types of non-profits in 
rationing rules that reflect their ethical norms. In addition to the host of different non- 
profits, for-profit enterprises may also enter the markets. The for-profits set prices and 
capacity as to maximise profit and remain in the industry only if the consumers are ready 
to pay a higher price for the assured availability of the service. Thus, the model 
envisages co-existence of different types of producers in the same market. 24 
The more detailed analyses on supply of performing arts have concentrated on empirical 
assessments of production. Throsby's (1994) categorisation of research traditions 
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acknowledges merely the few studies on "production and cost relationships", and calls 
for "more carefully articulated models" as well as more detailed empirical assessments 
of production of performing arts. Actually - even if Throsby (1994) rightly laments the 
lack of empirical research on production of performing arts - an undercurrent of 
empirical studies on production of cultural services has slowly emerged. These studies, 
however, refer with production of cultural services to both performing arts institutions - 
orchestras, theatres, dance companies, and opera - and institutions connected to visual 
arts - museums and galleries. 25 These empirical studies, moreover, fall into three main 
categories. First, studies that stem directly from the B-B thesis and focus on the growth 
of costs and stagnant productivity, second, studies that look at features of technology 
and particularly scale economies, and third, studies that examine efficiency of 
production. 
As already noted, the B-B thesis has stimulated a wealth of empirical studies in relation 
to legitimisations of public subsidies. In terms of more detailed analyses of production, 
comparisons between growth rates of production costs in production of cultural services 
and general price level have attracted most attention. This line of inquiry has been 
followed e. g. by Netzer (1978), Throsby and Withers (1979), Peacock et al. (1982), 
Baumol and Baumol (1980,1984) as well as Schwartz (1986), who all suggest that costs 
in performing arts rise with a faster rate than in the rest of the economy, thus, implying 
a continuously increasing earnings gap. The assumption of stagnant productivity - that 
is the driving force of the B-B thesis - has been empirically addressed by Felton (1994), 
9 
who devices a rudimentary measure for labour input productivity in US orchestras. 
Controversially, the study gives preliminary evidence that productivity of labour input 
in performing arts institutions fluctuated considerably from 1972 till 1992. 
The scale properties of production of cultural services have been analysed mainly by 
using the cost function approach. The cost function approach has become widely used, 
since it does not require detailed information on technical aspects of production, but 
employ information on economic aspects - in the case of cultural services data on 
economic aspects has been more often available and more reliable, than data on technical 
aspects. Globerman and Book (1974), who examined scale properties of US symphony 
orchestras and theatre groups, were first to employ cost functions to production of 
cultural services. Thorsby (1977) followed suit, and assessed Australian performing arts 
institutions. The mid 1980's brought about some more theoretically sound estimations of 
cost functions: Lange et al. (1985) estimated cost flexibilities for different size of US 
symphony orchestras, Jackson (1988) compared cost flexibilities of different types of US 
museums, and Paulus (1993) examined scale economies of French museums. All these 
applications found different degrees of increasing scale economies, notwithstanding the 
producer type. 
The third area of empirical analysis of production - efficiency - emerged only in the 
early 1990's and utilised new methodological innovations. Most importantly, non- 
parametric mathematical programming methods - Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) and 
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Free Disposal Hull (FDH) - were taken into the methodological repertoire. 
The path of 
efficiency analysis was, however, blazed by Lapinski (1979), who already in the late 
1970's estimated for US performing arts institutions time series transcendental production 
functions that allowed a variety of configurations for marginal products of inputs. The 
estimated production functions - that captured both technical change and divergences 
from the doctrine of positive but declining marginal products of inputs (technical 
efficiency) - suggested, first, that performing arts institutions generally exhibit decreasing 
scale economies, and second, that artistic personnel is over utilised together with the 
capital input. 
The pioneering application of non-parametric methods is by Ek (1991a, 1991b, 1994), 
who assessed productivity growth and technical efficiency of Swedish theatres. A 
subsequent study by Paulus (1995) examined technical efficiency of French museums, 
and Mairesse (1997) assessed technical efficiency of Belgian museums. All these three 
latest studies have applied DEA and found substantial technical inefficiencies. 26 
By and large, the three empirical traditions to look at the production of cultural services 
- studies on productivity, scale economies and efficiency - have two distinctive 
characteristics. First, the early studies in each tradition have a tendency to treat different 
types of producers similarly, particularly different types of performing arts institutions. 
Even if the studies cover a wide range of producers from dance companies to museums, 
similar approaches have been applied across the board: for example Jackson (1988) and 
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Lange et al. (1985) use similar single-output cost functions with similar functional form 
for museums and symphony orchestras, respectively. Moreover, in all three traditions the 
results appear to be relatively similar across different institution types: cost disease is 
argued to plague both performing arts institutions as well as museums, both performing 
arts institutions and museums exhibit scale economies, and production seems to be 
technically inefficient in both performing arts institutions and museums. Notwithstanding 
this, there are grounds to suspect that production technology varies significantly between 
different kinds of producers: staging an opera piece by Wagner is likely to differ 
radically from setting up an exhibition of water colors by Turner. 
Second, the previous studies scarcely discuss about the methodological issues and 
explicitly argue for the methodological choices. This is partly due to the fact that the 
research has been to a great extend driven by policy concerns: the research topics, rather 
than methodologies have dominated the discussion. 27 The proliferation of methodological 
tools has, however, instigated a need to discuss the applicability and relative performance 
of different (econometric) methods in more detail. In the case of cultural services three 
main points are of particular interest - besides the main stay arguments for the usage of 
particular methodologies - as to the choice of methodology: caveats deriving from 
available data sets, conceptual and measurement problems related to inputs, output(s) and 
quality, as well as level of a priori knowledge on the production technology. 
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This thesis builds on the three empirical traditions - productivity, scale properties and 
efficiency - as to analyse production of cultural services. The two over-arching themes 
of the thesis are the differences and similarities of production amongst different types 
of producers of cultural services, as well as factors affecting the methodological choices. 
This thesis endeavours to demonstrate, with respect to the three research traditions, that 
features of production differ significantly across different types of producers, as well as 
advocates discussion on methodological choices. 
2 Definitions of the basic concepts 
Representation of production presupposes an input bundle, output bundle, and illustration 
of the input and output correspondences, i. e. production technology, that indicate how 
inputs are turned into output(s). The production technology can be approached either 
from the perspective of inputs or output(s). The former perspective defines production 
technology in terms of minimisation of inputs at a given output level, while the latter 
determines production technology in terms of maximisation of output(s) with given 
inputs. Moreover, the production technology, either input or output oriented, can be 
modeled either in a quantity or price space. This means, that input and output bundles 
can be defined either in terms of quantities or prices, and hence, the production 
technology - correspondence between input and output - can be defined in terms of 
quantities, prices or a combination of thereof. 28 
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Traditionally, the correspondence between inputs and output has been modelled as a 
production function. 29 The production function is an output oriented representation of 
technology: production technology can be modeled in a quantity space as a 
transformation of a n-dimensional vector of non-negative inputs x into a (m-n)- 
dimensional vector of non-negative output, i. e. y= f(x). The production function is 
generally assumed to represent the maximum output for given inputs, and some 
additional properties are generally posed in order f(x) to represent a well behaving 
production function that depicts the economic behaviour presupposed in neoclassical 
economic theory. " 
A cost function, in turn, is an input oriented representation of technology in a quantity- 
price space which represents the minimum inputs required to produce a given output(s). 31 
Assuming a vector of strictly positive input prices p, the cost function can be written as 
a following minimisation problem: 
c(p, y) = mint [p "x: xE V(y)] 
in which V(y) is the input requirement set that has to be non-empty and closed in order 
the cost function c(p, y) to exist. In this definition the input requirement set V(y) and the 
producible output set Y* define the input output correspondence: the input requirement 
set V(y), contains all the input bundles x that can produce output level y, i. e. V(y) = {x 
: (x, y) E Y}, whereas Y* includes all output bundles that appear in the production 
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possibility set Y, that includes those pairs of input and output bundles (x, y) with which 
y can be produced by using x, i. e. Y* = {yI(x, y) E Y}. Furthermore, a well-behaving 
cost function has the properties of (1) non-negativity, (2) non-decreasingness in p, (3) 
non-decreasingness in y, (4) positive linear homogeneity in p, (5) concavity and 
continuousness in p, and (6) differentiability. 32 
As seminally pointed out by Shephard (1953), cost and production functions can be 
alternatively used to represent the same input output correspondence. 33 This feature is 
captured in the theory of production duality which implies that under certain conditions 
it is possible to derive from the cost function the underlying dual production technology. 
The starting point of a representation of the dual relationship is that the cost function 
represents the cost minimising points of all isoquants, in given input prices for all output 
levels. Hence, the cost function presents all the cost minimising points of the input 
requirement set V(y) in given factor prices. In order for the cost function to describe also 
the economically inefficient production possibilities the factor prices p are let to vary 
over all possible price vectors. This yields V*(y), which is defined as V*(y) _ {x: px >_ 
px(p, y) = c(p, y) for all pz 0). The focal point of the duality is, thus, under what 
conditions the input requirement set derived from the cost function V*(y) corresponds 
the true V(y). It has been proven that V*(y) equals V(y) when V(y) is regular, convex, 
and monotonic. 34 In case the original technology is convex and monotonic, the cost 
function can be used to reconstruct completely the underlying production technology. 
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And vice versa, if the cost function is non-decreasing in both y and p as well as linear 
homogenous and concave in p, the cost function will accurately describe the production 
technology. In this sense McFadden (1979) calls the cost function a "sufficient statistic 
for all the economically relevant characteristics of the underlying technology". 35 
Notwithstanding whether the input-output correspondences are represented in quantity 
or quantity-price space, the most relevant characteristic of technology has traditionally 
been the scale economies. The scale economies generally refer to the proportional 
changes in the size of technology. The elasticity of scale E (y, x), that can be derived 
from the production function, is a measure of output variation associated with a 
simultaneous change in all inputs in same proportion. Formally, the elasticity of scale 
can be written as E=ä In f(Xx)/ö In X L=1 . The alternative measures - elasticity of size 
and cost flexibility - are derived from the cost function and measure the effect of output 
change on costs. The elasticity of size is the reciprocal of the cost flexibility that is 
defined as the first derivative of the cost function with respect to output. In fact, the 
concept of cost flexibility n(p, y) measures the elasticity of cost with respect to output, 
and it can be written as n(p, y) = [ac(p, y)/äy]y / c(p, y) = öln c(p, y) / aln y. The 
interpretation of this is that if n(p, y) > 1, smaller size production is more cost effective, 
and if n(p, y) < 1, there are cost advantages in larger sized production. As noted, the 
elasticity of size E *(p, y) is the reciprocal of cost flexibility, i. e. E *(p, y) = 1/n(p, y). 36 
According to this an enterprise exhibits decreasing economies of size if E *(p, y) < 1, and 
increasing returns to size if E* (p, y) > 1. 
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The focal point to note is that the scale elasticity E (p, y) and the size elasticity E *(p, y) 
are equivalent only if the production technology, and subsequently both the production 
and cost functions, exhibit homotheticity. The homotheticity - introduced into economics 
again by Shephard (1953) - indicates that an increase in output does not alter the relative 
utilisation of inputs, i. e. cost function is separable. In the framework of cost functions 
this, furthermore, implies that since an increase in output does not alter the relative 
utilisation of inputs the cost shares of inputs do not alter. In fact, in such a case the cost 
function can be written as a separable function in output and factor prices, i. e. c(p, y) = 
h(y)g(p). As is well known, homotheticity is also a pre-requisite of homogeneity of 
production technology with respect to output: homogeneous technology with respect to 
output implies e. g. that the level of scale (dis-)economies does not increase/decrease 
when the output expands. 37 
Besides the scale properties of production, the performance of a producer in turning 
inputs into outputs is generally assessed by using the notion of productivity. In fact, 
productivity depicts how well inputs are transformed into outputs: the higher the 
productivity the less inputs are required to produce more output. Usually, productivity 
is determined in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) that is defined as a ratio of an 
index of outputs to an index of inputs. 38 The variations of productivity between 
producers and over time have been of particular interest. Traditionally, productivity has 
been assumed to vary, pace Solow (1957), solely due to technical change that refers to 
a change in production technology, i. e. input output correspondence. Recently, 
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productivity has been, however, interpreted as a result of a net change in output due to 
technical change, changes in efficiency and environment in which production takes place. 
The change of productivity in time - productivity growth - has generally been defined 
as a change in TFP in time. 
Efficiency can be defined by comparing observed and optimal values of output produced 
and inputs utilised. Again, this comparison can be either output or input oriented - 
efficiency can be defined as the ratio of observed to maximum potential output 
obtainable from the given input, or as the ratio of minimum potential to observed inputs 
required to produce a given output level. 39 In both of these comparisons optimum is 
defined in terms of difference between the actual production and optimal feasible 
production possibilities determined by the production technology. Hence, this type of 
efficiency is called technical efficiency. 
Traditionally, technical efficiency is defined either in terms of Koopmans efficiency or 
Debreu-Farrell efficiency. As demonstrated by Lovell (1993), according to Koopmans 
(1951) a production unit (input-output vector) is technically efficient if increasing any 
output or decreasing any input is possible only by decreasing some other output or 
increasing some other input - Koopmans definition requires efficiency in all inputs and 
outputs. The definition pace Debreu (1951) and Farrell (1957) is less stringent: a 
production unit is Debreu-Farrell -efficient if an equiproportionate increase in all outputs 
(an equiproportionate decrease in all inputs) is not possible when input usage (output 
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level) remains the same. 4° This definition requires efficiency only in at least one input 
(or output), and thus, Debreu-Farrell technical efficiency is necessary, but not a sufficient 
condition for Koopmans technical efficiency. 4 
In addition to technical efficiency, efficiency includes also the notion of allocative (or 
price) efficiency. Allocative efficiency- introduced by Farrell (1957) - implies that inputs 
are employed in optimal proportions in terms of prevailing market prices, and that 
production process is economically efficient. In more detail, production is allocatively 
efficient where the ratios of market prices for inputs equal to corresponding marginal 
rates of technical substitution: allocative efficiency is often defined residually as the 
ratio of cost efficiency to the Debreu-Farrell input-oriented measure of technical 
efficiency. Cost efficiency, in turn, is generally defined as the ratio of minimum feasible 
cost - given technical and allocative efficiency - to the observed actual cost. Hence, a 
producer is cost efficient if and only if it is technically and allocatively efficient: cost 
efficiency requires that the producer employs, in addition to technical efficiency, an input 
mix as to minimise the costs, i. e. inputs are combined in optimal proportions in light of 
prevailing market prices. A cost efficient production unit is, thus, allocatively as well as 
technically efficient, but allocatively efficient unit is not necessarily cost efficient. 
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3 Themes of the thesis and research questions 
As noted, this thesis builds on the three empirical traditions - productivity, scale 
properties and efficiency - as to analyse production of cultural services and consists of 
four articles. Each article forms an independent analysis of a facet of production of 
cultural services, but contributes to the over-arching themes of the thesis: features of 
production technology and their variation across different types of producers, as well as 
choice of methodology. 
The four articles proceed in "chronological" order. The first article deals with problems 
shared by all subsequent studies, namely definition and measurement of inputs, output(s) 
and quality. The second article focuses on the earliest strand of empirical cultural 
economics and in the context of B-B thesis examines the assumption of stagnant 
productivity in Finnish orchestras. The third article takes on the scale economies and 
looks at the features of production in Finnish theatres, whereas the fourth article 
addresses the question of efficiency and assesses cost efficiency of Finnish museums. 
Notwithstanding the different methodologies, all four articles employ an input (cost) 
oriented approach that represent production technology in a quantity-price space. The 
reason for this is twofold: first, data on economic aspects - rather than technical aspects 
- of production has been available and data reliable, and moreover, information on 
economic aspects of production are considered to be of more interest as to policy making 
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and management of individual institutions than information on technical aspects of 
production. It should, however, be noted that each of the four articles is based on 
different data sets, methodologies, and perspectives, and hence, can be read as a self- 
contained study. Most of the articles have been published as selfcontained studies. 42 
3.1 The first article 
The first article tackles the question that is relevant in each of the three latter articles, 
namely the measurement of inputs (input prices) and output(s). Besides this, possibilities 
to capture quality of production in empirical analyses are discussed. The aim of the 
article is, first, to show how the previous empirical applications have solved the 
measurement problems - the seminal empirical applications are shown to assume single- 
output production and to employ relatively similar measures for both inputs (prices) and 
output, irrespective the type of the institution, whereas the more recent applications use 
multi-output framework. Furthermore, the article suggests proxies for input prices and 
output(s) to be employed in the three subsequent empirical articles. 
The possible proxies for output(s) and quality are explored by using neo-classical single- 
output cost functions and Structural Equations Modeling (SEM). The cost functions are 
employed primarily to underline the fact that the choice of the proxy for output has a 
significant effect on the results. Altogether four different single-output cost functions are 
estimated by using four different proxies for output. Besides this, a model with a proxy 
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for quality of output is estimated. SEM, in turn, is utilised to explore possible measures 
for output in a multi-output setting. SEM approach is employed for two main reasons: 
the method allows to use latent variables to capture the evasive output, and besides this, 
the method incorporates means to test each and every relation of a given model. Both 
applications use a cross-sectional data set of 164 Finnish museums, year 1991. 
The article proceeds in four stages. The measures for input (prices), output(s) and quality 
employed in the previous studies are first discussed. Then the data set of the two 
subsequent empirical applications is introduced. The application of cost functions is set 
off by putting forward the parameterisation of the single-output cost function that is 
followed by the estimates and their interpretation. After this, it is turned towards the 
multi-output setting and introduction of the SEM approach together with the subsequent 
results. Lastly, some concluding remarks are made. 
3.2 The second article 
The second article revisits the B-B thesis, and focuses on productivity growth in 
orchestras. The aim of the article is to test the assumption of stagnant productivity 
growth, given cost efficient production pace Baumol and Bowen (1966), as well as to 
explore possible causes of stagnant productivity growth. The article, moreover, casts 
some light to the features of the underlying production technology: homotheticity and 
scale properties of production. The assumption of stagnant productivity, and its possible 
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causes, is examined by using index numbers together with neo-classical cost functions. 
The analyses utilise a panel data set of 19 Finnish symphony orchestras from 1978 to 
1995. 
Two different index number approaches are employed: the traditional Törngvist 
approximated Divisia index that assumes competitive markets and constant returns to 
scale, and a generalised Divisia index, that allows to relax the assumption of constant 
scale economies. Of these, the former approach interpretes productivity growth equal to 
technical change, while the latter interpretates productivity growth to result both from 
technical change and scale properties of production. The two indices, that both allow to 
analyse productivity growth at firm level, are used for two main reasons. The 
computationally convenient indices are used, first, to demonstrate that the assumption 
of stagnant productivity holds in the case of symphony orchestras, even if the origins of 
stagnant productivity differ from the ones put forward by Baumol and Bowen (1966). 
Second, the two alternative approaches are used as to assess relative performance of the 
two indices in analysing production of cultural services - whether the more rudimentary 
Törngvist index suffices, or whether the more elaborate generalised index is required. 
The article proceeds in four stages. The data set of the study is first described, with an 
emphasis on the existence of an earnings gap and its growth rate in time. Then the 
concept of productivity growth is introduced. The application of the indices is started by 
presenting the formulation of the traditional Törngvist approximated Divisia index 
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together with the calculated indices of productivity growth. After this, it is turned 
towards the generalised indices. Since the generalised Divisia index necessitates 
information on scale properties of production, a trans-log formulation of single-output 
cost function is introduced as well as the estimates of the size elasticities. Then the 
formulation of the generalised Divisia index is put forward, together with the generalised 
productivity growth indices. Lastly, the results of the two subsequent calculations are 
compared and concluding remarks are made. 
3.3 The third article 
The third article looks at allocative efficiency of theatres. The aim of the article is, first, 
to test whether theatres combine inputs in optimal proportions in light of prevailing 
market prices, and moreover, to cast light to the features of the underlying production 
technology: homotheticity, partial elasticity of substitution between labour and capital, 
labour intensity of production, as well as scale properties of production. The article 
employs cost functions, both as to test the allocative efficiency and to examine the 
underlying production technology, as well as a panel data set of 37 Finnish theatres 
1985-1993. 
Both neo-classical cost functions as well as non-linear generalised cost functions are 
employed. The neo-classical cost functions are used first and foremost to produce 
starting values for the non-linear estimations, but also to act as a reference point. The 
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non-linear generalised cost functions, in turn, are used since they enable to test allocative 
efficiency - that is modeled by using the notion of shadow input prices - as well as to 
assess the extend of allocative inefficiency. The generalised cost function is formulated 
as a flexible trans-log cost function since the trans-log functional form allows to test 
homotheticity, homogeneity as well as substitutability between inputs. 
This article proceeds in four stages. The notion of shadow cost function is first 
established as a generalisation of a neo-classical cost function. Then the data set is 
introduced. The estimations are initiated by computation of the neo-classical cost 
functions as system of equations and this is followed by estimation of a non-linear 
shadow cost function. After this, the assumption of allocative efficiency is tested, extent 
of allocative inefficiency is calculated, and features of production technology are 
outlined. Lastly, some concluding remarks are made. 
3.4 The fourth article 
The fourth article concentrates on cost efficiency of museums. The aim of the article is 
to assess relative cost efficiency both across different museum types (art, culture 
historical, special, nature historical and culture historical museums) and across all 
museum types. Besides this, a point is made about differences in cost efficiency between 
privately owned and publicly run museums (museums owned by associations, 
foundations or funds vs. museums owned by the state, towns or municipality). 43 The 
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article utilises a cross-sectional data set of 129 Finnish museums in 1996, as well as a 
non-parametric input (cost) oriented Free Disposal Hull (FDH) method that allows usage 
of multiple outputs. 
The FDH method is employed, most importantly, since the method does not necessitate 
definition of a functional form for the underlying production technology: a museum 
produces multiple outputs, whence correspondence between inputs and outputs is difficult 
to define formally. 44 The method enables, moreover, to examine relative performance of 
institutions that is of interest both to policy makers as well as to the management of the 
individual institutions - FDH establishes the best practice producers and compares the 
rest of the producers to this bench mark. The input (cost) oriented approach is chosen, 
since the orientation provides, besides the institution specific efficiency scores, also 
information on excess spending in individual institutions. 
The article proceeds in four stages. First, the data set is described. After this the FDH 
method is introduced with an emphasis on showing that FDH and DEA applied in the 
previous studies are nested. Then, the calculations of efficiency scores across different 
museum types are carried out. The same calculations are then repeated across all 
museums due to possible sparsity biases, outliers and existence of efficiency by default 
in the sample of the museums. The differences in cost efficiency between privately and 
publicly owned museums are then assessed. Lastly, some concluding remarks are made. 
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4 Data sets 
As noted, each of the four articles is based on a different data set. The first article uses 
a cross-sectional data set of 164 Finnish museums in 1991, the second article utilises a 
panel data set of 19 Finnish symphony orchestras from 1978 to 1995, and the third 
article is based on a panel data set of 37 Finnish theatres 1985-1993, whereas the fourth 
article utilises a cross-sectional data set of 129 Finnish museums in 1996. Two different 
cross sectional data sets on museums are used since a more recent data set was available 
at the time of writing the fourth article. 
All four data sets are based on the official annual statistics. The annual reports on 
museums are published in "Museotilasto 1991, Julius - Suomen Museoliitto Tiedottaa", 
Suomen Museoliitto (The Finnish Museum Association) and "Museotilasto 1996", 
Museovirasto (The National Board of Antiquities). The annual reports on orchestras are 
published yearly in "Toimintakertomus: Tietoja jasenorkestereista kalenterivuodelta", 
Suomen Sinfoniaorkesterit ry (The Association of Finnish Symphony Orchestras), while 
the annual reports on theatres are published in "Teatteritilastot", Suomen 
Teatterijärjestiijen Keskusliitto (The Finnish Theatre Association). The data set of each 
article is compiled from these reports - the data is, in each case, inputed into PC and 
processed into an analysable format by the author. "' Detailed descriptive statistics and 
information on how the data set is processed are presented in each article. 
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Endnotes 
1. The Association of Cultural Economics was founded in 1973. The Journal of Cultural 
Economics has been published since 1977 and the first (bi-annual) conference was held 
in 1979 in Edinburgh. 
2. See Bekemans (1989) for a nuanced classification of different branches of Cultural 
Economics. 
3. It should be noted, that the categorisation by Throsby (1994) omits from the research 
tradition studies on sports as well as socio-cultural activities which are included in the 
classification of cultural sector by UNESCO. Actually, UNESCO (STC/Q/883) classifies 
cultural sector to include cultural heritage, printed matter and literature, music, 
performing arts, socio-cultural activities, and sports and games. See Heilbrun and Gray 
(1993) for a convenient working definition of cultural sector for the purposes of 
economic analysis. 
4. In practice the definition of jazz by Louis Amstrong is sufficient also as to the works 
of art. According to Throsby (1994) Amstrog has allegedly pointed out when asked to 
define jazz that "if you gotta ask, you ain't never going to know. " 
5. An exception to this are reproductions and copies of arts works. See e. g. Pommerehne 
and Granica (1995) for a detailed discussion and an empirical application on the markets 
of reproductions. See Gary (1983) for discussion of forgeries. 
6. See Schneider and Pommerehne (1983) for discussion on the determinants of aesthetic 
quality of arts works. See McCain (1980) for discussion on information asymmetries 
related to aesthetic quality judgements. 
7. The primary markets are such that unorganized individual artists provide works to 
galleries, local art fairs and exhibitions, small dealers, and private buyers, while the 
secondary markets include transactions between established artists, dealers, and public 
and private collectors. See Jyrämä (1998) for characterisation of the secondary markets 
in Finland, Sweden, France and UK. 
8. See Guerzoni (1995) for fierce criticism of the Reitlinger's series. Guerzoni (1995) 
argues that the data set, as well as most time series data sets on official auction sales, 
suffer from significant distortions. These distortions arise, first, from "the absence of data 
relating to the identify and the profession of the market agents involved in the 
transactions recorded in time series", and second, from " the criteria of selection adopted 
to construct the historical series of prices. " See Frey and Eichenberger (1995) for more 
general criticism of the rate of return studies. 
9. Besides the great variability in the results on rate of return, the studies also differ in 
terms of methodologies. Two main methods have been the single sales -method and 
multiple sales -method. The single sales method assesses price changes of art works 
basing on average prices of similar kind of works in respective years, while the multiple 
sales method uses observations of sales of the same piece at different time points. The 
former approach is problematic since the average prices in one market may fluctuate 
considerably e. g. due to a sale of a single Van Gogh. The latter approach, that is most 
generally employed, is problematic due to reduced number of observations as well as the 
fact that the time period between the sales is not accounted for. 
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10. For criticism of the treatment see Buelens and Ginsburgh (1993). 
11. The seminal studies of the same strand include e. g. Anderson (1974) and Stein 
(1977). 
12. Numerable studies on artists employment have been conducted basing on Finnish 
data sets. See e. g. Karhunen (1996), Heikkinen (1995) as well as Heikkinen and 
Karhunen (1996). These studies have assessed the effects of professional training and 
gender on employments and income levels. Besides this, the studies have looked at 
effects of direct public support on the economic situation of artists. 
13. Alternative presentation of the "superstar" phenomenon has been provided e. g. by 
Adler (1985) and MacDonald (1988). 
14. The B-B thesis is implicitly based on Baumol's more general work on two sector 
models. See Baumol (1970, first edition 1951) for the seminal formulation of the implicit 
model. 
15. Studies on economic rationales for public subsidies to cultural institutions is by far 
the most researched topic of Cultural Economics. The topic has inspired, even as late as 
early 1980's, various volumes of collected articles: examples of this are e. g Blaug (ed. ) 
(1976), Hendon et al. (eds. ) (1980), Shanahan et. al. (eds. ) (1982), Hendon and Shanahan 
(eds. ) (1983), and Chartland et al. (eds. ) (1987). See also the seminal contribution by 
Netzer (1978) on public subsidies. See Taalas (1993) for discussion and an account of 
the literature on public subsidies to the arts. 
16. The survey by National Endowment for the Arts (1992) on US production and 
consumption of cultural services revealed that in 1990 $5 billion was spent on 
admissions to theater, opera, galleries, and other not-for-profit arts events (more than on 
admissions to spectator sports), $4.1 on movie admissions and $17.6 on books. Some one 
per cent of US labour force was involved in production of cultural services (theater, 
music, opera, dance, visual arts, crafts, literature, community and folk arts). 
Consumption and production of culture was estimated to account for one per cent to 2.5 
cent of the GDP depending on the definition of cultural sector. 
17. The merit good argument suggests that production and consumption of arts is 
advantageous by nature, and thus, should be publicly subsidised. The argument has been 
criticised, most importantly, due to its paternalistic overtones: consumers know well 
enough what is good for them, and because of this public intervention to the markets is 
not desirable. The most original merit good argument by far has undoubtedly been put 
forward by Scitovsky 
. 
(1972) who argued that production and consumption of arts 
prevent criminal activities, and hence, arts being meritious. 
18. Such a line of inquiry became particularly appealing after the launch of the project 
"The Program on Non-Profit Organizations" in Yale in 1977. Examples of spill-overs of 
the program are e. g. Rose-Ackerman (ed. ) (1986), Powell (ed. ) (1987), and James (ed. ) 
(1989) for the Yale tradition, and others e. g. Bekemans (1989), Gui (1989), and O'Hagan 
and Purdy (1993). 
19. See DiMaggio (1987) for an extensive description of the characteristics of not-for- 
profit producers of cultural services. 
20. Throsby and Withers (1986) suggest that on average the Australian taxpayers 
willingness to pay exceed the current tax liability as to cultural sector. Morrison and 
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West (1986), in turn, found out in the Canadian case that the current level of tax 
expenditure was adequate, and that "The relevant external benefits appear to have been 
already captured (internalized) via current public expenditures. " 
21. There is a vast amount of studies on e. g. music and film industries, so to say, 
production of mass media. As noted, these industries have, however, been excluded form 
the sphere of this thesis. See for example Heilbrun and Gray (1993) for an over view 
of the studies on mass media. 
22. This finding has been confirmed also in a great variety of surveys of public 
participation in the arts. See O'Hagan (1996a, 1996b) for analyses of effects of income 
levels and educational attainment to access and participation in the arts, in US and in 
Ireland and US respectively. 
23. The sole theoretical model with a reference to museums is the model of private 
production of excludable public goods by Brito and Oakland (1981). The model assumes 
first, that museums (among other similar producers) produce excludable public goods, 
i. e. public goods for which exclusion by means of pricing is cost-less, second, that 
underlying production technology exhibits economies of scale, and third, that production 
is unique due to locational considerations. 
24. See Taalas (1995) for an application of a mixed oligopoly model of production of 
cultural services. In the treatment the model by Bester and Petrakis (1993) is used as a 
basis of a numerical simulation of incentives for cost reduction in a differentiated 
industry. This simulation suggests that with the simulated parameter values the 
profitability of a cost reduction in the social optimum is always higher than in a private 
oligopoly or a mixed oligopoly. This means, that both private and mixed oligopolies 
leads to under-investment in a cost reduction relative to the social optimum. Besides this, 
the profitability of a cost reduction for the private firm is higher in a private duopoly 
than in a mixed one. In the mixed oligopoly there is highest incentive for a cost 
reduction for the private firm if the public agency resembles a for-profit firm than when 
the public agency pursues mainly the consumer surplus. In all these cases the 
profitability of the cost reduction decreases when the degree of product differentiation 
increases. 
25. Increased interest in museums is reflected in emergence of particular workshops in 
economics of museums e. g. University of Venice summer school in 1992 and 
conference in Economics of Museums in University of Durham spring 1997 as well as 
publications by Pearce (ed. ) (1991) and Feldstein (1991). 
26. Since the non-parametric methods provide information on relative performance as 
well as level of excess spending, they are clearly public policy oriented. This is reflected 
in the fact, that all applications on production of cultural services have been done in 
European countries in which public subsidies are of great importance. The new tradition 
appears as the first European driven line of inquiry. 
27. This is demonstrated partly by the fact that receptiveness of new methodologies has 
been relatively low in Cultural Economics. 
28. See Färe et al. (1994) for a detailed description of possible representations of the 
production technology in quantity or price space, or a combination of thereof. 
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29. The formulation and estimation of production functions was introduced to Economics 
in the seminal paper "A Theory of Production" by Cobb and Douglas in 1928. See Fuss 
and McFadden (1979) as well as Chambers (1989) for more detailed accounts of the 
introduction of production functions. 
30. As is well known, a bare production function yields the maximum obtainable output 
from a given input vector, but does not as such provide a sufficient basis to support the 
neoclassical economic theory. See Fuss and McFadden (1979) or Chambers (1989) for 
a detailed account of the properties of a well behaving production function. 
31. As pointed out by Chambers (1989), Nerlove was first to utilise in 1963 cost 
functions instead of production functions in empirical analysis. The pioneering study 
centered on estimation of returns to scale in electricity supply. 
32. The non-negativity of cost function (c(p, y) >0, p>0 and y> 0) implies, that if 
input prices p are strictly positive and y is non-zero, the cost of producing a positive 
output is positive. The non-decreasingness in input prices p indicates, that increasing any 
input price must not decrease cost when the producible output bundle is fixed. (if p' _> 
p, then c(p', y) >_ c(p, y)) The non-decreasingness in terms of output y suggests, that an 
increase in output cannot decrease costs. (if y >_ y', then c(p, y) >_ c(p, y')) The property, 
that the cost function is positively linearly homogeneous in input prices p in turn 
indicates, that if an input bundle x is cost minimising at a strictly positive price vector 
p, and if all prices are multiplied by a positive scalar 0, then x is the cost minimising 
bundle and the level of minimum cost is multiplied by 0 (c(Op, y) = Oc(p, y), 0> 0). The 
property of concavity and continuousness suggests, that c(Op + (1 - 8)p', y) > Oc(p, y) 
+ (1 - 8)c(p', y), for 0 <_ 0 <_ 1 and c(p, y) is continuous as a function of p, for p»0. 
The differentiablity in p pre-requests a unique vector of cost minimising demands, that 
equals gradient of cost function c(p, y) in p. This property, known as Shepard's lemma, 
implies that it is possible to derive cost minimising demands of all inputs from a well- 
behaving cost function. Using Shephard's lemma yields x; (p, y) = äc(p, y)/öp;. Hence, the 
vector of derivatives of cost function with respect to prices gives the vector of cost 
minimising input demands. For proof see Chambers (1989). See e. g. Shephard (1970), 
Diewert (1974), McFadden (1979) or Chambers (1989) for presentations of the properties 
and their relation to production function. 
33. McFadden (1979) points out that the theory of production duality has its beginnings 
in the work by Hotelling in 1932, Roy in 1942, Hicks in 1946 and Samuelson in 1947. 
The pioneering study by Shephard (1953), however, was the first inclusive treatment of 
the subject as well as exhibition of the formal proof of the duality of cost and 
production. 
34. For the proof see McFadden (1979). 
3 5. See Fare et al. (1994) for a detailed proof the theory of production duality in a more 
general setting. 
36. In general the latter concept, elasticity of size is used rather than the concept of cost 
flexibility. This is because the interpretation of the elasticity of size is analogous to the 
elasticities of scale, whereas interpretation of cost flexibility is vice versa. This means 
that when the elasticity of size is greater than one there is increasing returns to size, 
whereas cost flexibility greater than one implies diseconomies of size. 
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37. See Chambers (1989) for a detailed presentation of homotheticity and homogeneity 
with respect to output, and their implications to scale economies. 
38. As noted by Kendrick and Vaccara (1980), prior to World War II all productivity 
estimates were of the simple output-per-worker or per-hour form. The first empirical 
attempt to measure total factor productivity was made by Tinbergen in 1942, and the 
concept of TFP was further elaborated by Kendrick in 1951. Solow (1957) was, however, 
the first to employ a production function framework, and thus, to establish TFP as an 
operational concept. See Kendrick and Vaccara (1980) for a more detailed account. 
39. See Färe et al. (1994) for a general presentation of the concept of efficiency. 
40. The original Debreu (1951) measure of technical efficiency, the so called "coefficient 
of resource utilization", was the first measure of productive efficiency. It is defined as 
one minus the maximum equiproportionate reduction in all inputs that still allows 
continued production of given outputs. Thus, a score of one implies technical efficiency 
because no equiproportionate input reduction is feasible, while a score less than unity 
describes the level of technical inefficiency. 
41. This means that the radial Debrau-Farrell efficiency may suggest a production unit 
to be efficient when achieving the maximum feasible input savings or output expansion, 
even if there might be a slack in outputs or inputs. This means that a production unit 
(input-output vector) determined efficient on the basis of Debreu's radial measure may 
be technically inefficient on the basis of Koopmans' definition because it may lie on the 
boundary of the production possibilities set, but not on the efficient subset of the 
boundary. See Lovell (1993) for a more detailed account. 
42. The cost function analysis of the first article on musems is published in Uusitalo and 
Ahola (eds. ) (1998) as Taalas (1998a), the second article on orchestras is published in 
Heikkinen and Koskinen (eds. ) (1998) as Taalas (1998b), and the third article on theatres 
is published in Journal of Cultural Economics as Taalas (1997). Besides this, two related 
studies - one on a mixed oligopoly models of production of performing arts and one on 
objectives of museums - in Benhamouet al. (ed. ) (1995) as Taalas (1995) and in Uusitalo 
and Ahola (eds. ) (1998) as Taalas and Uusitalo (1998), respectively. 
43. This is to say that the study participates in the discussion about the relative 
efficiency of the public and private producers where two diverging views have been 
presented. The popular press has maintained that public enterprises are less efficient than 
their private counterparts whereas the empirical evidence as well as theoretical analyses 
have not supported this view. 
44. The FDH method is employed, since FDH necessitates even fever a priori 
assumptions on the underlying production technology than DEA method employed in the 
previous studies. 
45. The kind help of The Finnish Museum Association, The Association of Finnish 
Symphony Orchestras, The Finnish Theatre Association, and the National Board of 
Antiquities in providing the annual reports is acklowledged. 
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11 Measurement of Inputs, Output(s) and Quality in Production of Cultural Services 
- Applications of Trans-log Cost Functions and Stmctural Equation Models 
1 Introduction 
The relative growth of service sector since 1960's has instigated a wealth of studies on 
production of services. ' These studies have centered on economic performance, most 
importantly productivity and efficiency, of a great variety of producers (e. g. banking, 
transport, education, health care and culture) analyses of which involve problems 
2 connected to output measurement. According to Griliches (1992) such measurement 
problems derive from lack of data as well as conceptual problems. The lack of data 
actualises in the fact that generally much more data has been collected on agriculture and 
manufacturing than on services. Conceptual problems "arise because in many service 
sectors it is not exactly clear what is being transacted, what is the output, and what 
services correspond to the payments made to the providers", and moreover, because 
production of services generally incorporate an aspect of quality. As to cultural services, 
both lack of data and conceptual unclarity contribute to the problems connected to 
measurement of inputs, output(s) and quality of production. 
The data sets employed in the pioneering studies on production of cultural services 
reveal the caveats related to data. ' The studies have generally utilised cross-sectional data 
sets including relatively few variables, thus, leading to analyses incorporating a single 
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measure for output and innovative measures for inputs (prices). This is the case for 
example in the analysis by Globerman and Book (1974) who used a data set on 33 US 
symphony orchestras and 27 theatre groups year 1971, in a study by Throsby (1977) who 
pooled cross-sections of variable number of Australian performing arts institutions in 
seasons 1971-1972 and 1974-1975, as well as in the study by Jackson (1988) who 
employed a data set of US museums in 1979 (the number of observations is unclear). 4 
The more recent analyses by Ek (1991 a, 199b, 1994) are good examples of cases in which 
availability of high quality panel data enables analyses with multiple outputs. ' 
Irrespective the quality of data, both the pioneering studies as well as the more recent 
applications have discussed the conceptual problems related to output measurement. Most 
often the problem is solved by stating that the outputs of cultural institutions are artistic 
experiences that include an aspect of quality. The early studies generally operationalise 
these artistic experiences by using either the number of performances or attendance to 
proxy the output, and in some cases this single proxy is accompanied by a proxy for 
quality. The more contemporary studies, in turn, generally employ multiple proxies for 
output, but use no specific measures for the quality aspect of production. Neither the 
early studies nor the more contemporary treatments, however, discuss the problems 
related to measurement of inputs (prices). 
This article concentrates on three main topics. First, the article maps the previously 
employed measures for outputs, inputs (prices) and quality of producers of cultural 
34 
services as well as discusses their applicability. Second, the article examines whether the 
proxy for output affects in a single output setting the assessment of economic 
performance and underlying production technology. Besides this, the article proposes an 
approach that can be used in choosing measures for output in a multi-output setting. The 
approach is based on Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) method that allows to assess 
(latent) unobserved variables as well as includes excellent model specification and testing 
procedures. ' The two subsequent empirical applications employ a cross-sectional data set 
of 164 Finnish museums in year 1991. 
The article proceeds in four phases. The previously employed measures for inputs 
(prices), output(s), and quality are first put forward. After this, a parametrisation of a 
single output translog cost function is briefly presented together with the data set. Single- 
output cost functions are then estimated by using the developed measures for input prices 
and the chosen proxies for output. The main emphasis in this is to demonstrate that the 
choice of the output measure affects the assessment of economic performance. The 
theoretical background of SEM approach is then briefly outlined, and the applicability 
of SEM models in choosing the output measures for multi-output producers of cultural 
services is demonstrated. Possibilities to assess quality of output are then discussed: the 
quality question is dealt with by estimating alternative SEM's for quality as well as 
testing the similarity of professional and non-professional museums. Lastly, some 
concluding remarks are made. 
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2 Output measures for pmducen of cultural services 
The seminal empirical applications and the more recent treatments of cultural institutions 
differ in their operationalisations of output. (See Appendix 1) As noted, the seminal 
empirical applications have generally assumed single output production and measured 
output either by number of performances or visitors (attendance). Lange et al. (1985) 
argue for the use of number of performances in the case of symphony orchestras because 
"on a conceptual level it is difficult to see the relationship between attendance and cost", 
whereas Gapinski (1979) employs attendance since "each member of the audience 
receives a cultural experience from being present, and thus it seems natural to regard 
output as the number of cultural experiences measured by attendance. " Jackson (1988), 
in turn, measures the output of museums by the number of visitors because "it is clear 
that the central measure by which to judge the scale of the operations is attendance. " 
Ek (1991a, 1991b, 1994), Paulus (1993,1995), and Mairesse (1997) - all point out the 
need for multiple measures for output. Ek (1991 a, 1991 b, 1994) applies both attendance 
and number of performances together with number of first nights to proxy the output 
of theatres, while Paulus (1995) defines the output of museums to contain two types of 
services, passive and active services. The passive services include those activities that 
are accomplished without almost any staff, e. g. exhibition of collection, whereas the 
active services include those activities that involve qualified and motivated staff. Basing 
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on this Paulus (1995) applies a multi-output framework and four proxies of output. 
Mairesse (1997), in turn, employs altogether six output measures for museums. 
Besides the differing views on single vs. multiple output production, the treatments differ 
also in their conceptualisations of the quality aspect: while the recent studies do not 
include any proxies for quality, the pioneering studies utilise a variety of measures. ' (See 
Appendix 1) E. g. Globerman and Book (1974) capture quality of performing arts 
institutions by attendance per tour performance and find that an increase in attendance 
per tour performance induces an increase in total costs. Throsby (1977) measure quality 
by the ratio of grants to box office revenue - such a quality measure, included in a total 
cost equation, was positive and statistically significant in the case of theatre groups but 
not statistically significant for other types of performing arts institutions. 
As to the museums Jackson (1988) argues that "neither of these quality measures [the 
ones used by Globerman and Book (1974) or Throsby (1977)] works well in the museum 
setting.... A valid indication of museum quality is the level of esteem with which it is 
held by professionals in the field. " Basing on this, Jackson (1988) uses the accreditation 
by the American Association of Museums (AAM) to capture the quality: the estimated 
cost function includes a dummy variable in which presence of accreditation stands for 
quality. The estimations by Jackson (1988), however, show that quality is a significant 
factor only for history museums in which "accredited museums have 61 % higher 
operating costs than similar unaccredited museums". Jackson (1988) attributes this 
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inability of the dummy variable to capture quality among other types of museums partly 
to "the nature of a dummy variable which does not allow various degrees of museum 
quality. " 
3 Measures of labour and capital inputs (input prices) 
Performing arts institutions as well as museums have generally been assumed to employ 
both labour and capital inputs in their production. 9 (See Appendix 2) The 
operationalisations of labour input (price) have generally been the conventional ones: in 
a cost function framework the unit price of labour input has been measured as the price 
of a man year, whereas in production function as well as Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) settings labour input has been captured by man hours (man years). " 
The operationalisations of capital input (price) have been less conventional. The sole 
application of a production function by Gapinski (1979) introduces a "props and papers" 
approach in which capital input is categorised into "props" that include purchase of rental 
sets, costumes, lights, sound and other stage equipment and "papers" that contain scores, 
scripts and royalties. Lange et at. (1985), in turn, pioneered an approach in which the 
unit price of capital input of symphony orchestras is defined as the ratio of promotional 
expenditures to donations. A similar measure is employed by Jackson (1988) in the case 
of museums, even if he notes that "it would be preferable to utilize a cost index based 
on construction costs and the price of specialized museum equipment and facilities" 
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instead of the measure applied in the study. This is not done due to lack of data and due 
to "considerable merits" of the employed proxy that "measures the price of a museum 
must pay for each dollar raised from its suppliers in its capital markets. "" Besides these 
two measures, the three applications of DEA capture capital input by operating costs. 
4 Application of the measures in a single-output cost function framework 
The effects of the choice of measures for output and input prices are first assessed by 
using neo-classical single-output cost functions and a cross-sectional data set of 164 
Finnish art, culture historical, special, nature historical, regional as well as combined art 
and culture historical museums in year 1991. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data set, year 1991, n= 164 museums, in FIM 1991 
Variable mean st. deviation variance 
TC 0.17044E+07 0.30934E+07 0.95692E+13 
PC 0.11504E+07 0.21116E+07 0.44590E+13 
FTE 6.89 12.15 147.72 
PTE 0.93 1.73 2.98 
RC 0.44072E+06 0.78589E+06 0.61762E+12 
CA 0.11325E+06 0.71949E+06 0.51767E+12 
AQUI 2218.80 5766.10 0.33248E+08 
COLL 50571.00 0.12849E+06 0.16509E+11 
OPEN 1301.80 1152.60 0.13285E+07 
VISI 16979.00 36933.00 0.13641E+10 
NEXB 6.67 7.27 52.87 
NPUB 1.61 2.43 5.90 
List of variables: TC = total costs, PC = personnel costs, FTE = full-time employees, PTE = part-time 
employees, RC = real estate costs, CA = costs of new acquisitions, AQUI = new acquisitions, COLL = 
magnitude of collection, OPEN = yearly open hours, VLSI = number of visitors, NEXB = number of 
exhibitions, NPUB = number of publications 
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In the estimations four different output measures are utilised, namely yearly open hours, 
number of visitors, number of exhibitions, and number of publications. The measures 
for input prices are constructed basing on the assumption that museums use both capital 
and labour inputs in their production. 
The unit price of labour input is defined in a conventional manner as: 
LP = LC/ (FTE + PTE/2) 
in which the total labour costs (LC) are divided by the number of full-time employees 
(FTE) plus a half of the number of part-time employees (PTE). So, the measure gives 
the price of one man-year in a museum. 12 
The unit price of the capital input is, in turn, defined as to reflect the price of collection. 
The reason for this is that the collection is the key capital input of any museum: 
investments into collection attract public subsidies and visitors, and besides this, 
investments in buildings (e. g. stores and exhibition space) and equipment (e. g. for 
conservation or display) are closely connected to the maintenance of existing collection 
and new acquisitions. The unit price of capital is given by: 
CP = (CA/AQUI) + (RC/COLL) 
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in which the first term of the right hand side is the costs of new acquisitions divided by 
the number of new acquisitions and the second term is the real estate costs divided by 
the total magnitude of collection. The first term of the definition, thus, reflects the price 
of new capital stock, while the second term indicates the price of maintaining the 
existing "capital stock". The two termed definition, thus, captures the fact that the price 
of capital increases when the market value of a new acquisition increases through 
decreasing the first term of the definition (assuming that funds for new acquisitions 
remain the same). Besides this, the definition prevents the price of capital being zero 
when a museum does not make new acquisitions because the price of maintaining the 
old "capital stock" is included. 
These two sets of measures - measures for output as well as measures for labour and 
capital input prices - are used together with a single-output cost function. The cost 
function employed here is the flexible translog (TL) cost function introduced by 
Christensen, Jorgenson and Lau (1973). 13 The parameterisation of the TL cost function, 
to which are added the conventional disturbance terms (e), is as follows: 
In c=ao+ ay In y+yyY(1nY)2+Ei aiIn pi +E; Ej-yljIn pi In p, + (1) 
E; -yyiInyinpi+ec 
and the corresponding cost share of the it" input is: 14 
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S; = cx, +yy; In y+ E; 'yijInp, +ei (2) 
in which c represents total costs, y is the output, p; denote prices of inputs. Moreover, 
ao is the intercept, a, and ak are the cost shares of labour and capital respectively, y,,, 
y,, k and y,, are the share elasticities, y, and yyk stand for the biases of scale, and yam, is 
the derivative of elasticity of cost with respect to output. 
Furthermore, in order the TL formulation to represent the dual underlying production 
technology the following regularity conditions have to be met: 
Eiai =1 
Ei7, i =0 Eipyij 
' 
Ejyij = `iEjlyij =0 
In practice, the above definition (1) - (2) yields a system of three equations: a cost 
function and cost share equations for labour and capital inputs respectively. 15 Due to 
technical reasons the other cost share equation is, however, eliminated (by using the 
regularity conditions) from the estimations, and the remaining two equations are 
estimated simultaneously by using multivariate regression. 16 As demonstrated by Barten 
(1969), the choice which of the cost share equations is eliminated from the estimations 
has no effect on the results, hence, the cost share equation for capital input is eliminated. 
The analysis is set off by estimating four alternative models utilising four alternative 
measures for output - yearly open hours, number of visitors, number of exhibitions, and 
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number of publications - and using the full sample of Finnish museums (n=164). The 
estimated models are not, however, acceptable since all regularity conditions are not met: 
none of the four estimated cost functions fulfill the regularity condition of non- 
decreasingness with respect to output. That is to say that for the whole sample an 
increase in output implies decreasing costs, i. e. cr was negative in each model! 
The regularity conditions can be imposed to (1) - (2) by using two alternative 
approaches: either by choosing a more restrictive functional form that a priori satisfies 
the regularity conditions globally or alternatively by finding an output region in which 
the regularity conditions are fulfilled. Since the former approach necessitates a priori 
assumptions on the underlying production technology the latter approach is chosen: the 
sample is truncated to output regions where the translog functional form satisfy the 
regularity constraints in the largest possible region. " 
For the number of visitors the feasible region occurs when attendance is greater than 
1600, implying that museums with fewer than 30 visitors per week are excluded (n = 
122). For the number of exhibitions the feasible region is when aggregate number of 
exhibitions is greater than 1, thus, only museums that arrange at least one exhibition 
besides the base exhibition are included (n = 116). The feasible region for the yearly 
open hours is where the measure is greater than 832: museums that are open less than 
two days per week are excluded (n = 94). The variable number of publications does not 
perform sensibly at any region, and thus, it is omitted from the further estimations. 
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Three cost functions are then estimated by using the truncated samples. Since all three 
estimated cost functions fulfill the regularity conditions, the estimations proceed to 
analyse the underlying production technology in each case. 
The analysis of the underlying production technology is set off by testing homotheticity 
and homogeneity of the production technology with respect to output. This is done by 
using the Likelihood Ratio (LR) test. The LR test is carried out by estimating for each 
measure of output (yearly open hours, number of visitors and number of exhibitions) 
three different models -a model that imposes neither homotheticity nor homogeneity, 
a model that imposes homotheticity (-yy; = 0), and a model that imposes homogeneity 
(, yyi= 0, 'yy}, = 0) - and then calculating the LR test statistics. As shown in Table 2, the 
test statistics for all three models suggest that the null hypothesises of homotheticity and 
homogeneity cannot be rejected, all test statistics remain below the critical value. This 
suggests, most importantly, that the relative utilisation of inputs remain constant when 
output expands. 
Table 2: LR test statistics for homotheticity and homogeneity 
Measure of output Homotheticity Homogeneity 
number of visitors X2(2) = 4.53 X2(3) = 9.01 
number of exhibitions X2(2) = 2.25 X2(3) = 2.48 
yearly open hours X2(2) = 3.06 x2(3) = 4.77 
Critical value X2(2) = 9.21 X2(3) =11.34 
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Homotheticity and homogeneity of the underlying production technology have, moreover, 
a bearing on the assessment of scale properties of production. Generally, the scale 
properties are assessed in a cost function framework by using either the concept of cost 
flexibility or elasticity of size that both measure the effect of output change on cost. The 
cost flexibility can be formally written as aln c(p, y)/äln y that coincides the following 
TL formulation: 
µ(P, Y) = ay + 'y In Y+E1 'Yyi in (P). 
The elasticity of size, in turn, is a reciprocal of cost flexibility, and can be written as: 
n'l(p, y) = (a,. + -yy, In y+Ei -yyi in (pi))-' 
In case production technology exhibits homotheticity, elasticity of size equals to (a}, + 
, yY, In y)"' since homotheticity presumes 'y),; = 0, and alternatively in case technology 
exhibits homogeneity (-y =0 and 'yy .= 
0) cost flexibility equals to p(p, y) = ay. 
Table 3 summarises the estimates of the cost flexibilities and elasticities of size for each 
model and demonstrates that the usage of the number of visitors or exhibitions to proxy 
the output yields estimates that suggest existence of economic gains from large scale 
production. Of particular interest is the similarity of the estimates in these two cases. The 
estimations utilising yearly open hours, in turn, suggest as expected existence of 
diseconomies of scale. These results can be further illustrated in the respective Average 
Cost (AC) curves. '8 (See Appendix 3) 
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Table 3: Cost flexibilities and elasticities of size 
Measure of output Cost flexibility Elasticity of sm 
number of visitors 0.49 2.05 
number of exhibitions 0.38 2.67 
yearly open hours 1.26 0.80 
Besides the differences in cost flexibilities, the models utilising alternative output 
measures also yield different estimates of relative utilisation of inputs as well as price 
elasticities of inputs: if output is measured by yearly open hours production turns out to 
be most labour intensive (85% labour and 15% capital), while when employing number 
of exhibitions technology proves to be least labour intensive (41% labour and 59% 
capital). This suggest that in order to increase the number of exhibitions a museum will 
spent four times as much to capital input, acquisitions and maintaining their collection, 
than when the museum chooses to increase their yearly open hours. 
Table 4: Parameter estimates (std. errors in parentheses) 
Parameter number of visitors number of exhibitions open hours 
ao 0.27 (1.05) 4.78 (0.44) -6.49 (3.18) 
ay 0.49 (0.11) 0.38 (0.18) 1.26 (0.42) 
ak 0.43 (0.04) 0.59 (0.05) 0.15 (0.05) 
a, 0.57 (0.04) 0.41 (0.05) 0.85 (0.05) 
Ykk -0.00 (0.00) -0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.00) 
711 0.02 (0.00) 0.03 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) 
7k, -0.01 (0.00) -0.03 (0.00) 0.009 (0.00) 
By and large the estimations demonstrate that the proxy for output may have a 
considerable bearing on the results in a single output setting. Of interest is that while the 
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results by using either number of visitors or exhibitions are of similar order, the results 
basing on the yearly open hours are radically different. This is not, however, to say 
whether the three proxies capture the same or a totally different aspect of the output of 
museums - the estimations are unable to determine whether the three output measures 
could be used jointly in a multi-output setting. 19 
5 Multiple output framework - Structural Equation Models for output 
The basic idea of SEM is to use measurement models to present relations between latent 
and observed variables. 20 A measurement model can be written as: 21 
X=X: +a (3) 
in which x is a (q x 1) vector of observed random indicators of the latent (unobserved) 
variable t, and 6 is a (q x 1) vector of measurement errors for x respectively. The A; 
coefficients represent magnitude of the expected change in the observed variable for one 
unit change in the latent variable: X is a (q x n) matrix of coefficients relating x to t. 
Besides this, a measurement model contains a (q x q) covariance matrix 68 for the 
measurement errors of x. 22 
In practice, the application of (1) proceeds in five phases: model specification, 
identification, estimation, testing fit and respecification. 23 The specification phase 
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includes outlining of a path diagram, formulation of corresponding equations (e. g x= 
Xý + S), and decomposition of the theoretical E(O). Identification determines whether 
unique values can be found for each parameter of the specified model24, and the actual 
estimations employ a fitting function: 25 
F(S, E(8)), given by F= log IS(O) I+ tr(S E "'(0)) - log 
kI- (p + q). 
The fit of the model (whether the estimated model is consistent with the data) is 
examined by using over all fit measures, such as X2-statistic and goodness-of-fit indices. 
If the specified model does not fit the data, the model is re-specified basing on 
modification indices (NII), Likelihood ratio test (LR), Incremental Fit Index (IF), Normed 
Fit Index (A) and Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 26 
As to the museums, a measurement model can be used to present relations between 
latent output and its observed measures. The basic assumption of a measurement model 
is, thus, that output of museums cannot be directly measured, but output is captured by 
an exogenous unobserved latent variable ý; that consists of multiple observed measures. 27 
In the case of Finnish museums applicability of seven observed measures of output is 
tested, namely yearly open hours (x), number of visitors (x2), number of publications 
(x3), total number of exhibitions (x4), number of permanent exhibitions (x5), number of 
exhibitions produced by the museum (x6), and number of exhibitions produced by other 
museums but displayed at the museum (x, ). 
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For the estimations the observed variables (x) are summarised in a lower triangular 
correlation matrix (R) that is employed to examine three main questions. 28 First, does the 
unobserved latent output of museums Q) consist of all or only some of the observed 
variables x;. Second, whether the output can be modeled by using only one unobserved 
latent construct (; ) or does the output consist of two latent unobserved constructs. Third, 
which of the observed variables (x; ) - yearly open hours, number of visitors, number of 
publications, number of exhibitions, number of permanent exhibitions, number of 
exhibitions produced by the museum, number of exhibitions produced by other museums 
but displayed at the museum - best capture the latent output. 
Table 5: Correlation matrix R of the observed measures for output 
xi X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7 
x, 1.000 
x2 0.392 1.000 
x3 0.339 0.265 1.000 
x4 0.191 0.347 0.176 1.000 
xs 0.408 0.171 0.395 0.193 1.000 
x6 0.146 0.077 0.391 0.168 0.175 1.000 
x7 0.436 0.192 0.440 0.352 0.666 0.705 1.000 
The two first specifications of the measurement model of output - M, and M2 - both 
include a single latent variable E, that is assumed to contain all observed variables x;: 
the hypothesis is that all seven observed variables constitute the output. The difference 
between the two models is in the treatment of the variances of measurement errors 
in M, S; 's are set equal, while in M2 S; 's are estimated without constraints. In 
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both models the scale is set by constraining the variance of the latent construct (ý) 
equal to one. 29 The functional form of both models can be written as: 3o 
xi = x11 ý1 + U1 
X2 =X21 t1 +v2 
X3 = X31 1+ V3 
X4 X41 t1+ u4 
X5 = 1t1 
+ V5 






The overall fit measures in Table 6- X2-test statistics, goodness of fit index (GFI), 
adjusted goodness of fit index (AGFI) and the coefficient of determination (R2)3' - 
reveal, that both models are misspecified. 32 The standardised residuals of M, locate the 
specification error to three of the observed variables: number of permanent exhibitions, 
number of exhibitions produced by the museum, and number of exhibitions produced by 
other museums but displayed at the museum. 33 (The largest standardised residual 6.626 
is for x4 - x7, and relatively high positive standardised residuals occur also for x4 - x6 
(4.365), x7 - x2 (3.501), and for x, - x6 (-3.594)). 34 
Because three of the observed variables prove to be "redundant", two re-specified models 
- M3, M4 - are estimated. Both models still consist of one latent variable Q) and the 
observed variables x,, x2, x3 and x4, while the observed variables capturing number of 
permanent exhibitions, number of exhibitions produced by the museum, and number of 
exhibitions produced by other museums but displayed at the museum are excluded from 
the model. The scale of the models is set by setting 4ý equal to one, and moreover, in 
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M, the variances of the measurement errors (S) are set equal, while in M4 measurement 
errors are estimated without constraints. 
Table 6: Overall fit measures for M, - M4 
Model x (df) p-value GFI AGFI R'y 
M, X('20) = 235.03 0.00 0.82 0.74 0.78 
M2 X2(14) = 126.11 0.00 0.83 0.65 0.81 
M3 2(5) = 13.86 0.02 0.96 0.92 0.68 
M4 f(2) = 9.71 0.01 0.97 0.86 0.70 
M5 X2(1) = 2.75 0.10 0.99 0.92 0.87 
M6 X2(4) = 9.21 0.06 0.97 0.93 0.79 
M7 X2(2) = 3.64 0.16 0.99 0.95 0.85 
The overall fit measures in Table 6 suggest that M3 and M4 are again misspecified 
models, though better ones than the more extensive M, and M2.35 This implies, that the 
output of Finnish museums cannot possibly be modelled by a single latent unobserved 
variable, but a model with at least two latent constructs is required. 
The rewritten model M5 divides the single latent construct into two latent constructs that 
are assumed to consist of four observed measures of output. 36 The first latent variable 
(, ) consists of the observed yearly open hours (x, ) and number of visitors (x2), and thus, 
describes the output in terms of the "availability of the service". The other latent 
construct (2) consists of number of publications (x3) and total number of exhibitions 
(x, ), and tries to capture the more "invisible" work of the museums, e. g. research, 
arranging exhibitions as well as art education. 
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The model M5, in which the scale is defined by setting the coefficients A and X42 equal 
to one, can be written as: (See Appendix 4) 
xi = El + U1 X3 = 
X321,2 + U3 
x2-X2ltl +V2 X4-E2+64 
(5) 
The overall fit measures in Table 6 indicate a good fit for M5: X2 -statistic is well below 
the critical value (a = 0.05), the Goodness-of-fit Index indicates that the model fits well 
to the data, and Rey is relatively high. 
To test further the assumptions on the measurement errors two additional models are 
estimated: in M6 the variances of measurement errors bi, i=1,..., 4, are set equal and in 
M, solely S, and 82 are set equal. Table 6 demonstrates that also these two models have 
a good fit: according to the LR test both restrictions on the measurement errors improve 
the fit of the model X2(3) = 6.48 and X2(1) = 0.89. The model selected is, however, M5 
with least restrictions on the parameter estimates. This is because the AIC for M5 is the 
smallest (AIC-M5= 4.75, AIC-M6 = 17.21 and AIC-M7 = 7.64). 37 According to M5 the 
Maximum Likelihood (ML) estimates for k and for 4 are as follows: 38 
Table 7: ML estimates for k and variances and covariances of E, and E2 
Parameter Estimate t-value 
 0,71 3.37 
421 0.43 5.03 
(D22 0.53 3.71 
A 1.00 - 
X2, 0.55 3.50 
X32 0.83 4.68 
1\42 1.00 - 
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These estimates suggest, first, that the two latent variables are well explained by the four 
observed measures of output (the positive and statistically significant parameter estimates 
of variances and covariance of the two latent variables are relatively high). The 
relatively low covariance of E, and ý2, furthermore, support the assumption of two latent 
constructs rather than a single unobserved latent variable. Such a finding can be verified 
by running a test on the correlation between the two latent variables - the hypothesis to 
be tested is that the correlation between the two latent variables equals one (H°: 421= 
1) implying that output consists of a single latent unobserved variable. The hypothesis 
is rejected by the LR test X2(1) = 6.96, confirming that in the case of Finnish museums 
the output consist of two latent variables containing four observed variables (yearly open 
hours, number of visitors, number of publications and number of exhibitions). 
Table 7 reveals, furthermore, that all the standardised estimates for k are positive and 
statistically significant. 39 The estimates for ) demonstrate that yearly open hours is a 
more accurate measure of the first latent output than the observed number of visitors. 
The number of exhibitions, in turn, has a larger loading from the latent variable than the 
observed number of publications, indicating that the former observed variable captures 
better the second latent construct. 
Since the estimated SEM models M, - M5 do not give any idea of possible proxies for 
quality of output - but only casts light on the explanatory power of the suggested 
measures of output - two models are constructed to capture the quality aspect of 
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production. The first model Q, includes a single latent quality that is measured by 
categorical variables that contain education of personnel, and the second model Qz 
captures a single latent quality by using two non-continuous variables indicating the type 
of the museum (art, culture historical, special, nature historical, regional and combined 
art and culture historical museums) and organisational structure of the institution (private 
institutions owned by associations, foundations or firms vs. public museums run by the 
state, municipalities or towns). 40 Neither the former model in which the latent quality 
contained education of the personnel (X2(5) = 440.06), nor the latter model including 
the ownership and type of museums (X2(1) = 24.07) appear, however, to be statistically 
significant. Because of this, the full correlation matrix R, employed in M, - M5, is used 
to capture the quality of production, rather than alternative variables not included in the 
original R. 
The correlation matrix R is, thus, used to test the operationalisation of quality proposed 
by Jackson (1988) who captured quality by presence or absence of accreditation by the 
American Association of Museums (AAM). In the Finnish case, the test is based on the 
categorisation of museums by the Finnish Museum Association (Museoliitto) to 
professional and non-professional museums: a museum is defined as a professional 
museum if and only if the museum employs at least one employee with a university 
degree in art history or equivalent (otherwise the museum is doomed as non- 
professional). Thus, the test is based on the a priori assumption that quality of production 
differs between "professional" and "non-professional" museums. 
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In order to test the applicability of the dichotomy the full sample correlation matrix R 
is divided into two correlation matrices: the data set (n=164) is apportioned into two sub- 
samples of professional museums (P, n=1 15) and non-professional museums (NP, n= 49). 
The comparison of these two sub-sets is lead off by testing whether the correlation 
matrices of professional and non-professional museums are equal. 41 In other words the 
hypothesis to be tested is given by HE: E_ VP, in which superscripts refer to each sub- 
group. The hypothesis is rejected basing on a LR-test - 2(10) = 47.71 - suggesting that 
output of professional and non-professional museums is not necessarily of similar calibre, 
when yearly open hours, number of visitors, number of exhibitions, and number of 
publications are employed to measure the output. This is not, however, to say whether 
the difference derives from differences in quality or some other aspects of production. 
6 Conclusion 
This article has examined measurement of inputs (prices), output(s), as well as quality 
of production in cultural services. Three main questions have been of focal interest: first, 
whether the output of museums constitutes of a single or multiple output(s) and how the 
output can be best measured in either case, second, whether the measure of output affects 
the assessment of the underlying production technology, and thus, policy 
recommendations, and third, whether SEM approach can be used to find proxies for 
output and quality in a multi-output setting. Besides this, the article also pointed out the 
caveats connected to measurement of inputs. 
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The caveats connected to measurement of inputs (prices) were shown to concern mainly 
the capital input (price), while the measurement of labour input (price) has been 
relatively clear cut: labour input (price) is most often measured - both in performing arts 
institutions as well as museums - either by man years or unit price of a man year, in 
which the contribution of volunteers is generally omitted due to lack of data. The ways 
to measure capital input, in turn, vary to a great extend - the measures of capital input 
have ranged from "props and papers" approach to a ratio of promotional expenditures 
to donations. The "props and papers" approach is likely to be problematic since the 
measure adds up actual amounts of capital - i. e. musical instruments, scrips, scores. etc. - 
while the latter measure is inappropriate in the case of publicly subsidised European 
cultural institutions that do not rely on private donations. 
Because of these shortcomings, an alternative proxy of capital input (price) was 
introduced in the case of museums: the unit price of capital was defined basing on the 
collection, and was operationalised as a sum of the unit price of new capital stock and 
the unit price of the existing capital stock. The definition, thus, allows the capital input 
price to increase when the market value of new acquisitions increase, and moreover, 
prevents the price of capital being zero even if a museum does not make new 
acquisitions. As to the performing arts, capital input price could be defined accordingly 
as the ratio of capital costs to seating capacity, in which the seating capacity refers to 
the maximum audience in the permanent venue of a given theatre/orchestra and the 
capital costs include costs that are allocated to the running of the estate, costs being 
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caused by investments or aquiring capital (interests), and costs of staging as well as 
purchases of equipment (stage, lighting, sound equipment, musical instruments, scores 
and scripts). Such a definition would relate the unit price of capital directly to the 
capacity of each institution and attendance. 
Besides the varying practices to measure capital input (price), also the measures of 
output have varied to some extend. Of interest is that while the seminal studies have 
opted for a single output to capture the artistic experience, the more recent studies have 
generally employed multiple proxies for output. The most common proxies for output 
have been the number of visitors and performances, and the multi-output settings have 
included extended combinations of thereof. 
According to most previous studies the assumption of a single-output technology seems 
justifiable in the case of performing arts institutions since their main aim is to provide 
"artistic experiences" to different audiences. This is reflected e. g. in the fact that the 
revenues of the institutions' consist mainly of admission revenues - the visitors are 
willing to pay for the artistic experience that can be measured either by number of 
visitors or performances. The attendance figure was considered a particularly convenient 
proxy of output in institutions that perform mainly in their permanent venue places, such 
as theatres. The number of performances, in turn, was argued to suit to proxy the output 
of institutions that perform also outside their permanent premises, e. g. orchestras 
arranging outdoor concerts. The main reason for the usage of number of performances 
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instead of attendance figures would be that the attendance figures - number of artistic 
experiences - are not necessarily accurate, and thus, the number of performances is used 
to proxy the "quantity" of artistic experiences. 
The early studies on museums have also assumed single output production. The most 
often employed measure of output has been the number of visitors. This single proxy has 
been utilised even if the studies have pointed out the multi-output nature of production 
as well as suggested possible additional measures for output, such as the yearly open 
hours, number of exhibitions, and number of publications. As to the usage of these 
measures in a single output setting, estimations of single output cost functions 
demonstrated that usage of the alternative proxies for output yield different assessments 
of the underlying production technology, and thus, differing policy recommendations: 
while the estimations with number of exhibitions or visitors suggest existence of scale 
economies (elasticities of size of 2.67 in the former case and 2.05 in the latter), and thus, 
promote relatively large production units, the estimations with yearly open hours 
advocate relatively small production units and increasing average cost curves (elasticity 
of size of 0.80 ). 
The constructed SEM's casted more light on the assumption of single-output production 
of museums. The output of Finnish museums was shown to consist of two latent 
unobserved variables. The first latent unobserved output consisted of yearly open hours 
that depict the availability of all services as well as the number of visitors that reflect 
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the number of artistic experiences. The other latent unobserved output included the 
number of publications and exhibitions: the former captures the research activities of a 
museum and it is closely connected to art education, whereas the latter is related 
particularly to accumulation of collection as well as conserving. The estimated SEM's, 
thus, supported the view by Paulus (1995) and Mairesse (1997) on the multi-output 
production of museums. 
The quality aspect of production has been previously captured by using four different 
proxies. The quality aspect of performing arts has been captured by attendance per tour 
performance, ratio of grants to box office revenues as well as a dummy variable picking 
up the characteristics in which the institutions operate. The quality aspect of museums 
has, in turn, been measured by using a dummy variable that represents quality in terms 
of an accreditation of the AAM (or lack of it). A similar variable was tested in the case 
of Finnish museums by using the classification of the museums, pace Finnish Museum 
Association, as to professional and non-professional museums: the estimated SEM's 
suggested that the output of professional and non-professional museums is not identical, 
and the dichotomy may incorporate some aspect of quality. Since the classification rests 
on the amount of university educated personnel the results, however, point out the 
importance of quality differentials of inputs as a determinant of output differentials. 
The more recent studies have not employed self-contained variables for the quality 
aspect. The studies have, instead, implicitly assumed that the utilised output measures 
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capture as such some aspect of quality. Most often such assumption is based on the 
notion that demand or alternatively production costs of the service reflects its quality. 
It is of interest to note that while a relatively high demand/costs of a 
performances/attendance can be quite safely assumed to reflect high quality at least in 
the sense of what Hansmann (1981) calls "lavishness of production" (exceptionally 
skilled performers, lavish staging, and well known pieces). The relatively low 
demand/costs do not, however, necessarily suggest low quality - relatively low 
demand/costs may only suggest that an institution may "choose to produce works that 
appeal only to the most refined tastes, avoiding the more popular items in the repertoire", 
as pointed out by Hansmann (1981). Thus, in the case of cultural services demand/costs 
are not as such a clear cut determinant of the quality aspect, but necessitates additional 
information, e. g. peer assessments, in order to result a meaningful proxy for quality - the 
multi-faceted possibilities to interpret quality in terms of demand/costs puts an emphasis 
on the interpretation of the results. 
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Endnotes 
1. See Griliches (1992) for a detailed discussion and definition of "the slippery concept 
of services". 
2. These measurement problems have been dealt with in few international conferences, 
the latest Conference on Output Measurement in the Service Sectors was organised in 
Charleston, South Carolina, US in 1990. See Griliches (ed. ) (1992) for the selected 
papers of the conference. The first conference on the topic was organised in 1958, 
selected papers of which are collected in a volume labelled Output, Input and 
Productivity Measurement. 
3. Throsby (1994) underlines heavily the "serious constraint imposed on research in 
cultural economics by the lack of comprehensive statistics on the arts industry or its sub 
sectors. " Throsby (1994) goes as far as to argue that "Cultural Economists will need to 
pay greater attention to the collection of new data in future if they wish their work to 
be taken seriously by other researchers or to be useful to policy makers, organizations 
or individuals working in the field. " 
4. An exception to this list is Gapinski (1979) who utilised a high quality panel data set 
1971-1976 of American performing arts institutions - 35 theatres, 27 opera companies, 
77 symphony orchestras, and 10 ballet companies. 
5. Of the more recent studies Paulus (1995) used a cross-sectional data set on 125 
French museums, Mairesse (1997) used a cross-section of 82 Belgian museums year 
1995, whereas Ek (1991a, 1991b, 1994) used in his first study a panel of 23 Swedish 
theatres in 1985-1988, in the second study a panel of 23 theatres form 1976 to 1979 and 
from 1985 to 1988, the third study used data on 21 theatres 1980-1982 and 1990-1992. 
6. See the special issue of Journal of Econometrics vol 22 (1983) for a detailed account 
of the method. 
7. This is the case even if Jackson (1988) points out the multi-output nature of 
production: Jackson (1988) defines museums' activities to include "1) creating a base 
community life through its special programs for members, 2) conserving and preserving 
important artifacts, 3) providing educational opportunities to a variety of age groups, and 
4) developing and presenting special exhibitions". 
8. See Braeutigam (1986) for discussion and treatment of the quality aspect in main stay 
econometric applications. 
9. Exceptions to this are the early studies by Globerman and Book (1974) and Throsby 
(1977). 
10. Gapinski (1979) categorises labour input in a production function framework 
furthermore as primary and secondary inputs. The primary inputs are perceived to be sine 
qua non elements of the production process "without the artist there would be no art" 
and the secondary inputs are not necessary but "some output could occur in their 
absence". Such inputs are e. g. ushers, box office help, maintenance personnel, and 
administrators. 
11. Of interest is that Paulus (1993) applies in a cost function context a measure of 
capital input that is not given in terms of a unit price. 
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12. The contribution of volunteers is omitted due to lack of data, as well as the fact that 
Finnish museums do not utilise volunteers to a large extend. 
13. The reason for the usage of TL formulation is twofold: first, the TL functional form 
is by far the most often applied functional form in estimations of cost functions due to 
its flexibility, and second, the TL formulation has been shown to be "dependable 
approximation of reality provided that reality is not too complex" in Monte Carlo 
estimations by Guilkey and Lovell (1980). See Lau (1986) for discussion on the choice 
of functional forms and Diewert and Wales (1987) on detailed discussion on flexible 
functional forms in general. 
14. As is known from Shephard's lemma xi = ac(p, y)/öp;, which implies that äln c(p, y)/ 
öln p; = p; x; /c. (The cost share of it' -input Si is the first derivative of In c(p, y) with 
respect to p; ). 
15. The estimations are carried out by employing SHAZAM 7.0 program. 
16. In the estimated systems of equations both the cost share of labour and the total costs 
are endogenous variables. As unknown parameters are estimated: the intercept ao, cost 
share of labour when output does not change a,, "cost flexibility" a),, share elasticities 
7i, an d -ykl, biases of scale -yy, and "second derivative of cost flexibility" 'yry. The 
remaining parameters - ak, 'yk, 'Yyk - are derived by using the regularity conditions. 
17. See Röller (1990) for discussion of truncation. Also Jackson (1988) and Lange et al. 
(1985) have omitted from their samples approximately 10% of the institutions, the 
criteria and method remain, however, unclear. 
18. The AC curves are calculated for each model by fixing the input prices to their mean 
values and letting the output level to vary. 
19. Two alternative homogeneous multi-output cost functions - multi-output hybrid 
Diewert (HDMCF) and generalised TL multi-product function (GTMCF) - were 
estimated to examine this. The estimated functions did not, however, yield promising 
results: neither of the multi-output cost functions fulfilled the regularity conditions nor 
performed sensibly at any region. See Lau (1986) for details of the two functional forms 
utilised in the estimations. 
20. A measurement model is actually a part of a full structural equation model that 
consists of a latent variable model and measurement model. See Bollen (1989) or Saris 
and Stronkhorst (1984) for detailed presentations of full structural equation models. 
21. The notation and assumptions are based on the Jöreskog-Keesling-Wiley approach. 
See Saris and Stronkhorst (1984), Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989) and Bollen (1989) for 
more detailed descriptions. 
22. For a measurement model for which the following assumptions hold - E( 8T) = 0, 
E(S) = 0, E() = 0, E(x) = 0, NP - (0, (1, E) - the basic hypothesis is E= F(8), in which 
E is the population covariance matrix of the observed variables x, and F(9) is covariance 
matrix of model parameters. In its general form E(6) consist of E, ß(8) that 
is given by: 
1; , X(0)=XX 4XT+e6. 23. PRELIS 1.1 program is employed to screen and summarise the data set. The actual 
estimations are carried out by using LISREL 7.0 program. 
24. The identification is either to be formally proven for each free parameter of the 
model or by applying the Null B rule, Recursive Rule or the necessary but not sufficient 
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t- rule. See Leskinen (1989), Saris and Stronkhorst (1984), as well as Bollen (1989) for 
detailed presentations of the identification rules. 
25. It should be noted, that there is a fundamental difference of the structural equation 
procedures compared e. g. to multiple regression, in which the regression coefficients or 
the error variance estimates derive from the minimisation of the residual sum of squares. 
The structural equation models are in turn estimated from, and tested on summary 
statistics namely the covariances or correlations, not evaluated relative to the raw data 
matrix. 
26. The Normed Fit index A can be written as 0= (To - T) / To, in which To is the 
value of the test statistic for the null model and T, is the value of the test statistic for 
the alternative model. IF is formally given by To - T, / To - (df, /N - 1), in which To is 
the value of the test statistic for the null model and T, is the value of the test statistic 
for the alternative model. In practice the value of A and IF lay between 0 and 1, and 
in the literature 0.9 has been proposed as a critical value to stop the revisions. In this 
case it should be noted, that there is no difference between A and IF, however in IF it 
is intended to decrease the dependence of A on sample size and simultaneously 
controlling for degrees of freedom available to evaluate the model of interest. Jöreskog 
and Sörbom (1989), Bollen (1989), and Bollen and Long (1993) provide throughout 
discussions of the various over all fit measures applicable in SEM as well as procedures 
of re-specification of models. 
27. It should be noted, that this generally applied notation of SEM is not in line with the 
notation generally used in applied production theory in which output is generally noted 
by y; and inputs by x;. 
28. The reason for application of correlation matrix (R) instead of covariance matrix (S) 
is that the former is scale free. The use of correlation matrices implies that here the units 
of measurements of the observed variables are not assumed to have a definite meaning 
- e. g. the units of measurement in number of visitors is not similar as the units of 
measurement in collection. See Saris and Stronkhorst (1984) for discussion. However, 
it should be noted, that in case a sample correlation matrix is used to estimate a 
covariance structure the normal asymptotic theory is not necessarily valid. Two necessary 
conditions should be met if one is using the correlation coefficients instead of the 
covariances , namely the scale 
invariance of the model and that the condition diag (E) 
= diag (S). The model is scale invariant if for any diagonal matrix D of positive scale 
factors and any parameter vector 0, there exists another parameter vector 0*, such that 
E(8*) =D E(0)D. The second condition can be assessed by examining the fitted 
residuals. See Joreskog and Sörbom (1989). 
29. Because the ý are latent unobserved variables, their origin and unit of measurement 
are arbitrary: the latent variables do not have a definite scale. The origin of the 
measurement is defined by assuming a zero mean for each variable. The unit of the 
measurement is set by setting a non-zero value for each row of k, and thus, the scale 
of the latent variable is defined in terms of a latent observed variable. Besides this, the 
latent t could be assumed to have an unit variance, and thus be standardised. See 
Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989) for scaling in SEM. 
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30. Direction of causation between a latent variable and indicator is determined by an 
indicator being either a cause or effect indicator. The former is an observed variable that 
causes the latent variable and in the latter case the latent variable causes the observed 
variable. In general, as well as in these estimations, effect indicators are employed. See 
Bollen (1989) for discussion of causation. 
31. The X2 test enables to examine whether the model is consistent with the data. The 
GFI and AGFI, in turn, estimate the extent to which the sample variances and 
covariances are reproduced by the hypothesised model while Rey is a measure of how 
well the observed variables jointly serve as measurement instruments for the latent 
variables. See Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989), Bollen (1989), and Bollen and Long (1993) 
for more detailed discussion. 
32. On the basis of the LR test the equality constraints set on the measurement errors 
should not be posed: X2(6) = 108.92. Besides this, it should be noted, that the equality 
constraints set on the parameter estimates in analysing a correlation matrix may modify 
the model being analysed. 
33. The residuals are examined basing on M, even if the model has a poorer fit thanM2. 
This is because M2 includes a negative error variance (the O is not positive definite) 
indicating a wrong model specification, and thus, the residuals of the model are not 
reported. See Wothke (1993) about discussion on non-positive definite matrices in SEM. 
34. The reason for the high standardised residuals is either that museums have differing 
practises in categorising their exhibitions or some degree of collinearity between the 
variables in the data set. In SEM collinearity can be detected either from the simple 
bivariate correlation coefficients indicating relatively high coefficients between cetrain 
variables or by examining the eigenvalues and eigenvectors. For a more detailed 
discussion see Whotke (1993), according to whome collinearity in SEM can be corrected 
by omitting variables that are recognised redundant, reducing number of variables and/or 
gathering more data in a case of a small data set or by matrix smoothing and carrying 
out estimations by using the IJLS method. 
35. The LR test indicates that the restrictions on measurement errors are correct: X2(3 ) 
= 4.15. Notwithstanding this, the model with least restrictions M4 is used in further 
comparisons. 
36. The exclusion of the three variables can be justified by applying A and IF on M2 and 
M4: according to both indices proportion of improvement of fit (0.92) from M2 to M4 
suggests that the exclusion of the redundant variables is correct. 
37. Browne and Cudeck (1989) have advanced the use of fit measures based on the logic 
of Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) for covariance structures. The Information 
Criterion is defined as AIC = T1 + 2r, in which r refers to the number of free parameters 
of the model and T is the value of the test statistic. See Tanaka (1993) for discussion on 
the use of AIC in SEM. 
38. The estimates of the variances of measurement errors bi of the observed variables 
are statistically significant except the error term S,, that is relatively small. The 
measurement error S2 - that is a measurement error of the observed x2 - is relatively 
high. Also 83- that is a measurement error of the observed x3 - is relatively high. 
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39. It should be noted, that all the parameter estimates are standardised because the 
correlation matrix is used: all the variables are expressed in standard deviations and the 
effects indicate a change in the effect variable that is caused by a change of one standard 
deviation in the causal variable. 
40. In both models polychoric correlation matrices are used because the observed 
variables are not continuous. See Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989) for more detailed 
discussion. 
41. Only the similarity of correlation matrices is tested, not the applicability of say M5. 
The reason for this is that model structures - H,, : k(') = X(2) , Hxe : 
ea(') =O 2) 
and Hx4)e : 4(1) = 4p(2) - can not be tested if the analysis is based on correlation 
matrices. See Jöreskog and Sörbom (1989) for discussion. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A: Measures of output(s) and quality in performing arts institutions 
Author Institution type Measure Quality of 
output 
Globerman symphony number of attendance/ 
and Book (1974) orchestra, performances tour 
theatre group performances 
Throsby (1977) theatre, orchestra, attendance grants/box 
opera, dance office 
revenue 
Gapinski (1979) theatre, orchestra attendance dummy 
opera, ballet, variable a 
modern dance 
Lange et al. (1985) symphony number of N/A 
orchestra performances 
Ek (1991a, 1991b, theatre attendance, N/A 
1994) number of first nights, 
number of performances 
A dummy variable is used to capture the characteristics in which the organisation operates: 
"environmental agents are enumerated including demographics of the local population, the quality and 
price of live performances, competition from amateur companies, movies, or sporting events, and the 
draw of suburbia". 
Table B: Measures of output(s) and quality in museums 
Author Institution type Measure Quality 
Jackson (1988) general, history and number of accreditation 
science museums visitors' by AAM 
Paulus (1993) art, culture historical, number of visitorsb N/A 
nature historical, and 
special museums 
Paulus (1995) art, culture historical, number of visitors,. N/A 
nature historical, and number of exhibitions during 
special museums the last 5 years, number of 
new research workers, 
number of children 
participating 
the special programmes 
Mairesse (1997) museums financed number of visitors, N/A 






value of collection 
Besides the number of visitors five additional variables were used to capture "museums's 
priorities". These "priority variables" include cost shares of promotional expenditure, exhibition 
expenses, conservation and preservation expenses and membership activity expenses. 
b Besides the number of visitors three additional variables were used to capture diffusion of 
artistic experiences ("indicateur specifique de l'activite de diffusion"). These "diffusion variables" 
include number of exhibitions arranged during the last five years, number of researchers, and 
number of publications in the museum's library. 
Communaute francaise de Belgique 
d Activities refer to conferences, work shops, and concerts 
APPENDIX 2 
Table A: Measures for labour and capital inputs (prices) in performing arts 
institutions 
Author Method Labour input Capital input 
(price) (price) 
Globerman cost function N/A N/A 
and Book (1974) 
Throsby (1977) cost function N/A N/A 
Gapinski (1979)" 
Lange et al. (1985) 






man-hours of artistsb "props"d 
man-hours of adjuvants"'papers1e 
wages to musicians/ promotional 
number of musicians expendit. / 
donations 
applied one input: total costs 
man years operating 
costs 
In the study inputs are categorised as primary and secondary inputs. 
" Man-hours of artists include man-hours of performing and guest artists, directors, conductors, stage 
managers, instructors, designers, technicians, and other artistic personnel. 
` Man-hours of adjuvants include administrators and supervisors as well as ancillaries, e. g. stage hands 
"Props" include purchase of rental sets, costumes, lights, sound and other stage equipment. 
` "Papers" include scores, scripts and royalties. 
Table B: Measures for labour and capital inputs (prices) in museums 
Author Method Labour input Capital input 
(price) (price) 
Jackson (1988) cost function total wages/number of promotional 
full time employees expendit. / 
donations 




Paulus (1995) DEA number of employees operating 
costs' 
Mairesse (1997) DEA number of employees operating 
COStSb 
Operating expenses do not include personnel costs 
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Figure B: Average costs - number of visitors 
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APPENDIX 4 
The variances and a covariance of the variables in M5 can be written as: 
a12 = E[(X11E1 + 61)(t1TX11T + 61T)] 
= E[X1111TX11T + X11 1V1T 
+ b1E1Tx11T + U161T] 
_T X11x11 + Oil 
Qx22 = E[(X21E1 + 62)( 1TX21T 
+ a2 )1 
= E[X21t1E1TX21T + X21 1S2T 
+ 62E1TX21T + 6262T] 
T X2121 + 022 
1 Qx2, 
x1 
= E[(X21ý1 + 62) (ý 1TX11T 
+ o1TJ1J 
= Eý%1 1 1TX11T 
+ 
1t1u1T 
+ 62t1 Tx11T + S2 S1Ti VU 
ý21X11 T 
III Total Factor Productivity in Production of Cultural Services 
- Productivity Analysis of Orchestras in the Presence of Non-constant Returns to Size 
and Technological Change 
1 Introduction 
By using a framework of a two sector unbalanced growth model Baumol (1951,1967) 
introduced his thesis of cost disease, according to which "the unit cost of a product of 
a persistently more stagnant activity must rise without limit in comparison with that of 
a more progressive activity". As a case in point Baumol (1951,1967) use the production 
of services vs. the rest of the economy and Baumol and Bowen (1966) test the idea, 
most notably, in the case of US performing arts institutions. ' 
The argument of "cost disease" (B-B thesis) in performing arts rest on three main 
assumptions. The starting point of the B-B thesis is that there are two sectors in the 
economy, sector 1 that produces performing arts and sector 2 that represents the rest of 
the economy. The production of performing arts is characterised by labour intensity and 
relatively low or stagnant productivity deriving from lack of technical progress. The 
production in the other sector is, in turn, characterised by relatively high productivity 
deriving from innovation and accumulation of capital. The second assumption is that the 
costs of production are in both sectors determined by labour costs. Besides this, the 
labour costs in the two sectors are assumed to be equal, and driven by the productivity 
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growth in the rest of the economy. Thus, because of the stagnant productivity in sector 
1 the relative costs in that sector increase without limits, while in sector 2 they remain 
constant over time. ' Thirdly, B-B thesis assumes that performing arts is characterised by 
high demand elasticity which implies that mounting costs cannot be covered by 
increasing admission fees. As a result, the thesis proposes that the US performing arts 
sector faces an increasing gap between its costs and revenues, a so called earnings gap. 
(See Appendix 1) 
Since Baumol and Bowen (1966), e. g. Throsby and Withers (1979), Leroy (1980), 
Peacock et al. (1982) as well as Baumol and Baumol (1980,1984) have further 
examined the applicability of the B-B thesis in the case of performing arts. ' These 
studies have mainly centered on finding evidence of the earning gap by comparing the 
growth rate of costs in performing arts to the general price level, and generally find that 
the growth rate of costs (per performance) exceed the general price index. The main trust 
of these studies has, thus, been on verifying the existence of the earnings gap, while the 
causes of the gap - labour intensity together with wages determined in the rest of the 
economy, stagnant productivity growth and high demand elasticity of performing arts - 
have instigated less empirical interest-4 (See Appendix 2) 
The few empirical applications that have dealt with the causes of the gap include e. g. 
Felton (1994). Felton (1994) focuses on the assumption of stagnant productivity growth 
and demonstrate, first, by using an output-per-worker productivity estimate that for the 
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fiscal years 1972-1992 productivity growth in 25 large US orchestras exceed that of 
manufacturing in half of the examined years! Moreover, Felton (1994) reveal that "while 
the real compensation per worker in manufacturing only increased by ten percent over 
the whole period, salaries per player-week rose by almost four times, 38.7 percent.... This 
development clearly violates the assumption that wages are the same in the two sectors. "s 
The estimations also include evidence of inelastic demand. 6 According to Felton (1994) 
"These results demonstrate that orchestras are subject to cost disease when their 
productivity lags. But they also reveal that productivity increases are possible. " 
This article concentrates on two main aspects of the B-B thesis. First, the article looks 
at the earnings gap. By using a panel data set of 19 Finnish symphony orchestras, 1978- 
1995, the article assesses whether Finnish orchestras are subject to an increasing gap 
between their costs and revenues. Second, the article focuses on the assumptions of the 
B-B thesis. An emphasis is on the assumption of stagnant productivity growth, i. e. on 
whether the assumption holds in the case of Finnish orchestras. The main reason for this 
is the lack of theoretically sound assessments of total productivity growth in performing 
arts in general as well as the positive implications of possible productivity improvements 
to the operation of individual institutions. The main questions of the article, hence, center 
on how productivity growth evolves in Finnish orchestras and what are the main factors 
explaining the changes in productivity. It should be noted that productivity growth in 
orchestras is not compared to that of the rest of the economy, and thus, the dynamics of 
the B-B thesis is not tested as such. 
68 
The article proceeds by first describing the panel data set of 19 Finnish symphony 
orchestras from 1978 to 1995, with an emphasis on growth rates of costs and revenues, 
inputs and outputs, as well as the earnings gap. The theoretical background of 
productivity growth is then put forward: it is demonstrated that the applied definition of 
total factor productivity (TFP) growth as well as the methods to measure TFP originate 
from the seminal treatment by Solow (1957). As to the methods, two alternative index 
number approaches are introduced. First, is introduced the so called Törngvist 
Approximated Divisia index, together with the calculated indices of TFP growth, and 
after this is put forward a generalised version of the Divisia index together with the 
corresponding TFP measures. ' The results of the two calculations are then compared and 
the main factors explaining the changes in productivity discussed. In this, of particular 
interest is the relative performance of the two alternative index number approaches. 
Lastly, some concluding remarks are made. 
2 Description of the data set and existence of an earnings gap 
The data set used in the analysis is a panel of 19 Finnish symphony orchestras from year 
1978 to 1995. The data contains information on total costs, labour and capital costs, 
public subsidies, own revenues, number of visitors, number of concerts, number of full- 
time and part-time employees, and number of seats. The summary statistics of the data 
is as follows: (See Appendix 3) 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data set, 1978-1995, n= 19 orchestras, in FIM 1994 
Variable mean st. deviation minimum maximum 
TC 0.49758E+07 0.61471E+07 0.1654E+05 0.3412E+08 
FTE 33.65 28.58 0.00 108.00 
PTE 2.65 5.76 0.00 45.00 
LC 0.41473E+07 0.49197E+07 0.1380E+05 0.2777E+08 
CC 0.81598E+06 0.13682E+07 2582.00 0.8665E+07 
PS 0.45279E+07 0.55212E+07 0.1858E+05 0.3147E+08 
OR 0.41003E+06 0.63259E+06 1000.00 0.3337E+07 
NS 663.00 371.84 196.00 1806.00 
List of variables: TC = total costs, FTE = full-time employees, PTE = part-time employees, LC = labour costs, 
CC = capital costs, PS = public subsidies, OR = own revenues, NS = number of seats 
The comparison of total costs and own revenues reveal that during the 1978-1995 period 
total costs exceed own revenues in all orchestras, and public subsidies are required to 
cover the deficits: 











78 79 90 81 92 93 84 95 86 87 28 69 90 91 92 93 94 95 
Figure 1: Average annual earnings gap 
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As shown in Figure 1, the average annual deficit, the average annual earnings gap, has 
followed the pattern suggested in B-B thesis: the earnings gap has increased steadily in 
time, except a little slump in 1991 that coincides with the cyclical down turn of Finnish 
economy. In general, deficits amount more than 90% of total costs, whereas own 
revenues cover a meager 10%. The percentages of the deficit on total costs have 
revolved from 94% in 1980 and 1985-1987 to 90% in 1991-1993, suggesting that the 
relative earnings gap has diminished slightly over time. Both a relative increase in the 
own revenues, as well as slackened growth of costs have contributed to this. (See 
Appendix 4) As shown in Figure 2 the decreased growth rate of deficits coincide closely 
with the decreased growth of costs, whereas the growth rate of own revenues fluctuates 
more considerably: 
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Figure 2: Growth rates of earnings gap, costs and own revenues 
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Figure 2 demonstrates, moreover, that the growth rate of costs, as the growth rate of the 
earnings gap, increased till 1983. Since that the growth of costs decreased steadily, 
except the peaks in 1985 and 1989. A radical drop occurred in 1992: the growth rate of 
costs reached its minimum as did the growth rate of the earnings gap. In the 1992-1994 
time period costs grew relatively slowly - total costs remained almost at the level of 
previous years - while in 1995 the growth accelerated slightly. 
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Figure 3: Growth rates of outputs and inputs 
The growth rates of aggregate real input and outputs, in turn, diverge from the general 
declining trend of the growth rate of total costs: both the growth rate of input usage, as 
well as number of concerts or attendance, fluctuate considerably. The fluctuations in 
growth rates of number of concerts and visitors are of the same sign, except in 1978- 
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1979 time period, and of quite similar order. The growth rate of input usage fluctuates 
less, but exceeds the growth rate of number of concert goers and attendance roughly 
every other year. ' 
3 The concept of TFP and measurement of productivity growth by using Tömgvist 
Approximated Divisia Index 
The pioneering study by Solow (1957) provides a convenient ground work for the 
definition of TFP growth as well as operationalisation of the concept. 9 The definition is 
set off by first decomposing total output of a firm, yt, into two elements -a neo-classical 
production function f(x; `) and a variable capturing technical change in time A(t): 
Yt = A(t)f(x t) (1) 
The neo-classical production function f(xl`) is assumed to describe, in each time period, 
production technology that exhibits constant returns to scale and is characterised by 
competitive markets. It follows from this, that production is technically efficient, input 
prices equal their marginal productivity, and moreover, that outputs are sold at marginal 
costs. The constant returns to scale, furthermore, requires the production function f(x; `) 
to be homogeneous of degree one, suggesting that an equiproportionate increase in inputs 
yields an equiproportionate increase in output level. Technical change A(t), in turn, is 
assumed to be Hicks neutral, implying that the ratio of marginal products of inputs 
remain unchanged for any given input mix, so that technical progress leads to 
73 
proportional reductions in all inputs. 10 As a result, (1) depicts a situation in which the 
structure of technology f(x) does not change in time, but the production function may 
shift in time through the parameter A. 
Under these assumptions a total differentiation of (1) with respect to time and division 
by y, results a measure of total factor productivity growth that corresponds technical 
change. " Suppressing the is to simplify notation, and letting dots to denote time 
derivatives, yields: 
ý /y = A/A + E; (af/ax; ) (x1/f(x) ( /x) = A/A + E; s; ( /Xi) (2) 
in which s; is the cost share of ih input that can be rewritten as: 
s; = (ay/ax; ) (x1/Y) = pixy/wY = P; x; /E1p1x1 (3) 
Rearranging (2), hence, results a measure of TFP change that corresponds technical 
change: 12 
A/A = (4) 
For empirical applications, for which continuous data required by (4) is seldom available, 
Solow (1957) proposed a discrete definition of the TFP growth. 13 He suggested that 
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changes in time could be approximated, instead of the time derivatives, by discrete 
changes. The most often employed discrete approximation of (4) is the Tömgvist 
Approximated Divisia Index. 14 By using Törngvist's approximation technical change, 
OTFP or AA, can be written as: 
ATFP = [In Y1,, - In Y,,, -, 
] - '/2 Ei [st, + St-, ] [In x; t - In x;,, -, 
] (5) 
in which x; t represent the inputs, Y; ', the output, and si, t = p;, tx; / 
E ; p;, tx;, t denotes the cost 
share of the x; "' input in period t. 
The assessment of TFP growth in Finnish orchestras is carried out by using (5). Two 
alternative measures, OTFP1 and ITFP2, are calculated. In both ATFP1 and OTFP2, 
orchestras are assumed to use labour and capital inputs in their production: in the 
calculations labour input is measured by man years and capital input is measured by 
number of seats. As suggested in (5), these two inputs are weighted in the calculations 
by their respective cost shares in each time period. 
Two alternative output measures are used: in ATFPl output is measured by number of 
visitors, while OTFP2 is derived by using the number of concerts as a proxy for output. 
Thus, the former follows the line of Throsby (1977) who employed the number of 
visitors to measure the output of Australian orchestras, whereas ATFP2 is constructed 
by using the output measure - number of performances - employed by Globerman and 
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Book (1974) as well as Lange et al. (1985) in estimations of cost functions for Canadian 
and American symphony orchestras respectively. 
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Figure 4: Two alternative Törngvist Approximated Divisia Indeces 
Figure 4 reveals that the two measures propose productivity growth of similar order, 
suggesting that the changes in productivity of the orchestras can be captured either by 
OTFP 1 and zTFP2. In more detail, both measures revolve around zero, and result on 
average yearly TFP growth rates of -0.01. Thus, the traditional TFP growth measures for 
19 Finnish orchestras in the 1978-1995 time period seem to support the presumption of 
the B-B thesis that practically no productivity growth takes place in the performing arts 
institutions. Alternatively, ATFP1 and OTFP2 suggest that no technical progress has 
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taken place in Finnish orchestras: in a single-output case, under the assumptions of 
constant returns to scale and competitive markets productivity growth defined as (5) 
equals technical change. " 
4 The concept of TYP and measurement of productivity growth by using Generalised 
Divisia Index 
As already pointed out by Solow (1957), technical change is as such an insufficient 
explanation of changes in TFP - Solow (1957) noted that the residual difference between 
rates of growth of real product and weighted rates of growth of labour and capital inputs 
remains substantial. '6 
The residual has been sought to narrow, first, by including into the measures of inputs 
factors that change their quality over time. " As noted by Kendrick and Vaccara (1980), 
three main approaches have been employed: components of labour input have been 
weighted e. g. by effects of increased education, shortened hours of work and changing 
age-sex composition of the labour force, or alternatively, labour inputs have been 
adjusted for quality shifts together with a measure for capital input in which input 
components are weighted by the marginal products. Alternatively, some studies have 
continued to compute factor inputs unadjusted for quality change and prefer to view the 
increases in quality as a part of the broader residual. An example of such practise is 
Kendrick (1973). 
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Besides the technical change and quality adjustments of inputs, non-constant returns to 
scale, market imperfections and (in)efficiency of production have been argued to explain 
TFP growth. As to the inefficiencies of production, two alternative methodologies have 
been developed: Nishimizu and Page (1982) were first to employ a parametric production 
function in decomposing TFP growth into technical progress and changes in efficiency, 
while Tulkens (1990) pioneered the non-parametric frontier approach to TFP 
measurement. '8 Since the original B-B thesis assumes technically efficient production, 
neither of these lines of inquiry are followed here, and thus, it is still assumed that 
production of orchestras is a result of best practice. 
Griliches (1963,1964,1967), in turn, was the first to demonstrate empirically that the 
measure of TFP growth includes not only the effects of technical change, but also the 
effects of non-constant returns to scale and market imperfections in industries where the 
assumptions of constant returns to scale and competitive markets do not hold. To solve 
this problem Denny, Fuss and Waverman (1981) developed a Generalised Divisia Index 
that allows non-constant returns to scale and non-competitive markets. This framework 
explains TFP growth in a multi-output setting by technical progress, scale effects, and 
effects of non-marginal cost pricing of outputs. This work was heavily based on Caves, 
Christensen and Swanson (1980) as well as Caves and Christensen (1980). 
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The work by Caves, Christensen and Swanson (1980) is based on Solow's (1957) insight 
according to which productivity growth can be defined as a difference between the rates 
of growth of real product and inputs. Along the lines of (4) the proportionate growth rate 
of TFP (T `P) can be written as: 
TPP =It -I' (6) 
in which t denotes the growth rate of output and P the growth rate of input usage that 
is defined as in (4) by weighing the growth rate of each input with its cost share, i. e. 
E; p; xi/c R;. For simplicity's sake, (6) assumes a single output framework that allows 
multiple (i) inputs. '9 
Caves, Christensen and Swanson (1980) derive their generalised index by exploiting the 
dual theory of production together with (6). 20 They base the index in the shifts of a 
generalised cost function given by: 
C= C(p1,..., pn, Y, t) (7) 
in which p denotes input prices, Y stands for output, and t is time. 2' Totally 
differentiating (7) with respect to time yields: 
dC/dt =E; ac/api ap; lat + ac/ay ay/at + ac/at. (8) 
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The proportionate shift in the cost function can be derived by dividing (8) by C and 
setting äc/öp; = x; from Shephard's lemma: 22 
I /C ac/at =1 /C dC/dt +E; p; x; /c p; + ac/äY Y/C '' (9) 
By denoting proportionate shift of the cost function 1 /C öc/öt = 19 and noting that 
(&/äY) (Y/C) equals the cost flexibility, allows (9) to be rewritten as: 
t= t- Ei PiX; lc P- s'ý (lo) 
This implies that the shift in the cost function (b ) equals the change in the costs minus 
the change in aggregate inputs minus the scale effect. 
Total differentiation of C=E; p1xj with respect to time and rearranging yields: 
Ei Pixi $-t-E; Pixi/c R; . 
(11) i 
Substituting (10) to (11) yields: 
(12) 19 =EiP; x; /c R; - et 
that can be rewritten as 
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b=c- et (13) 
The shifts of the cost function (19 ) are, hence, proportioned into two elements: the term 
E; p; x; /c k; =P that denotes the proportional rate of growth of inputs and the term ct 
that represents the scale effect with proportional rate of growth of output. Now, using 
the definition of total factor productivity (6), TfP =t-P, the shifts in cost function can 
be linked with the measure of total factor productivity. Substituting (6) into (12) yields: 
TfP=- $ +(1-e)' (14) 
This implies that if there are constant size elasticities, e=1, then T! P =-t suggesting 
that changes in TFP reflect only technical change. Whereas, if the size elasticity departs 
from unity the measure for TFP growth consists in addition to inter-temporal shifts in 
cost function (technical change) also the scale effect. 
An empirical application of the generalised index (14) into real data, however, 
neccesitates a discrete approximation. Rearranging (14) yields: 
$_ (1-e)'t - T! P (15) 
in which the discrete approximation of TPP can be written, as in the Törngvist 
approximation (5), as: 
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OTFP = [In Y;, t - 
in Y,, t-j] - '/2 i 
[s + Si, t-1] [in x;, t - 
In x, t-1] 
(1 6) 
where the arithmetic averages of cost shares are used to approximate the instantaneous 
weights. The scale effects, in turn, can be approximated by first defining a 
discrete approximation for the cost flexibility. As proposed by Caves, Christensen, and 
Swanson (1980) the cost flexibility e= (ac/ÖY)(Y/C), that is generally written as e= 
(aln c/amnY), can be approximated by using the first differences of logarithms to 
approximate logarithmic derivatives. Again using the arithmetic averages to approximate 
the instantaneous weights of cost flexibility, and assuming that can be approximated 
by 1nY;, t - 
1nY;,,,, results: 
D (1- c)Y = [I - %2 ; [(öln c/a1nY); t+ (aln c/ö1nY)i, t., ] [1nY;, - 1nY;, t_, ] (17) 
Then by using (16) and (17), a discrete approximation of the technical change OB can 
be written as: 
-OB = '/2 F; [(öln c/ä1nY)ýt + (ä1n c/a1nY);, t_, ] [1nY; t- 
1nY;, t_, ] 
+ '/2 Ei [5;, t + si, t. 1] 
[In x;, - In xic-, ] (is) 
In (18) all but the cost flexibilities alnc/alnY can be obtained directly from the data - 
the growth of output [1nY;, t - 
1nY; t_, ], the growth of 
inputs [In x1t - In xýt_, ], and the 
changes in the cost shares [s1, + st-, ] can all be calculated directly from the raw data, 
whereas the cost flexibilities (alnc/81nY) have to be estimated by using a cost function. 
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Thus, in order to calculate the first term on the right hand side in the discrete 
approximation (18) - '/2 E; [(äln c/älnY); t + (aln c/alnY), t_1] 
[1nY; t - 
1nY; 
t_, ] -a cost 
function has to be estimated. 
The cost function employed here to derive the cost flexibilities - for each orchestra in 
each year - is the translog (TL) cost function introduced by Christensen, Jorgenson, and 
Lau (1973). The parameterisation of the flexible TL cost function, to which are added 
the conventional disturbance terms (er and e) and a dummy structure, is as follows: 
In c= ao + ay In y+ 7ry(ln Y)2 +Ei ai In p, +EiE; Yi; In pi In pp + 
Ei 1'y; lnyInpi+ Sf+öt+ e , 
i=1, k (19) 
and the corresponding cost share of the ih-input is: 
S; S= a; +-yyiIny+ EjyjIn p, +e1 (20) 
in which ao is the intercept, al and ak are the cost shares of labour and capital 
respectively, -y,,, -y, J and -Yk, are the share elasticities, -yy, and 'yyk stand 
for the biases of 
scale, and -yy}, is the derivative of elasticity of cost with respect to output. The orchestra 
specific costs that are not included in the explanatory variables are captured by 8f, and 
b, is a dummy variable for the time effects. 
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Furthermore, in order the TL formulation (19) - (20) to be dual to the underlying 
production technology the following regularity conditions have to be met: 
si i=1, Eiyyi = 0, 
Eiy;; = E; y;; = E; E; yi; =0 
Because, as noted, the cost flexibility can be written as p(p;, y) = alnc/alnY the TL 
formulation of a neo-classical cost function (19) yields the following definition of the 
cost flexibility: 
µ(P, Y) = «y + 'Yyrln y+E i'Yyi In (p) (21) 
This definition yields estimates of cost flexibilities for each orchestra in each year, that 
are needed in calculation of the equation (18). 
In practice, empirical application of (18) proceeds in three phases. First, the cost 
flexibilities needed in calculation of the scale effect are derived by estimating the TL 
cost function (19) together with the corresponding cost share equations (20). Then, raw 
data is employed to calculate the observable variables, i. e. the growth of output, growth 
of inputs, and the changes in the cost shares. Third, the estimated cost flexibilities are 
used together with the observable variables to calculate (18). The calculation of (18) 
produces measures for technical change (OB) and scale effect A (1- c)Y that are then 
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substituted to (15). These substitutions, together with a rearrangement, yields the 
generalised TFP indices. The generalised indices, henceforth denoted as ZTFP3, explain 
TFP growth by two components - technical change (AB) and the scale effect 0 (1- e)Y. 
4.1 Estimation of cost flexibilities and notes on the production technology 
The calculation of discrete approximations of the Generalised Divisia Index (18) for 
Finnish orchestras is set off by estimation of the cost flexibilities. The cost flexibilities - 
needed in calculation of the scale effect - are derived by estimating the TL cost function 
(19) together with the corresponding cost share equations (20). 23 The estimations are 
carried out by using a modification of Zellner's (1962) SUR procedure in which the share 
equation for capital is deleted in order to avert the problem of singularity of the 
contemporaneous covariance matrix, and the remaining parameters are derived by using 
the regularity conditions. 24 
In the estimations the output of orchestras is measured, along the lines of Globerman and 
Book (1974) and Lange et al. (1985), by the number of concerts. 25 Along the lines of 
Lange et al. (1985) orchestras are, furthermore, assumed to employ capital and labour 
inputs in their production. Lange et al. (1985) derived the unit price of labour input by 
dividing total artistic expenses by number of players in the orchestra, and the price of 
capital input was defined as the ratio of promotional expenditures to contributions from 
all sources (donations and subsidies). In order to include into the labour input price also 
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the administrative and technical personnel, in addition to the artistic personnel, the unit 
price of labour input is measured by: 
LP = LC /(FTE + PTE/4) 
in which FTE is the man years of full-time workers and PTE the part-time employees 
who are assumed to work one quarter of a man year in a given orchestra. 26 The capital 
input price is, in turn, measured as the ratio of capital costs to number of seats in the 
permanent venue place: 
CP = CC/NS 
in which CC denotes capital costs (rents, interests, and maintenance), acquisitions of 
instruments, as well as loans of notes, and royalties, whereas NS is the number of seats. 
This definition reflects the fact that the Finnish orchestras do not rely on private 
donations, but on own revenues and public subsidies that do not involve promotional 
expenditures. 
Table 4 demonstrates that the estimated system (19) - (20), by using the above measures 
for output and input prices, fulfills the regularity conditions: ak + a1 = 1, yyk + yy, = 0, 
as well as yk, + -ykk+ 'yll = 0. Besides this, all parameter estimates, but the intercept ao, 
are statistically significant and of the right sign. (See Appendix 5) The magnitudes of 
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individual parameter estimates are of the expected order, except the estimates of the cost 
shares of labour and capital: the estimates for a, and ak suggest, contrary to B-B thesis, 
that production in Finnish orchestras is not distinctly labour intensive (labour 45% and 
capital 55%). Thus, the assumption of labour intensity of production, presupposed in B-B 
thesis, is not an appropriate assumption in the case of Finnish orchestras. 
The parameter estimates of the system (19) - (20) are as follows: 
Table 2: Parameter Estimates (s. e in parentheses) 
Parameter Estimate Parameter Estimate 
ao 21.76 (84.50) ak 0.55 (0.01) 
ay 99.51 (44.57) -ykk 0.04 (0.00) 
yyy -18.80 (5.86) -yyk -0.15 (0.01) 
a, 0.45 (0.01) ykl -0.02 (0.00) 
yýl -0.02 (0.00) 7yl 0.15 (0.01) 
The estimated cost function, furthermore, reveals that production technology exhibits 
non-homotheti city - the hypothesis that the underlying production technology is 
homothetic ('yyk yy, = 0) is rejected at the 0.05 level (X2(2) = 369.30; critical value X2(2) 
= 5.99). This implies, first, that the relative utilisation of inputs varies depending on the 
output level: the biases of scale, 'Yyk and y,,, indicate that the relative utilisation of labour 
input increases when the number of concert increases. Besides this, because 
homotheticity is a prerequisite to homogeneity ('yyk = yy, = yYY = 0) production 
technology proves to exhibit also non-homogeneity. This means that output does not 
expand at the same rate as the utilisation of inputs increase. 
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The non-homotheticity and non-homogeneity have implications also on the estimates of 
cost flexibilities - non-homotheticity and non-homogeneity of the underlying production 
technology with respect to output imply in TL formulation that the cost flexibilities, äln 
c(p, y) / äln y, are derived from + yyyln y+ In 17 
In practice, the cost flexibilities are calculated for each orchestra by employing the 
derived parameter estimates (Table 2), using the yearly averages of input prices across 
the orchestras as the input prices of individual orchestras, and letting the output levels 
to vary. As a result, the calculations yield cost flexibilities of p(p, y) = 24.94 on average, 
suggesting that Finnish orchestras exhibit decreasing size elasticities steadily over the 
whole time period, i. e. that there are economic gains from small scale production in each 
and every year. 28 (See Appendix 5) 
4.2 Calculation of the Generalised Indices and factors explaining TFP growth 
The generalised Divisia indices (ATFP3) are calculated, according to (18), by using the 
growth rates of outputs and inputs, estimated cost flexibilities as well as cost shares of 
inputs. As in (18), the growth rates of output are weighted by cost flexibilities, the 
reason being that orchestras exhibit - instead of constant scale economies - considerable 
diseconomies of size. 29 The growth rates of inputs are, in turn, weighted by their 
respective cost shares. 3o 
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The use of (18), use of the number of concerts as a proxy for output, and assuming that 
orchestras utilise labour and capital inputs in their production result the following 
measures for TFP (OTFP3), technical change (OB), and the scale effect (A(1 - e)Y) : 
Table 3: Components of TFP growth in Finnish orchestras 1978-1995 
Year ATFP3 -AB 0(1 - e)Y 
1978-1979 0.07 2.32 -2.25 
1970-1980 0.12 2.97 -2.85 
1980-1981 -0.10 -1.34 1.23 
1981-1982 -0.17 1.47 -1.64 
1982-1983 0.03 3.07 -3.05 
1983-1984 -0.04 0.08 -0.11 
1984-1985 -0.05 2.00 -2.04 
1985-1986 -0.12 -0.08 -0.03 
1986-1987 0.02 1.38 -1.36 
1987-1988 -0.07 -0.72 0.65 
1988-1989 0.02 1.91 -1.89 
1989-1990 0.07 1.17 -1.11 
1990-1991 -0.08 -1.24 1.16 
1991-1992 0.13 3.58 -3.45 
1992-1993 -0.07 -2.01 1.94 
1993-1994 0.08 1.58 -1.50 
1994-1995 0.00 -0.55 0.55 
Average -0.01 0.92 -0.93 
Since the measure for TFP'growth in Table 3, MTFP3, is by definition the same as 
OTFP2, both measures suggest that TFP growth has been stagnant in the Finnish 
orchestras. 31 As shown in Table 3- as well as in Figure 4- productivity growth is at its 
highest from 1991 to 1992, OTFP2 = OTFP3 = 0.13, and at its lowest in 1981-1982 time 
period, zTFP2 = OTFP3 = -0.17. The peak in the TFP growth rate coincides with a 
substantial drop in the growth rate of costs, weighty increases in the growth rates of 
attendance and number of performances, and a considerable drop in the growth rate of 
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input usage. (See Figure 2 and Figure 3) The lowest productivity growth rates, in turn, 
coincide with a relatively high growth rate of inputs, but a negative growth of outputs. 
(See Figure 3) 
Notwithstanding the correspondance of OTFP3 and ATFP2, the two measures, however, 
yield different interpretations of the origins of stagnant productivity growth. The major 
difference is in that zTFP2 considers stagnant productivity to derive from lack of 
technical progress, while the Generalised Index ATFP3 suggests that stagnant 
productivity growth originates from fluctuations in both technical progress and the scale 
effect. 
Figure 5 reveals that the fluctuations in technical progress and scale effect are 
considerable within ATFP3: the highest rate of technical progress is AB = 3.58 and the 
lowest rate is -2.01, whereas the greatest scale effect is z. (1 - e)Y = 1.94 and the most 
adverse scale effect is -3.45. Of interest is that the technical change and scale effect 
consistently fluctuate to opposite directions and cancel out each others: the adverse scale 
effect of increasing the number of concerts is canceled out by technical change of 
roughly the same magnitude and vice versa, thus, resulting a stagnant overall 
productivity growth rate. Figure 5 shows the pattern in which an improvement in one 
component - either technical change or scale effect - is generally followed by a relapse 
in the next period. 
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Figure 5: Components of TFP growth 
A possible explanation to this rather peculiar cancelling out phenomenon is, first, that 
orchestras may increase the number of concerts even if the number of musicians is 
reduced: a part of the increase in number of concerts is attributable to an increase in 
concerts that are not performed with the whole ensemble, e. g. chamber concerts. An 
orchestra may also make such choices of repertoire or artistic personnel (musicians and 
conductors) that induce fluctuations in both technical progress and scale effect: an 
orchestra may choose relatively easy and well known compositions in the repertoire since 
"easy pieces" do not require extensive practice and may appeal to the less refined tastes, 
alternatively, an orchestra may choose less known "difficult" pieces that require 
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extensive practice and may appeal only to the most refined tastes, or any combination 
of thereof. 32 The artistic personnel, putting the chosen repertoire into practice, may also 
vary from ordinary musicians to "super stars". 33 
An illuminating example of the above explanations is provided by 1981-1983 time 
period, of which year 1982 was the anniversary of Finnish music that inspired orchestras 
to perform a great number of pieces composed by Finnish composers as well as to order 
totally new pieces to be performed (altogether 43 new Finnish compositions had their 
first nights in 1982). Year 1981 was, in turn, occupied by rehearsing the 1982 repertoire, 
while 1983 experienced widening of the repertoire from mostly Finnish compositions 
with the whole ensemble and reverting to pre 1982 level of inputs (copy right fees and 
fees to "super stars"). 
In other words, the 1981-1983 time period suggests in terms of actual growth rates of 
outputs (number of concerts and attendance) and inputs that year 1981 witnessed a slump 
in outputs together with a modest increase in inputs, in 1982 growth rate of outputs was 
positive but relatively low and the growth rate of inputs was relatively high, whereas in 
1983 the growth rate of number of concerts and visitors peaked together with a slump 
in the growth rate of inputs. (See Figure 3) As a result, technical change OB increase 
steadily from -1.34 in 1981 to 3.07 in 1983 whereas the scale effect A(1 - e)Y range 
from 1.23 in 1981 to -3.05 in 1983. Notwithstanding these considerable fluctuations, 
OTFP3 remains close to zero and fluctuate from -0.10 in 1981 to 0.03 in 1983. This 
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suggests that the assumption of stagnant productivity growth deriving from lack of 
technical progress does not hold in the case of Finnish orchestras, and furthermore, that 
it is possible to enhance productivity growth via technical change or adjustment of the 
scale of production. On the basis of the calculations it, however, seems that Finnish 
orchestras that do not fully exploit the possibilities of productivity improvements, but 
seem to take action only when they face an adverse scale effect and choose to be more 
lax when benefitting from the small scale of production. 
5 Conclusion 
This article has centered on empirical analysis of the B-B thesis. Three main questions 
have been of interest: first, whether Finnish orchestras are subject to an increasing gap 
between their costs and revenues, i. e. an earnings gap, and second, whether the 
assumption of stagnant productivity growth holds in the case of Finnish orchestras and 
what are the main factors explaining the changes in productivity. Besides this, the article 
examined whether two alternative measures of TFP growth - Törngvist Approximated 
Divisia Index and Generalised Divisia Index - yield different interpretations of the 
sources of TFP growth and what are their implications to the empirical assessment of 
cultural instiutions. 
The analysis revealed, first, that the examined 19 Finnish orchestras face a considerable 
earnings gap during the whole time period 1978-1995: costs exceed handsomely own 
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revenues, as proposed by Baumol and Bowen (1966). The calculations suggested that the 
earnings gap was on average some 93% of total costs. The difference between the costs 
and own revenues did not, however, increase in time, but decreased slightly - the growth 
rate of the earnings gap had a slight overall decreasing trend even if it fluctuated quite 
considerably. At its highest, in the mid 1980's, the growth rate of the earnings gap 
reached 40% annual rate, whereas at its lowest, in the early 1990's, the growth rate of 
earnings gap turned negative to some -3% annual rate. Both the increased growth rate 
of costs and increased growth rate of own revenues contributed to the slight decrease in 
the growth rate of the earnings gap. 
A more detailed analysis of own revenues revealed that there has been a clear increasing 
trend in admission revenues per concert goer, while the number of visitors and number 
of performances have not had a slackened growth. This hints that the assumption of high 
demand elasticity of orchestral performances might not be valid in the case of Finnish 
orchestras. Thus, as suggested already by Moore (1968), Throsby (1994) and Felton 
(1992), it is likely that the increasing admission fees can be used to some extend to 
cover the increasing costs. 
The second main finding of the article was that the Finnish orchestras encountered 
stagnant or even negative productivity growth, as suggested by Baumol and Bowen 
(1966). The Törngvist Approximated Divisia Index approach - that considers productivity 
growth and technical progress synonymous following from the assumptions of constant 
94 
returns to scale and competitive markets - suggested -0.02 average annual percentage 
growth of productivity during the 1978-1995 time period. The results were of similar 
order, notwithstanding the measure of output (the number of concerts or attendance): the 
annual TFP growth measures were close to zero and revolved around +/- 0.05, with the 
exceptions of years 1979 and 1982. 
The Generalised Divisia Index suggested accordingly stagnant productivity growth, but 
pointed out that since the assumption of constant scale economies does not hold in the 
case of Finnish orchestras the lack of technical change is not a sufficient explanation of 
stagnant productivity. 34 The calculations revealed, most importantly, that stagnant 
productivity of Finnish orchestras derive from considerable fluctuations, +/- 3.5, in 
technical change and the scale effect: stagnant productivity is a result of technical change 
and the scale effect consistently fluctuating to opposite directions and cancelling out each 
others. 
Such a finding has twofold implications: first, the finding implies that usage of Törngvist 
Approximated Index would yield undoubtedly biased estimates of technical change in 
the case of Finnish orchestras - the highest rate of technical progress in Törngvist 
Approximated Index is 0.13 in 1991-1992 and the lowest rate is -0.17 in 1981-1982, 
while according to the Generalised the highest rate of technical progress is 3.58 and the 
lowest -2.01. As a result of this and omission of the scale effect, the Törngvist 
Approximated Divisia Index also underestimates the possibilities to improve TFP growth. 
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Due to these two major biases, the usage of Generalised Index is preferred to the 
Törngvist Approximated Index. 
By and large, the findings of the article have shown that the assumptions of the B-B are 
not in accordance with the findings on Finnish orchestras. The analysis casts doubt on 
the assumption of high demand elasticity, demonstrates the invalidity of the assumption 
of highly labour intensive production, and moreover, shows that stagnant productivity 
does not derive form lack of technical progress, but from fluctuations in technical change 
and the scale of production. On the basis of this it seems that only a more detailed 
assessment of the cancelling out effect could provide a solution to the considerable 
earnings gap, also the Finnish orchestras are facing. This implies a need for more 
detailed analyses of the effects of the choice of repertoire and usage of artistic personnel 
with different qualifications as means of productivity improvements. 
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Endnotes 
1. See Towse (ed. ) (1997a) for an overview and collection of the early contributions on 
B-B thesis as well as on developments of the theory of cost disease and its implications 
to Cultural Economics. 
2. This means that wages do not increase more than the productivity growth of labour 
input allows. 
3. See Towse (ed. ) (1997a) on implications of the B-B thesis on libraries, health care and 
education systems. See also Baumol et al. (1985) for discussion. 
4. The causes of the earnings gap have inspired a great variety of discussion, instead of 
empirical testing. See Towse (ed. ) (1997a) for discussion on policy implications. 
5. Heikkinen and Karhunen (1996) have demonstrated with a cross-sectional data on 
Finnish wages that there are clear income disparities between artists and other 
occupational groups (as well as between male and female artists). They show that "Both 
male and female artists earn about one third less than their counterparts among upper 
level employees. Compared to lower level employees and manual workers artists are in 
a better situation. " 
6. The assumption of high demand elasticity of performing arts has been called into 
question also by Moore (1968) and Felton (1994). Moore (1968) examined demand for 
Broadway theatre and found price elasticities ranging from -0.33 to -0.63. Felton (1992) 
reported price elasticities for US orchestras of around -0.6 and found the price elasticities 
for major US ballet and opera companies to range from -0.1 to -0.6. 
7. It should be noted, that the assessment of productivity growth in Finnish orchestras 
is carried out, pace Felton (1994), by using index numbers. The approach is, however, 
more elaborate in two respects: instead of a productivity measure that is based on a ratio 
of single output to single input (labour) is utilised a concept of total factor productivity 
that accounts all inputs and outputs, and moreover, instead of a simple output-per-worker 
measure is employed two alternative TFP indices, namely the Törngvist Approximated 
Divisia index and Generalised Divisia Index. 
8. It should be noted, that in the graph inputs include both labour and capital input that 
are weighted by their cost shares. 
9. The underlying idea of Solow's (1957) model was originally to distinguish the impact 
of technical change on output growth from the effects of capital accumulation. In short, 
he developed an "elementary way of segregating variations in output per head due to 
technical change from those due to changes in the availability of capital per head. " 
10. See Grosskopf (1993) for a more detailed discussion on Hicks neutral technical 
change. 
11. It should be noted, that productivity growth defined as (1) equals technical change 
in a single output case only and only if the assumptions of constant returns to scale and 
competitive markets hold. See Denny, Fuss, and Waverman (1981) for a proof. See 
Kendrick (1973) for a non-technical discussion. 
12. A similar kind of definition of total factor productivity growth has been put forward 
also by Kendrick (1973) as well as Jorgenson and Griliches (1967). 
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13. This approach towards productivity analysis was later established by Jorgenson and 
Griliches (1967), Richter (1966), Hulten (1973), and Diewert (1976). 
14. The theoretical contributions to develop the correspondence of index numbers and 
theory of production is largely based on Diewert's (1976,1978) work on exact or 
superlative index numbers showing that there is a unique correspondence between the 
type of the index used to aggregate over outputs and inputs and the structure of the 
underlying technology. 
15. See Kendrick (1973) for a non-technical discussion. 
16. Kendrick and Vaccara (1980) note that this residual was called by Abramovitz, and 
by many others thereof, as a "measure of our ignorance". 
17. See Kendrick and Vaccara (1980) for a detailed discussion on the conceptual and 
methodological developments. 
18. Both approaches have instigated a wealth of empirical applications as well as 
methodological extensions. See Grosskopf (1993) for a detailed discussion on the 
methods as well as their subsequent extensions. 
19. In multi output cases the output index is usually constructed by weighing different 
output volumes by their revenue shares. See Grosskopf (1993) for examples. 
20. Ohta's (1975) has demonstrated that the duality between cost and production can be 
exploited to formulate technical progress by using cost functions. 
21. The cost function (7) is homogeneous of degree one, non-decreasing, and concave 
in the input prices p; and the first partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to 
the input prices represent the cost minimising input demand (Shepard's Lemma). 
22. As is well known, the first partial derivatives of the cost function with respect to the 
input prices (p) are equal to the cost minimising input levels (Shephard's lemma). 
23. The estimations are carried out by employing SHAZAM 7.0 program. 
24. As shown by Barten (1969) the estimates are invariant to the choice of equation to 
be deleted. 
25. As shown in chapter 3, the calculated Törngvist Approximated Divisia Indices were 
similar irrespective of the output measure, number of concerts and attendance. 
26. It should be noted, that the way to give statistics on personnel changed in 1985 (the 
way to assess contributions of part-time employees). As a result of this, the unit price 
of labour input is likely to be slightly over-estimated between the 1978-1985 time 
period. 
27. As shown, this definition coincides with the elasticity of scale when the underlying 
production technology is homothetic with respect to output. 
28. Size economies - the reciprocal of the cost flexibility - are on average some 0.4 
during the time period from 1978 till 1995. 
29. The growth rates of outputs are not weighted in ATFP1 and ATFP2 since constant 
returns to scales is assumed. 
30. Cost shares are acceptable weights for the input growth rates, i. e. are satisfactory 
estimates of cost elasticities with respect to factor prices, given that Finnish orchestras 
purchase their factors of production in reasonably competitive markets. 
31. This can be simply demonstrated by noting, first, that the traditional Divisia index 
can be written as TPP =t-P whereas the generalised index can be written as 1ft = 
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(1-e)t - TFP. Substituting the former to the latter yields: - 19 = Ei' - 
P. Rewriting the 
definition of the generalised Divisia index (14) by using the definition of technical 
change results: Tf p =t -' which suggests that the value of the measure for total factor 
productivity is the same in the generalised Divisia index ATFP3 and the traditional index 
ATFP2. 
32. Similar suggestions have been made e. g. by Throsby (1994) and Peacock (1985) who 
have noted that productivity growth can take place in performing arts via employment 
of new venue designs and improved sound and lighting systems, performance of plays 
with simpler sets or smaller casts, and plays for which copyright fees are not anymore 
due. 
33. See Adler (1985) for discussion of "super stars". 
34. As to the underlying production technology it was shown, first, that Finnish 
orchestras exhibit decreasing scale economies, and second, that production in Finnish 
orchestras is not distinctly labour intensive, but labour and capital are utilised in 
production almost in equal proportions. Similar findings has been made by Gapinski 
(1979) in the case of US orchestras. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The B-B thesis (1966) rests on three main assumptions. ' 
(1) It assumes that there are two sectors in economy, secor 1 producing performing arts 
and sector 2 representing rest of the economy. The sector 1 is characterised by labour 
intensity and, furthermore, by constant or stagnant productivity growth of labour input. 
The labour input and the level of output, at time t, are in sector 1 denoted by L, t and 
Y1, t: 
Yt t= aL,, t, 
in which a is a constant 
The sector 2 is assumed to be more progressive, and productivity growth to be faster 
than at sector 1. Thus, for sector 2: 
Yet =ß L2tj1 + r]` 
where r represents the productivity growth of labour input, and 0 is a constant. 
(2) The costs of production are determined by labour costs, p,,, and p2,,, and thus it is 
assumed that the capital costs are either constant or zero over time. The labour costs pl, 
and P2,, are assumed to vary at the same phase, and be affected by the productivity 
growth of labour input in sector 2: pl, t = P2, t = pt = p[l + r]`. The relative average costs 
are, hence: 
cl = PL1, Y1,, = PI1 + r]t LIt/a L, ', = P[ 1 + r]`/a 
C2 = PrLI, Y2, t = P[1 + r]t L2, 
ßß L2, t[1 + r] 
t= P/ß 
Thus, the costs in sector 1 augment without limits, while in sector 2 they remain 
constant in time. 
' The notation of the model is modified from that of Baumol (1951,1967). 
(3) The model assumes that performing arts is characterised by high demand elasticity. 
The prices of output are assumed to be proportional to the costs, pl = ac, and p2 = ßc2,: 
PIYI/P2Y2 = ac1Yl/ßc2Y2 
in which cly1/c2Yz = p[l + r]t Lj, JP[1 + r]` L2, t = LI, 
/ L23 = Ko 
and YI/Y2 = aL1, Jß[1 + r]t L2, t =aK,, /ß[1 + r]t 
where yl/Y2 -' 0 when t -* oo, implying that production of sector I 
diminishes inevitably. 
The model, hence, proposes that because of (a) lack of possibilities to productivity 
growth, (b) impossibility of cutting costs without jeopardising artistic quality, and (c) 
impossibilty of increasing admission revenues due to elastic demand, the performing arts 
sector faces an increasing gap between its costs and revenues, a so called earnings gap. 
To maintain sector I private donations and public subsidies are required. 
APPENDIX 2 
data results 
Baumol W. and Bowen W. (1966): 
Years 1771-1776,1963-1964 
Dury Lane Theatre, London, U. K. 
Royal Shakespeare Theatre, London, U. K 
Cost per performance 13.6 fold during 
the time period, the general price 
index 6.2 fold. 
Years 1843-1964 
New York Philharmonic Orchestra, 
New York, U. S 
Years 1945 - 
23 orchestras, 3 operas, 1 dance group, 
Annual growth rate of adm. fees 
2.5%, the annual growth rate of 
general price index 1%. 
Growth rate of costs per performance 
exceed the the general price index. 
Broadway theatres, U. S 
Years 1945 - Growth rate of costs per performance 
Covent Garden, London, U. K. exceed the general price index. 
Royal Shakespeare Theatre, London, U. K 
Thmsby C. and Withers G. (1979): 
Years 1964-1978 Growth rate of costs exceed growth 
Various theatres, opera, orchestras, rate of profits and total revenues. 
ballet, Australia 
Leroy D. (1980): 
Years 1860-1950, opera, Lille, France 
Years 1976-1970, opera, Paris, France 
Years 1871-1965, theatres, Paris 
Years 1882-1964, Comedie, -Francaise 
Years 1860-1965, orchestra, Paris 
Growth rate of costs exceed the 
general price index. Except during 
periods with high inflation or war: 
average growth rate of deficits 
exceed growth rate of price index. 
Peacock A., Shoeshmith E. and Millner G. (1983): 
Years 1975-1981, opera, dance, theatre, Growth rate of costs highest in 
orchestras, London, U. K. theatres (15.1%), dance (15.25%), 
opera (13.75%), orchestras (13.5%) 
Baumol W. and Baumol H. (1984): 
Years 1974-1983, symphony orchestras, Growth rate of costs per performance 
theatres, U- S exceed growth rate of general price index, 
by 1% in theatres and by 0.9% in orchestras 
APPENDIX 3 
List of variables: TC = total costs, CC = capital costs, LC = labour costs, PS = public 
subsidies, VISI = number of visitors, CON = number of concerts, LP = labour input 
price, CP = capital input price, OR = own revenues, NS = number of seats, FTE = full- 
time employees, PTE = part-time employees 
Table A: Descriptive Statistics, 1978-1995, n= 19 orchestras, in FIM 1994 
TC CC LC PS VISI CONC 
1978 
Mean 0.71517E+06 0.61704E+06 98128.00 0.62994E+06 28844 63.26 
Std. Dev. 0.76151E+06 0.61555E+06 0.16775E+06 0.67324E+06 25048 42.70 
1979 
Mean 0.81130E+06 0.71090E+06 0.10040E+06 0.75232E+06 27506 56.84 
Std. Dev. 0.87094E+06 0.76099E+06 0.11627E+06 0.78067E+06 25071 35.93 
1980 
Mean 0.10414E+07 0.89976E+06 0.14165E+06 0.96671E+06 26492 60.37 
Std. Dev. 0.11 139E+07 0.94302E+06 0.17434E+06 0.10175E+07 24273 36.21 
1981 
Mean 0.13787E+07 0.12164E+07 0.16225E+06 0.12931E+07 26473 57.68 
Std. Dev. 0.14656E+07 0.12872E+07 0.18869E+06 0.13469E+07 25700 35.61 
1982 
Mean 0.17261E+07 0.15115E+07 0.21460E+06 0.16144E+07 25388 59.00 
Std. Dev. 0.17279E+07 0.15358E+07 0.19908E+06 0.16147E+07 22003 34.28 
1983 
Mean 0.21731E+07 0.18922E+07 0.28032E+06 0.20554E+07 27599 61.26 
Std. Dev. 0.21155E+07 0.18501E+07 0.27635E+06 0.20715E+07 25245 34.20 
1984 
Mean 0.27687E+07 0.23861E+07 0.39215E+06 0.25494E+07 27773 62.63 
Std. Dev. 0.27175E+07 0.21605E+07 0.60696E+06 0.23620E+07 24141 34.82 
1985 
Mean 0.35050E+07 0.29257E+07 0.57936E+06 0.32209E+07 27897 63.79 
Std. Dev. 0.33727E+07 0.25131E+07 0.10398E+07 0.30001E+07 23785 30.08 
1986 
Mean 0.43040E+07 0.36955E+07 0.60852E+06 0.39399E+07 27515 61.32 
Std. Dev. 0.41587E+07 0.36939E+07 0.59574E+06 0.36794E+07 20249 27.47 
1987 
Mean 0.48367E+07 0.41825E+07 0.65423E+06 0.44201E+07 28478 63.62 
Std. Dev. 0.43095E+07 0.37721E+07 0.65170E+06 0.37476E+07 22270 27.14 
1988 
Mean 0.54701E+07 0.46634E+07 0.76464E+06 0.50392E+07 26018 61.42 
Std. Dev. 0.48151E+07 0.42233E+07 0.80406E+06 0.43058E+07 19244 27.08 
1989 
Mean 0.66152E+07 0.56818E+07 0.93339E+06 0.60392E+07 28014 61.90 
Std. Dev. 0.57343E+07 0.49888E+07 0.85716E+06 0.51499E+07 23191 25.48 
1990 
Mean 0.78089E+07 0.64546E+07 0.13543E+07 0.71209E+07 29876 70.68 
Std. Dev. 0.66759E+07 0.49530E+07 0.19958E+07 0.58159E+07 21220 39.72 
1991 
Mean 0.87609E+07 0.74692E+07 0.13006E+07 0.79669E+07 28212 63.63 
Std. Dev. 0.75541E+07 0.62992E+07 0.13245E+07 0.67203E+07 22003 25.70 
1992 
Mean 0.88244E+07 0.72769E+07 0.15224E+07 0.80145E+07 30571 70.63 
Std. Dev. 0.80218E+07 0.60176E+07 0.21293E+07 0.71754E+07 22870 24.03 
1993 
Mean 0.90346E+07 0.73451E+07 0.17304E+07 0.81576E+07 28487 67.74 
Std. Dev. 0.81413E+07 0.65719E+07 0.19410E+07 0.72286E+07 20199 29.28 
1994 
Mean 0.93004E+07 0.74116E+07 0.18888E+07 0.84425E+07 32507 72.53 
Std. Dev. 0.85760E+07 0.65162E+07 0.22422E+07 0.78153E+07 26479 26.51 
1995 
Mean 0.10042E+08 0.81075E+07 0.19341E+07 0.90745E+07 29890 71.95 
Std. Dev. 0.91476E+07 0.70269E+07 0.22423E+07 0.84019E+07 18659 27.90 
Descriptive Statistics: year 1978-1995, N= 19 Orchestras, in FIM 1994 
LP CP OR NS FTE PTE 
1978 
Mean 25554.00 125.35 50615.00 646.68 24.56 5.33 
Std. Dev. 6654.30 115.64 80776.00 345.85 26.04 10.61 
1979 
Mean 34162.00 151.88 58343.00 646.68 25.22 2.28 
Std. Dev. 20770.00 131.51 92119.00 345.85 26.33 4.03 
1980 
Mean 60418.00 209.59 67057.00 646.68 28.11 1.78 
Std. Dev. 87886.00 195.41 99761.00 345.85 28.47 4.11 
1981 
Mean 78183.00 247.67 89105.00 646.68 26.83 3.00 
Std. Dev. 0.12036E+06 224.66 0.12580E+06 345.85 26.51 6.50 
1982 
Mean 61969.00 334.74 0.12179E+06 646.68 28.34 5.00 
Std. Dev. 32682.00 257.41 0.16315E+06 345.85 28.09 9.54 
1983 
Mean 73445.00 432.71 0.16835E+06 646.68 29.34 4.42 
Std. Dev. 31885.00 355.73 0.23883E+06 345.85 28.16 8.21 
1984 
Mean 90273.00 519.19 0.20903E+06 646.68 30.79 4.58 
Std. Dev. 46604.00 434.10 0.32461E+06 345.85 28.18 10.24 
1985 
Mean 99800.00 687.24 0.23951E+06 646.68 33.45 4.32 
Std. Dev. 49803.00 602.91 0.35104E+06 345.85 29.57 7.97 
1986 
Mean 0.11249E+06 860.01 0.29915E+06 646.68 35.03 3.95 
Std. Dev. 58172.00 566.16 0.44906E+06 345.85 29.44 6.57 
1987 
Mean 0.12711E+06 959.12 0.34572E+06 646.86 35.87 2.37 
Std. Dev. 64885.00 639.66 0.47417E+06 345.85 29.47 3.67 
1988 
Mean 0.12492E+06 1071.50 0.38958E+06 646.68 36.76 2.32 
Std. Dev. 45937.00 652.64 0.51085E+06 345.85 29.69 3.03 
1989 
Mean 0.16419E+06 1332.00 0.49440E+06 646.68 38.11 1.63 
Std. Dev. 86282.00 777.91 0.53532E+06 345.85 29.80 1.61 
1990 
Mean 0.19270E+06 1485.00 0.60403E+06 708.37 38.52 1.26 
Std. Dev. 0.10898E+06 1103.40 0.78027E+06 436.18 29.92 1.24 
1991 
Mean 0.22019E+06 1709.10 0.71383E+06 708.37 38.87 1.11 
Std. Dev. 0.14249E+06 1128.90 0.86798E+06 436.18 30.16 1.24 
1992 
Mean 0.21678E+06 1652.30 0.83390E+06 708.37 38.03 1.63 
Std. Dev. 0.14759E+06 1207.50 0.89203E+06 463.18 28.97 0.94 
1993 
Mean 0.20506E+06 2194.60 0.89457E+06 683.05 38.79 1.03 
Std. Dev. 0.10627E+06 1431.80 0.94629E+06 448.58 29.81 1.06 
1994 
Mean 0.21314E+06 2283.50 0.85057E+06 683.05 38.87 0.87 
Std. Dev. 0.13922E+06 1740.90 0.84171E+06 448.58 29.97 0.85 
1995 
Mean 0.22570E+06 2357.20 0.91349E+06 682.37 38.59 0.87 
Std. Dev. 0.10703E+06 1579.10 0.81717E+06 446.92 30.03 0.78 
APPENDIX 4 
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Adni ion Revenues per Concert Goer 
rigure A: Admission tees per concert goer 
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Figure B: Costs per performance 
APPENDIX 5 
Table A: Estimated cost flexibilities for orchestras 
Year µ(p, y) Year P(P, Y) 
1978-1979 27.48 1986-1987 24.79 
1970-1980 25.86 1987-1988 25.37 
1980-1981 26.82 1988-1989 24.64 
1981-1982 28.06 1989-1990 22.95 
1982-1983 26.63 1990-1991 24.30 
1983-1984 26.33 1991-1992 21.85 
1984-1985 25.26 1992-1993 23.20 
1985-1986 25.61 1993-1994 22.90 
1994-1995 21.99 
Table B: Year specific dummies (std. errors in parentheses) 
parameter estimate parameter estimate 
61978 base 1987 -113.74 (11.58) 
61979 -111.60 (11.40) 
b1988 
-120.95 (11.59) 
61980 -111.57 (11.41) 61989 -116.03 (11.69) 
61981 -108.15 (11.41) 61990 -112.06 (11.61) 
61982 -118.57 (11.42) 61991 -110.28 (11.64) 
61983 -118.66 (11.48) 61992 -109.24 (11.72) 
51984 -115.12 (11.46) 61993 -115.53 (11.64) 
61985 -116.80 (11.51) 61994 -113.67 (11.67) 
61986 -116.26 (11.55) 61995 -112.02 (11.65) 
Table C: Orchestra specific dummies (std. errors in parentheses) 
parameter estimate parameter estimate 
61 base  11.39 (11.79) 
S2 13.91 (11.91) 612 -10.17 (12.62) 
63 5.43 (11.68) 613 -13.22 (12.37) 
S4 16.33 (11.89) 614 59.90 (12.09) 
b5 4.60 (11.71) 615 -11.54 (12.09) 
86 -11.43 (11.75) 616 -10.25 (12.32) 
6, 118.58 (11.70) S17 2.98 (12.78) 
Sg -4.13 (12.01) 618 -26.28 (13.47) 
b9 73.19 (11.69) b19 64.11 (22.86) 
b, o 16.67 (11.72) 
IV Generalised Cost Functions for Producers of Perfonning Arts 
- Allocative Inefficiencies and Scale Economies in Theati s 
1 Introduction 
In recent years cost functions have been increasingly used to study the structure of 
production. This has been enabled by the theory of production duality, according to 
which the structure of production can be examined by using cost functions. Under certain 
conditions cost functions based on information of input prices and output levels can be 
used to study the underlying production technology. Hence, cost functions have been 
widely applied in the analyses of industries where observations of production technology 
are scarce but observations of economic aspects of production, such as input prices and 
output, are available. 
This lack of information on production technology is particularly true with studies of the 
production of cultural services, and most of the empirical work done in this field has 
relied on cost functions: Globerman and Book (1974) estimated cost functions for 
symphony orchestras and theatre groups, Throsby (1977) for performing arts institutions, 
Lange et al. (1985) for symphony orchestras and Jackson (1988) for museums. The sole 
application of a production function has been carried out by Gapinski (1979) who 
estimated transcendental production functions for performing arts institutions. 
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The main interest of all previous applications of cost functions for cultural institutions 
has been in finding evidence on scale economies - Globerman and Book (1974), Throsby 
(1977), Lange et. al. (1985), and Jackson (1988) all concentrate on this topic. They all 
discovered different degrees of economic gain from large scale production - the estimates 
of elasticity of scale ranged from 10 to just over one. These results have important 
implications both on theoretical modelling and practical management of theatres. In 
theoretical modelling scale economies indicate monopolistic markets, and in practical 
management the existence of scale economies suggest possible cost savings from large 
scale production. 
The accuracy of these previous findings is, however, debatable for three main reasons. 
First, in the treatments by Globerman and Book (1974) and Throsby (1977), the 
definitions of the cost functions are not based on the theory of production duality, so 
the estimates of scale elasticities do not necessarily reflect the properties of the 
underlying production technology. Second, Lange et al. (1985) and Jackson (1988) a 
priori impose a homothetic underlying production technology with respect to output in 
their estimations. This assumption is contrary to the widely held view that the production 
of cultural services exhibits non-homotheticity, i. e. relative shares of input utilisation are 
likely to vary when output expands. Third, and most importantly, all four studies rely 
on the assumption that the production of cultural services is technically and allocatively 
efficient. In short, these studies assume that in the production of cultural services the 
minimum amount of inputs is used to produce a given output level, and that inputs are 
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combined in optimal proportions in light of prevailing market prices. ' However, there are 
grounds to suspect that the production of cultural services is characterised by 
inefficiencies, and thus, estimations based on the efficiency assumption are likely to 
result biased estimates. ' 
This article explores the structure of the production of Finnish theatres. It concentrates 
on three main questions. Along the lines of the previous studies, it first looks at the 
existence of economic gains from large-scale production. Second, the article examines 
the underlying production technology to find out whether the relative shares of input 
utilisation remain constant when the output expands, i. e. is the underlying production 
technology of theatres homothetic with respect to output. The third question revolves ' 
around the efficiency of production. The article tests the allocative efficiency of the 
production of theatrical performances, and further, it assesses how an omission of 
allocative inefficiencies affects the results. 3 
This article proceeds in two phases. The analysis begins with a brief presentation of the 
theoretical basis of cost functions. The main point is that if the hypothesis of allocative 
efficiency does not hold, then the use of traditional neo-classical cost functions is 
inappropriate. Thus, a generalised cost function, that retains the desirable properties of 
the dual neo-classical cost function but allows allocative inefficiencies, is used in the 
analysis of likely inefficient theatres. The functional form and parameterisation of the 
generalised cost function rely on the idea that theatres base their production decisions 
102 
on unobservable shadow prices, rather than market prices of inputs. The formulation is 
attained, following Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984), by rewriting the translog cost 
function introduced by Christensen, Jörgensen, and Lau (1973) and by using the notion 
of shadow input prices. ' This yields a pararneterisation of the generalised cost function 
in which the existence of allocative inefficiencies, as well as the homotheticity of the 
underlying production technology, is a testable hypothesis, not an a priori assumption. 
The second phase deals with the estimation of the generalised cost function. The 
estimations employ a panel data set of 37 Finnish theatres from 1985 to 1993 and 
examine the existence of allocative inefficiencies. This is done by running a test of 
relative price efficiency, i. e. a test whether the marginal rates of technical substitution 
equal the corresponding ratios of the market prices of inputs. Then, the assumptions of 
the homotheticity and homogeneity of the underlying production technology are tested. 
The estimations are completed by an examination of whether there exist economic gains 
from large scale production, what kind of average cost curves the estimated model 
implies, and whether the omission of inefficiencies affect the results. 
103 
2A generalised cost function for theatres 
The neo-classical cost function prescribes the minimum cost of producing a given output 
level. ' Formally, it is given by, 
c(p, y) = min., o(p "x: xE V(y)] (1) 
in which p is a vector of strictly positive input prices, x is a vector of input factors, and 
V(y) is the input requirement set. As is well known, the first-order conditions for the 
above cost minimisation problem (1) imply that the marginal rate of technical 
substitution between the it" and jt' inputs equals the ratio of the ith to the jt' input price 
suggesting that there exist no allocative inefficiencies. For the above formulation (1) to 
incorporate allocative inefficiencies it is assumed that there exists a shadow cost function 
which depends on the shadow prices of inputs instead of market prices - firms choose 
inputs in order to minimise the total shadow costs of the chosen level of output. The 
shadow cost function can be defined as, 
cs(q, Y) = min, ý, o[q -x: xE 
V(Y)] (2) 
in which q is a vector of strictly positive shadow input prices defined as q=v; p; where 
v; is the proportion of which the shadow price of the ith input differs from its (strictly 
positive) market price p;. Moreover, x is a vector of input factors and V(y) is the input 
requirement set. 
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The shadow cost function (2) can be used, by applying the Shephard's lemma, to derive 
the actual input demand functions: the vector of derivatives of (2) with respect to the 
shadow input prices q gives the vector of shadow cost minimising actual input demands, 
x(q, y) = äcs(q, y)/aq. These actual input demands x(q, y) can then be used to derive the 
total actual costs c8(q, y), 
Ce (q, y) =E ipjxi =F ipi[a&s(q, y)/ac]. (3) 
In order to rewrite (3) the shadow cost share of the it input still needs to be defined: 
the shadow cost share is given by S; s = gx/cs(q, y) which can be written as x= 
S; Scs(q, y)/q. Substituting this to the above formulation (3) yields the actual cost function 
(4) that retains the desirable properties of the traditional neoclassical cost function - non- 
negativity, non-decreasingness in q, non-decreasingness in y, positive linear homogeneity 
in q, concavity and continuity in q, and differentiability - and, thus, is dual to the 
underlying production technology, 
ce(q, Y) = cs(9, Y) E ; v; 
1 Sis (4) 
The estimation of (4) requires a functional form. As noted, the translog (TL) functional 
form introduced by Christensen, Jörgenson, and Lau (1973) suits for this purpose. 
Because the basic formulation of the TL cost function does not, however, incorporate the 
possibility of allocative inefficiencies the neo-classical TL formulation is modified. 
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Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980; 1984; 1986) suggest that a way to do this is first to 
define the shadow cost function (2). Thus, the TL shadow cost function - where v; are 
the proportions of which the shadow price of the ih input differs form the market price 
p; - can be written as, 6 
In cg= ao + ay In y+ 'y (ln y)2 +:; a; In (viP) +EiE; 'Y,; In (v, Pi ) In (v; P; ) 
+ E; -yyi In y In (v; p), i=1,2 (5) 
From this can be derived the shadow cost shares of inputs S; s by logarithmic 
differentiation of (5) with respect to In vlp;: 
aln cs(viPi, y)/aln vipi = (viP, /cs(vip,, Y))(acs(vipi, Y)/ävipi) = vipix/cs(vip1, y) = Sts. 
Hence, the shadow cost share of the i"'-input can be written in the TL form as, 
S; S = a, + yyi In y+Fjyj In (v; p1), i=1,2 (6) 
The shadow cost share (6) and the shadow cost function (5) can then be used to derive 
the parameterised actual cost function that is based on the shadow prices. Taking 
logarithms and substituting (6) and (7) to the definition of the actual cost function (4) - 
ee(Vipº, y) = es(vjpi, y) E; v; 1Si, - yields, 
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In ce = ao + ay In y+ 'yyy(In y)2 +E; a11n(viP) +FIF j'YiJ In(v1p1) ln(v p) 
+Ei -y,, i In y 1n(vip) + In[ E ivi-1(«i + -yyi 
In y+E; 'Yij 1n(v1p; ))], i=1,2 (7) 
The actual cost shares, in turn, are defined by S; a = p; x; /ca(v; p;, y). These actual cost 
shares can be re-written by using the definition of actual input demands x; = 
S; Sc3(v; p;, y)/v; p;, derived above, as S; 8 = p; (S, scs(v, p,, y)/v; pi)/ca(v; p,, y). Employing again the 
shadow cost function (5) and the shadow cost shares (6) yields the parameterisation of 
the actual costs shares, 
Sla = [a; + -yy; In y+E; 'yjn (vipj)]vi 1/ E Jai + 7yß In y (8) 
+j yij in (v; pj)]v; '', i=1,2 
Hence, the generalised TL cost function is parameterised as the actual cost function (7) 
and the two cost share equations (8). For these to be dual to the underlying production 
technology, the following regularity conditions have to be met, 
E; a; =1 
E; -y,; =0 
E, -', = Ej7, = EiEj-i' =0. 
This yields a system of equations that is flexible enough to test the homotheticity of the 
underlying production technology, and besides, the parameterisation allows to test 
whether production is allocatively efficient by analysing the vi parameter. As is well 
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known, the homotheticity can be tested by examining whether 'yy 0 and the 
homogeneousness by whether yy; 0 and yri 0. The allocative efficiencies can, in turn, 
be traced by using the notion of relative price efficiency (RPE). ' In (7) and (8) the 
assumption of RPE holds when v; : 76 1 but v; = v3 implying that the costs are minimised, 
but not necessarily at the efficient level of production. Whereas if vi ;, '- 1 but v; ? v3, then 
the assumption of RPE does not hold - the marginal rates of technical substitution differ 
from the ratios of the market prices of inputs. ' 
The actual cost function (8) can also be used to derive the estimates for the elasticities 
of substitution between inputs, own price elasticities of inputs, as well as measures for 
size and scale elasticities. In the TL form, the Allen partial elasticity of substitution is 
given by; 
Qij= (7 ij 
+ si'sja)/Siasja 
whereas he own price elasticity can be written as -q; = Qu S; ', in which Q,; = [_y; j + Sla(S, a - 
1)]/(S1a)2. The measure for the elasticity of size can, in turn, be written as; 
E iv; 
" sis] µa(V. p y) =%+ 'Yyyln y+E ('Yy, In (v1p1) +[E Zvi 
1 'y}/[ 
This coincides with the elasticity of scale when the underlying production technology 
is homothetic with respect to output. Thus, if the production technology is homothetic 
both the elasticity of size E *(v; p;, y) and elasticity of scale E (v; p;, y) equal (a}, + -yY, In y)-' 
and when the actual cost function is homogeneous E *(vlp;, y) and E (v; p;, y) equal (ay)-' 
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3 Data set and measures for input prices and output 
A panel data set of 37 theatres is employed in the estimations. This data of nine cross- 
sections, from 1985 to 1993, was collected by the Association for Finnish Theatres, and 
it comprises institutions that have full time personnel and stage performances on a 
regular basis. (See Appendix 1) 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the data set, 1985-1993, n= 37 theatres, in FIM 
Variable mean variance 
TC 0.12977E+08 0.15342E+15 
LC 0.88546E+07 0.65554E+14 
CC 0.33835E+07 0.16544E+14 
LP 0.13949E+06 0.23299E+10 
CP 5531.80 29285.00 
VISI 59947.00 0.36366E+10 
PERFO 226.57 24137.00 
FULL 67.41 140.56 
List of variables: TC = total costs, LC = labour costs, CC = capital costs, LP = labour input price, CP capital 
input price, VISI = number of visitors, PERFO = number of performances, FULL = seats taken (%) 
The statistics on wages, man-hours, number of full-time and part-time employees, real 
estate costs, depreciation, number of seats, as well as the number of visitors, are used 
to construct the measures for input prices and output. As to the measures for input 
prices, it is assumed that theatres use labour and capital inputs in their production. 9 The 
unit price of labour input LP (price of one man-year) is defined as, 
LP = LC / (FTE + PTE) 
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in which the total personnel costs LC are divided by the man-years of full-time 
employees FTE plus the man-years of part-time employees PTE. 1° The unit price of 
capital input CP - "price of one seat" - is, in turn, defined as, 
CP = (RC + OC - D)/NS 
in which RC denotes real estate costs, OC stands for other costs, D represents 
depreciation, and NS is the number of seats. The statistics on the real estate costs RC 
include costs that can be allocated to the running of the estate. The costs being caused 
by investments or acquiring capital (interest) are included in the other costs OC that also 
contain the costs of staging and purchases of equipment (stage, lighting, and sound 
equipment; musical instruments; scores; and scripts). The use of the number of seats NS 
as the divisor yields a unit price of capital CP that directly relates to the measure for 
output (number of visitors), as well as the capacity of each theatre. 
The output is measured by the number of visitors. The reason for this is that artistic 
experiences provided to theatre goers, rather than the number of reruns, reflect the output 
of theatres. " Furthermore, the use of the number of visitors seems reasonable in the light 
that none of the 37 theatres works on full capacity, and that there is always the 
possibility of making an unrestricted number of reruns of any play if there is demand. 
(See Appendix 2) 
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4 Estimation of the generalised cost function 
The parameter estimates for the actual TL cost function are derived from the non-linear 
cost function (7) and the cost share equations (8), to which are added the conventional 
disturbance terms (. cc and e1), as well as a dummy structure, 
In Ce = ao + ay In y+ 'yyy(ln y)2 +Ei ai In (vip) +EiE; Yi; In (vipi ) In (v; P; ) 
+i ryyi In y In (viP1) + 1n[ F. i v; -'(a; + -yyi In y+E; 'Yi; In (viP; ))] 
+Bf+ St +E, , i=1, k (9) 
Si' = [a; + yyi In y+E3yj In (viP; )] vi-' /Ei [a1 + 'y in y+E, -y,, in (v1P; )] vi-' 
+e1, i=1, k 
In this ao is the intercept; a, is the cost share of labour when the output does not 
change; ak is the cost share of capital; ay represents "the cost flexibility"; y,,, yy and 
'yk, are the share elasticities; y,, and 'Yyk stand for the biases of scale, and yyy is the 
derivative of elasticity of cost with respect to output yn,. The dummy variable bf picks 
the theatre specific costs that are not included in the explanatory variables, while S, is 
a dummy variable for the time effects. 
The v; parameter, as already noted, captures whether the shadow prices of inputs differ 
from the market prices. To facilitate the estimations, v; is assumed to be input specific 
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but identical across theatres. 12 Moreover, the generalised cost function (9) is assumed to 
be homogeneous of degree zero with respect to v;, i. e. a change in v; 's does not have an 
effect on the total actual Costs. 13 This restrictive assumption is made to enable an 
estimation of (9) without considering the possible technical inefficiencies that become 
apparent when v; has a direct effect on the total costs. It should be noted, that this 
assumption does not in any way affect the analysis of allocative inefficiencies, but the 
assumption precludes the testing of technical efficiencies. 14 
The estimation proceeds in two stages. A linear approximation of the system is first 
estimated, and then the parameter estimates from that are used as the starting values for 
the non-linear system. The linear system, that is estimated by using a modification of 
Zellner's (1962) SUR procedure, is a version of (9) with the assumption that v; equals 
one. The non-linear TL cost function is then estimated by using the parameter estimates 
from the linear approximation as the starting values. The procedure applied by Atkinson 
and Halvorsen (1984) is followed, and thus, the non-linear SUR system (9) is estimated 
by the iterative maximum likelihood procedure. This estimation incorporates a system 
of three equations, namely the actual cost function and the cost share equations for 
labour and capital, of which the share equation for capital is again deleted, and the 
remaining parameters derived from the regularity conditions. '5 
The use of the non-linear SUR proves to be appropriate: a test for contemporaneous 
correlation suggests that the null hypothesis of contemporaneous covariances being zero 
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can be rejected at 0.05 level (X2(2) = 151.65; critical value 2(2) = 5.99). This suggests 
that there is indeed a need for SUR, because the least squares applied separately to each 
equation would not be fully efficient. 
The parameter estimates in Table 2 are all statistically significant, and of the right sign. 
They demonstrate that the estimated actual cost function (9) fulfills the regularity 
conditions: ak + al =1, Tyk + 7Y1 = 0, as well as yu, + ykk + ryll = 0. Furthermore, it 
appears that the structure of the model, rather than the dummy structure, contributes to 
the explanatory power of the model. This is supported by the rejection of the hypothesis 
that all parameter estimates except 8t and Sf equal zero at 0.05 level. (X2(8) = 135860.95; 
critical value X(8) = 15.5). 
Table 2: Parameter Estimates (t-values in parentheses) 
parameter estimate parameter estimate 
as 1.32 (9.94) ak 0.11 (2.86) 
ay 1.57 (24.03) rykk 0.05 (11.82) 
Ty y -0.07 
(-15.87) yyk 0.01 (2.67) 
al 0.89 (22.23) '7k1 -0.03 (-6.18) 
111 -0.02 (-5.14) vk 0.61 (14.85) 
yyl -0.01 (-2.67) vi 1.00 
(a 
Normalised to equal 1.0 
The estimates of the year and theatre specific dummies, in Table 3 and Table 4, are 
almost all statistically significant - only one of the year dummies and four of the theatre 
specific dummies are not significant. 
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Table 3: Estimates of the year dummies St (t-values in parentheses) 
parameter estimate parameter estimate 
61985 the base 61990 0.21 (5.04) 
51986 0.07 (1.96) 61991 0.23 (5.62) 
61987 0.03 (0.86) 61992 0.24 (5.03) 
61988 0.10 (2.75) 61993 0.22 
(5.01) 
51989 0.16 (3.62) 
It appears, that neither the time specific nor theatre specific dummies could be excluded 
from the model - the hypothesis that the time specific dummies equal zero is rejected at 
the 0.05 level (X2(8) = 94.72; critical value X2(8) = 15.51), as is the hypothesis that the 
theatre dummies equal zero (2(35) = 2151.32; critical value X2(35) = 55.76). The fact 
that all year specific dummies are positive, suggests that costs have risen since the base 
year 1985. 
Table 4: Estimates of the theatre specific dummies bf (t-values in parentheses) 
parameter estimate parameter estimate parameter estimate 
1 -1.53 (-11.06) 613 -0.29 (-0.77) 625 -0.93 (-9.50) 
62 -0.03 (-0.29) ö14 -1.21 (-2.15) 626 -0.77 (-1.39) 
S3 -1.76 (-2.60) 615 -1.82 (-6.00) 627 -0.26 (-1.21) 
84 -1.83 (-4.64) 616 -1.63 (-2.86) 628 -2.77 (-11.46) 
65 -1.35 (1.90) 617 -0.88 (-2.01) 629 -3.49 (-18.87) 
S6 -0.86 (-2.23) 618 -1.37 (-3.18) 630 -1.97 (-4.67) 
87 -1.51 (-4.10) 619 -2.31 (-5.09) 631 -1.54 (-9.87) 
8g -1.42 (-1.94) 620 -2.44 (-13.87) 632 -0.75 (-6.57) 
69 -1.95 (-7.72) ö2, -1.30 (-1.79) 633 -1.54 (-3.05) 
610 -1.39 (-1.74) 622 -2.16 (-4.12) 634 -1.98 (-17.51) 
S -1.52 (-2.04) S23 -2.05 (-3.80) 
635 -1.69 (-6.15) 
612 -0.85 (-2.13) 624 -1.42 (-3.09) 
636 -1.57 (-3.92) 
637 the base (a 
The National Theatre 
114 
All of the theatre specific effects in Table 4 are of the same sign, the minimum value 
is -0.03 and the maximum is -3.49. This indicates that in the National theatre (the base 
theatre) production is, all things equal, the most expensive. Because the theatre dummies 
capture time invariant firm specific variation the relatively high costs in the National 
theatre could possibly be interpretated to originate from goodness of management, type 
of repertoire, quality of productions, or location. 16 
4.1 Parametric test of allocalive inefficiency and its magnitude 
The parametric test of allocative inefficiency is based on the concept of relative price 
efficiency (RPE), and the testing involves v; 's that are input specific but identical across 
firms. This implies, that in order to test the allocative inefficiency v, has to be 
normalised. Because v, is normalised to one (v, =1), also Vk should equal one, for the 
RPE to hold and no allocative inefficiencies to exist. " This seems, however, not to be 
the case: the estimate of vk is 0.61, and the hypothesis that Vk =1 is rejected at the 0.05 
level (x2(1) = 91.37; critical value X2(1) = 3.84). Thus, the assumption that the RPE does 
not hold, and that there are allocative inefficiencies in production. 
Even if the actual cost function (9) is assumed to be homogeneous of degree zero in vk, 
in section 3, it can be used to derive estimates of the allocative inefficiencies' effect on 
total costs. As proposed by Eakin (1993), the extent of the allocative inefficiency can be 
assessed by using the measure of allocative inefficiency Al = (Cobs - Cm`s)/Cm's), in which 
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the idea is to compare the fitted actual total costs (v, = 1) Vk = 0.61) and the fitted total 
costs when the RPE holds (v, = vk = 1). This means, that to circumvent the restrictive 
assumption of the homogeneity of degree zero in vk two separate models have to be 
estimated - one efficient and the other inefficient - and the predictions of these two 
models then compared. " The resulting Al, which indicate the effects of allocative 
inefficiency on total costs, suggests that the actual costs exceed the minimum cost by on 
average 4.94 per cent. The minimum value for the Al is 0.06 per cent, whereas the 
maximum is 5.31 per cent, indicating that all theatres in the sample suffer from some 
degree of allocative inefficiency. 
The deviation from the RPE can be further illustrated with the following figure, 
k 
Figure 1: Deviation from the RPE 
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in which the axes I and k stand for labour and capital inputs, and the isoquant I 
corresponds with the observed output level y and, thus, the observed input bundle V(y) 
is on the isoquant. A theatre facing the input price ratio pk/pl is located at u. The point 
u is allocatively inefficient in light of prevailing market prices, but efficient in light of 
shadow prices of inputs. In other words, with the input price ratio pk/pl the efficient point 
would be u* in which the isocost line's B' slope pk/p, tangents the isoquant, while with 
the shadow input price ratio the efficient point is at u where the isocost line's slope 
VkPk/PI tangents I. Since vk/vl is less than one (vk/vl = 0.61), the shadow input price ratio 
is less than the observed input price ratio, and the capital-labour ratio is larger at u, than 
at the cost efficient point u*. 
The effect of allocative inefficiency on input demands can also be estimated by using 
the same method. Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) have shown that this can be done by 
"comparing the fitted quantities with the quantities that would have been demanded if 
relative price efficiency had been attained. " The comparison proceeds in four stages. 
First, the actual cost share equation S; a = v; p; x; /Ca(v; p;, y) is solved for x;, which yields 
x; = Sj'C'(v; p;, y)/(v; p; ). Second, the fitted values of input demands (input demands when 
there are allocative inefficiencies) are derived by using the fitted actual cost shares S; 8 
and the actual costs Ca when v, = 1, vk = 0.61, and third, the efficient input demands 
(input demands implied by the efficient TL cost function with no allocative 
inefficiencies, v, = vk 1) are derived. 19 Lastly, the two calculated fitted values are 
compared. 
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The comparison of the two fitted values in the case of Finnish theatres suggests that at 
the mean of the data the estimated effect of allocative inefficiency on input demands is 
to decrease the demand of capital by 5.93 per cent and to decrease the demand of labour 
by 5.32 per cent on average. Furthermore, for the former the minimum is 4.59 and the 
maximum is 14.21 per cent, whereas for the latter the minimum is 1.22 and the 
maximum is 6.48 per cent. 
As to the demands of the inputs in the case when the RPE does not hold (v1 = 1, vk = 
0.61), the own price elasticities of the inputs reveal that the demand of the capital input 
is more elastic with respect to its own price than the labour input. The own price 
elasticities of capital rgkk= -0.52 (s. e 0.08) and of labour i= -0.26 (s. e. 0.04) imply that 
an increase in the price of capital diminishes its demand more rapidly than a change in 
the price of labour input. The estimates of Allen partial elasticities of substitution further 
suggest that capital and labour are Allen substitutes: at the mean values the Allen 
elasticity 0k, is 0.82 (s. e 0.47), indicating that an increase in the price of labour leads to 
an increase in the utilisation of capital, and vice versa. 
4.2 Homotheticity of production technology and elasticities of size and scale 
The underlying production technology proves not to be homothetic with respect to output 
- the hypothesis that biases of scale equal zero (-yy1= 'yyk 0) is rejected at the 0.05 level 
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(f(2) = 7.13; critical value X2(2) = 5.99). This result, first, suggests that the relative 
shares of input utilisation vary when output expands, which is an expected result in the 
production of cultural services where capital cannot necessarily substitute for labour in 
equal proportions. The fact that there exist no unitary elasticities of substitution between 
inputs can be further verified by noting that the hypothesis of unitary elasticities of 
substitution (-yk, = 0) is rejected at 0.05 level (X2(1) = 38.19; critical value X2(1) = 3.84). 
The non-homotheticity of the underlying production technology further implies that the 
underlying production technology is non-homogeneous with respect to output. The reason 
for this is, as is well known, that the homotheticity is a prerequisite for homogeneity. 
This result can be demonstrated by the fact that the hypothesis of homogeneity (-yy, = 
'Yyk = 7yy = 0) is rejected at the 0.05 level (2(3) = 404.56; critical value X2(3) = 7.81), 
which means that output does not expand at the same rate along the scale line when the 
utilisation of inputs expands. The fact that the term capturing the non-homogeneity ('yyy= 
-0.067, in Table 2) is negative suggests that there are increasing cost savings when 
output expands. 
The third implication of the non-homotheticity of the underlying production technology 
is that the measure of elasticity of size (reciprocal of size elasticity) does not coincide 
with the measure of elasticity of scale. The estimated cost flexibility, with each input 
price and output combination, is on average 0.82 implying economies of size of 1.22. 
Figure 2 shows the elasticities of size with the input prices set to their mean values and 
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suggests that the elasticities of size increase as the number of theatre goers increases (the 
curve denoted by +). As noted, this increase is mainly attributable to the negative 'yyyln 
y term. The estimates of the allocatively inefficient model differ form the allocatively 
efficient model: in the generalised cost function with v, = Vk =1 the estimated average 
cost flexibility is 0.75 implying an elasticity of size of 1.34 and increasing economies 
of size (the curve denoted by 0 in Figure 2). Thus, omission of the allocative 
inefficiencies from the estimations results in an underestimation of the cost flexibilities, 
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Figure 2: Elasticitiy of size - number of visitors 
The difference between the estimates derived from the cost function under the 
assumption of allocative efficiency and the cost function with the assumption that RPE 
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does not hold can also be seen from the average cost (AC) curves predicted by the two 
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Figure 3: Average costs - number of visitors 
The AC curves, in which the input prices are set to their mean values and the number 
of visitors is let to vary, show that as a result of allocative inefficiency the average costs 
(the curve denoted by +; v, = 1, Vk = 0.61) are above the minimum cost (the curve 
denoted by O; v, = Vk = 1) in order to produce the same amount. As such, the true 
predicted average costs (the curve denoted by +) demonstrate that an increase in the 
audience size results substantial cost savings: the average cost of a visitor at a relatively 
low level of production is higher than at a relatively high level of attendance. 
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5 Conclusion 
Whether the received wisdom about the structure of the production of cultural services 
holds in the case of theatres has been examined here. Three presumptions were 
examined: allocative efficiency, homotheticity of the underlying production technology, 
and existence of scale economies. The results of the analysis show that two of these 
presumptions did not hold in the case of Finnish theatres. First, there is clear evidence 
on allocative inefficiencies, which is contrary to the assumptions made in the previous 
estimations of cost functions for cultural institutions. Second, the underlying production 
technology of the Finnish theatres was non-homothetic with respect to output. This 
finding contrasts with Lange et al. (1985) and Jackson (1988), who assume homothetic 
production technology, but it coincides with the analyses of Globermann and Book 
(1974) and Throsby (1977), who both take non-homogeneity into account. " Third, 
production in Finnish theatres is characterised by size economies. This finding is in 
accordance with previous studies that find evidence of scale economies in performing 
arts institutions. 
The measure of allocative inefficiency finds that on average the actual total costs of 
theatres exceed the minimum costs by some 4.9 per cent. The capital input appears to 
be relatively more over-employed than the labour input. Theatres exhibit a 5.9 percent 
excess demand of capital, and 5.3 percent excess utilisation of labour. By and large these 
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results suggest that theatres do not combine inputs in economically optimal proportions 
in light of prevailing market prices. There are some plausible explanations for this. The 
non-optimal usage of inputs may originate from the managers' desire for large audiences, 
high quality of production, or large budgets. Alternatively, the non-cost minimising 
behaviour may derive from the strings that are attached to public subsidies, such as 
quality requirements. This indicates that future empirical analyses should take into 
account the possibility of allocative inefficiencies. Besides this, a need for a detailed 
analysis of the extent of technical inefficiencies is accentuated. A full blown examination 
of both allocative and technical efficiencies in the production of cultural services, 
however, necessitates the application of cost or production frontiers. 
The second main finding indicates biases of scale: when output expands, the relative 
utilisation of capital input increases. This observation points out that when the number 
of theatre goers increase, theatres tend to respond by increasing the size of auditorium, 
rather than by arranging labour intensive reruns. It appears, that the possible cause for 
the non-homotheti city and the bias for capital input is that in order to increase attendance 
a theatre has to "grab" a larger amount of initial peak demand, which implies 
investments on larger auditoriums. Moreover, demand for capital was shown to be more 
responsive to a change in its price, than the labour input. This relative inelasticity of the 
demand of labour input reflects the difficulty for performing arts institutions to cut down 
on personnel, and it verifies Granfield's (1971) [quoted in Gapinski (1979, pp. 2)] 
argument that, "La Mancha would definitely suffer if Sancho were replaced by additional 
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swords for Quixote. " In sum, the assumptions about the homotheticity and homogeneity 
of the underlying production technology should be tested, rather than posed a priori. 
The third main finding indicates the existence of size economies. For the Finnish theatres 
the estimated size elasticity was on average 1.22. The likely reason for the size 
economies is, as suggested already by Baumol and Bowen (1966), the relatively high 
costs of staging and rehearsing a play compared to the relatively low costs of keeping 
the play in a repertoire. The importance of the relatively high fixed costs of production 
was vindicated by the fact that the predicted average cost curve was downward sloping, 
and revealed substantial cost savings from increased attendance. Because the Finnish 
theatres employed on average only 67 per cent of their capacity they could still gain 
substantially from larger audiences. 
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Endnotes 
1. Also Paulus (1993) assumes efficient production in estimations of single output cost 
functions for museums. 
2. Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) have made this point in relation to regulated 
industries. 
3. The focus of this paper is on allocative inefficiencies, not on technical inefficiencies. 
The main reason for this is that the joint estimation of allocative and technical 
inefficiencies is problematic in the shadow cost function framework applied in this paper. 
See Greene (1993) for a detailed discussion. One should, however, note that neglecting 
technical inefficiency in a cost function does not affect consistence property of the 
parameter estimates, except the intercept. See Kumbhakar (1991a) for discussion. 
4. See Cowing (1981), Nelson and Wohar (1983), Pescatrice and Trapani (1980), and 
Spann (1974), Hollas and Stansell (1988), Eakin and Kiesner (1988), and Sickles et al. 
(1986) for alternative applications of shadow cost functions. 
5. The definition of the neo-classical cost function is here based on Chambers (1989). 
6. Lau and Yotopoulos (1971) have proposed, in an other context, that the shadow prices 
can be assumed to differ from the market prices of inputs by a fixed proportion v;. Thus, 
the shadow prices can be approximated by q=v; p;. 
7. See Atkinson and Halvorsen (1980) for a more detailed discussion of relative price 
efficiency. 
8. One should note that in this parameterisation, the actual cost function (8) equals the 
neo-classical cost function if the shadow prices of inputs equal market prices, which 
implies that v; = vv = 1. In this case, there exist neither technical nor allocative 
inefficiencies - the value of the marginal product for each input is equal to the market 
price, and thus, production is efficient. 
9. Throsby (1977) used no measure for input prices, Lange et. al. (1985) and Jackson 
(1989) measured the price of labour input as the wage rate and the price of capital as the 
ratio of promotional expenditure to contributions from all sources. 
10. One should notice that the practice of calculating man-years changed slightly in 
1989: till 1989 man-years are calculated on a yearly basis, not separately in each month, 
whereas since 1989 they are calculated separately in each month and, thus, unpaid leave 
as well as unfilled vacancies are deducted from the yearly man-hours. As a result of this 
both the man-years of full-time and part-time employees may be slightly over-estimated 
till 1989, and hence, the labour input price p, may be slightly under-estimated. Moreover, 
the labour input price p, does not comprehend those employees who take care of the real 
estates, neither is voluntary work included. 
11. Throsby (1977) measured the output by number of visitors, whereas Globerman and 
Book (1974) and Lange et al. (1985) used number of performances. 
12. Atkinson and Halvorsen (1984) made this assumption in order to avoid an 
identification problem. See Lau and Yotopoulos (1971) and Färe and Grosskopf (1990) 
for alternative ways to solve the problem. 
13. Kumbhakar (1991 a) has argued that if the assumption does not hold - (10) is not 
homogeneous of degree zero in v; - then the only parameter which consistency is in 
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jeopardy is the intercept ao. 
14. Actually the technical inefficiencies could be captured by using a deterministic 
frontier approach pioneered by Aigner and Chu (1968). This is not, however, done 
because of the fundamental problems of the deterministic frontiers. See Greene (1993) 
for a detailed discussion. 
15. As is well known the estimates are invariant to the choice of equation to be deleted. 
16. The previous estimations of cost functions for cultural institutions have tried to 
capture the quality of production in their estimations: Globerman and Book (1974) 
captured quality of production by attendance per tour performances, Throsby (1977) by 
grants per box office revenues, whereas Jackson (1988) used a dummy variable based 
on the accreditation of American Association of Museums (AMM) to measure the quality 
(or lack of it). 
17. As is well known the estimated relative values of the v; as well as the rest of the 
parameters are invariant whichever of the v's is normalised and with whichever value. 
18. In both models the fitted values are calculated by setting the input prices to their 
mean values. 
19. The input prices of capital and labour are set to their mean values. 
20. Globermann and Book (1974) and Throsby (1977) use in their estimations functional 
forms that include second and third powers of output. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Table A: Descriptive Statistics of the data set, 1985-1993, n= 37 theatres, in FIM 
R= mean, o2 = variance 
1985-1993 1985 1986 1987 
Total costs 
0.12977E+08 0.96685E+07 0.10600E+08 0.11291E+08 
0.15342E+15 0.84692E+14 0.98629E+14 0.11729E+15 
Labour costs 
x 0.88546E+07 0.65905E+07 0.73572E+07 0.77373E+07 
o2 0.65554E+14 0.33995E+14 0.41360E+14 0.48673E+14 
Capital costs 
x 0.33835E+07 0.16581E+07 0.18669E+07 0.30303E+07 
a' 0.16544E+14 0.51231E+13 0.81318E+13 0.13529E+14 
Performances 
x 226.57 261.34 277.54 270.03 
d2 24137.00 24908.00 24699.00 24455.00 
Visitors 
x 59947.00 66180.00 67464.00 65225.00 
o2 0.36366E+10 0.47695E+10 0.43452E+10 0.47313E+10 
Seats Taken (%) 
R 67.41 71.35 68.99 67.50 
0ý 140.56 127.94 154.84 127.38 
Labour Input Price 
x 0.13949E+06 0.10739E+06 0.12052E+06 0.12253E+06 
0.23299E+10 0.33936E+09 0.69155E+09 0.74619E+09 
Capital Input Price 
x 5531.80 2745.0 2775.80 4896.70 
o2 29285.00 0.33548E+07 0.65194E+07 0.61052E+07 
1988 1989 1990 1991 
Total Cost 
x 0.12660E+08 0.13105E+08 0.14534E+08 0.15046E+08 
J 0.14586E+15 0.15650E+15 0.20246E+15 0.20218E+15 
Labour Cost 
x 0.85863E+07 0.89988E+07 0.99204E+07 0.10501E+08 
o2 0.58799E+14 0.65129E+14 0.85175E+14 0.95629E+14 
Capital Cost 
x 0.36083E+07 0.36011E+07 0.41242E+07 0.38354E+07 
0ý 0.19410E+14 0.18491E+14 0.24180E+14 0.16975E+14 
Performances 
x 285.81 262.35 260.65 262.32 
a' 31317.00 26380.00 25744.00 22110.00 
Visitors 
x 64756.00 57585.00 56729.00 56730.00 
02 0.42733E+10 0.36512E+10 0.33938E+10 0.31498E+10 
Seats Taken (%) 
R 68.64 65.80 66.10 67.69 
0' 122.51 212.41 159.70 121.44 
Labour Input Price 
x 0.13704E+06 0.15024E+06 0.13358E+06 0.14725E+06 
o2 0.57820E+09 0.31358E+10 0.39949E+09 0.29018E+09 
Capital Input Price 
x 5888.60 5850.40 6896.00 6504.20 




o2 0.18584E+15 0.18078E+15 
Labour Cost 
x 0.10094E+08 0.99653E+07 
o2 0.84159E+14 0.73170E+14 
Capital Cost 
x 0.37439E+07 0.48047E+07 
o2 0.16852E+14 0.20435E+14 
Performances 
x 261.11 258.86 
Cý 21788.00 20792.00 
Visitors 
x 54117.00 51757.00 
0.28257E+10 0.22738E+10 
Seats Taken (%) 
R 66.11 64.82 
02 110.01 127.10 
Labour Input Price 
x 0.18275E+06 0.15086E+06 
o2 0.12530E+11 0.38326E+09 
Capital Input Price 
x 6185.30 7992.50 
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V Efficiency of Museums 
- Application of Free Disposal Hull Method to Measure Cost Efficiency 
1 Introduction 
Non-parametric mathematical programming methods have been increasingly used, instead 
of parametric (econometric) methods, to assess efficiency. ' The main reason for this has 
been that while the parametric approaches require pre-specified functional forms and a 
multitude of implicit and explicit assumptions on the underlying production technology, 
the programming methods require hardly any a priori assumptions. 2 Due to this, the non- 
parametric methods have been widely used to assess relative efficiency of producers of 
services for which the assumptions of traditional parametric methods have been found 
restrictive: mathematical programming method referred to as the Data Envelopment 
Analysis (DEA) and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) have been applied particularly in 
analysing producers of services. ' As to the museums, both parametric and non-parametric 
methods have been applied: cost functions have been applied to assess economic gains 
from large scale production and DEA has been employed to examine technical 
efficiency. 
The pioneering application of a cost function on a data set of museums was by Jackson 
(1988) who estimated a trans-log (TL) cost functions for US museums. The estimations 
incorporated a single output (number of visitors), variables describing "museums' 
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priorities" as to capture "the multifaceted nature of the output of museums", as well as 
a dummy variable to depict quality of production. ' The estimations found evidence on 
size elasticities ranging from 1.4 in art museums to 2.0 in history museums. A similar 
application was carried out by Paulus (1993), who ran single-output TL cost functions 
for French and German museums and also found evidence of substantial scale 
economies. 
Even if both treatments suggest results of similar order and existence of scale economies 
when approximating output by the number of visitors, the applications, however, include 
few caveats: first, both applications assume efficient production (production is presumed 
to be both technically and allocatively efficient). Second, the studies employ a single 
output, namely the number of visitors, to approximate the output of museums. Third, 
both studies apply a parametric method, i. e. they employ a given functional form for the 
underlying production technology -a TL cost function that is homothetic with respect 
to output - even if production technology of a museum producing multiple outputs is 
likely to be elusive. 
The studies by Paulus (1995) and Mairesse (1997) propose solutions for these three 
caveats. Paulus (1995) uses an output oriented non-parametric DEA pace Charnes, 
Cooper and Rhodes (1978) to assess technical efficiency of 64 French museums, and 
argues for the necessity of using multi-output framework. Paulus (1995) employs four 
measures of output and yields results according to which only 14 % of the French 
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museums are technically efficient. The inefficiency is explained by two main factors. 
First, increasing opening times are proposed as a source of inefficiency, suggesting that 
relatively long opening hours generate costs but are not compensated by an increase in 
outputs. Second, inefficiency is explained by museum type: historical museums were 
found to be more inefficient than art museums. The number of qualified employees had 
no impact on efficiency, as did neither the size of the museum nor the ownership. 
According to Mairesse (1997) the findings by Paulus (1995) are not, however, accurate 
due to the employed output measures. In order to avoid the problem of output 
measurement Mairesse (1997) employs altogether six measures for output - number of 
visitors, (visitors/disposal income)/personnel costs, number of exhibitions/personnel costs, 
publications/number of scientific personnel, activities/personnel, and value of collection 
- and an output oriented DEA in order to assess technical efficiency of 82 Belgian 
museums. The analysis shows, most importantly, that the choice of measures of output 
affects the efficiency considerations. 
Even if the studies by Paulus (1995) and Mairesse (1997) tackle some of the problems 
of the previous parametric applications on museums - assumption of technical efficiency 
and application of an a priori functional form - some problems remain unsolved. First, 
the output oriented approach of the two studies could be called into question: already the 
parametric methods on museums employed cost functions instead of production functions 
due to the fact that data on economic aspects of production, e. g. input prices and total 
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operating costs are available and often more reliable than data on factual amounts of all 
inputs. Hence, in this light the question of technical efficiency is as its own redundant, 
whereas the question of cost efficiency that incorporates both technical and allocative 
efficiency is of more interest. Moreover, the input (cost) oriented approach is particularly 
useful from the perspective of policy analysis since it provides information of possible 
savings, were the institutions operate efficiently. In the heavily publicly supported 
European museums - e. g. French, Belgian and Finnish museums - the degree of cost 
efficiency is of particular interest: are public funds used for production of cultural 
services in the most efficient way. 
This article assesses cost efficiency of 129 Finnish museums year 1996 by using a non- 
parametric input (cost) oriented FDH model that incorporates multiple outputs. The 
article concentrates on three main questions. First, the article examines the relative cost 
efficiency of different types of museums (art, culture historical, special, nature historical 
and regional museums as well as combined art/culture historical museums), and 
moreover, museums owned by private associations, foundations and firms versus 
museums owned by the state, municipality or town. Thus, the analysis centers on the 
relation between aggregate cost and the size of the services provided by different types 
of museums. Second, the article evaluates the effects of sparcity bias and efficiency by 
default on the assessment of relative efficiency, and, third, the article concentrates on the 
influence of outliers on efficiency measurement. 
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The article proceeds by first describing the data set of 129 Finnish museums (art, culture 
historical, special, nature historical and regional museums as well as combined art/culture 
historical museums) in year 1996. The theoretical background of FHD is then put 
forward: an emphasis is on showing that FDH and subsequent variants of DEA (with 
differing assumptions on scale properties) are nested. This is to demonstrate that the 
FDH method is a non-parametric mathematical programming method that necessitates 
least restrictions on the underlying production technology as well as to show that the 
model employed in the analysis is a generalisation of the traditional DEA model 
proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978). The results of the calculations are then 
presented together with an assessment of the effects of ownership on relative cost 
efficiency. The effects of sparcity bias, efficiency by default, and outliers on efficiency 
assessment are then magnified. Lastly, some concluding remarks are made. 
2 Descriptive statistics of the data set 
The data set used in the analysis is a cross-section of 129 Finnish museums, year 1996. 
The data contains information on the type of museums (art, culture historical, special, 
nature historical and regional museums as well as combined art/culture historical 
museums) as well as on the owner of museums (private institution such as an 
association, foundation and firm or public authority such as the state, municipality and 
town). Moreover, the data set includes information on total costs, yearly open hours, man 
years, number of acquisitions owned by the museum (pieces of art, items, specimen, and 
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documents), number of new acquisitions (pieces of art, items, specimen, and documents), 
number of exhibitions (produced by the museum or produced by an other institution) and 
number of publications. The summary statistics of the data is as follows: 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the data set, 1996, n= 129 museums, in FIM 
Variable mean st. dev. variance min max 
N 65.00 37.38 1397.50 1.00 129.00 
OWNER 1.37 0.49 0.24 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 3.46 1.78 3.16 1.00 7.00 
MANYEAR 11.52 18.92 357.81 1.00 121.00 
TC 0.36764E+07 0.57036E+07 0.32531E+14 0.21915E+06 0.39000E+08 
OPEN 2413.40 2176.90 0.47388E+07 106.00 16846.00 
VISITORS 28788.00 54007.00 0.29168E+10 100.00 0.39934E+06 
ITEMS 64374.00 0.45680E+06 0.20867E+12 0.00 0.51645E+07 
AQUIITEMS 850.31 3793.10 0.14388E+08 0.00 37967.00 
ART 1409.30 5707.30 0.32574E+08 0.00 59484.00 
AQUTART 44.434 167.74 28136.00 0.00 1580.00 
SPECIMEN 0.12893E+06 0.96118E+06 0.92386E+12 0.00 0.10400E+08 
AQUISPECI 2036.20 16065.00 0.25808E+09 0.00 0.17752E+06 
DOKUMENTS 52935.00 0.10792E+06 0.11646E+11 0.00 0.73455E+06 
AQUIDOKU 2577.90 7797.10 0.60794E+08 0.00 70000.00 
EXHIBIT 8.12 7.07 50.05 1.00 54.00 
OWNEXHIB 4.93 4.51 20.36 1.00 23.00 
OTHEREXHIB 3.14 4.18 17.45 0.00 31.00 
PUBLICAT 3.60 15.49 239.82 0.00 171.00 
List of the variables: N= number of museums, OWNER = type of owner (0 = private, 2= public), TYPE _ 
type of museum, MANYEAR = manyear, TC = total costs, OPEN = yearly open hours, VIS ITORS = number 
of visitors, ITEMS = number of items, AQUIITEMS = aquisitions of new items, ART = magnitude of 
collection, AQUTART = aquisitions of art, SPECIMEN = magnitude of specimen collection, AQUISPECI = 
aquisitions of new specimen, DOKUMENTS = number of documents, AQUIDOKU = aquisitions of 
dokuments, EXHIBIT = number of exhibitions, OWNEXHIB = number of exhibitions produced by the museum 
itself, OTHEREXHIB = number of exhibitions produced by other institutions but displayed at the museum, 
PUBLICAT = number of publications. 
The descriptive statistics of the data set in Table 1 reveal that there is great variation 
between museums. The high variance of total costs indicates that the size of museums 
vary considerably - total spendings range from a museum with FIM 219 150 total 
spendings to a museum with total spendings of FIM 39 million. This is suggested also 
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by the relatively high variance of the man years - the man years range from one man 
year to 121 man years. The "volume" of the museums also vary considerably: the yearly 
open hours of the exhibitions is at its smallest 106 hours and at its highest 16 846 hours, 
the number of visitors fluctuate from 100 visitors up to 399 340 visitors, the minimum 
number of exhibitions is one and the maximum is 54, and the number of publications 
range from no publications at all up to 171 publications. The variation in size (total costs 
and man years) and volume between museums is high also among similar type of 
museums (art, culture historical, special, nature historical and regional museums as well 
as combined art/culture historical museums), as well as among museums owned by 
private associations, foundations and firms compared to museums owned by the state, 
municipality or town. (See Appendix 1) 
3 Measurement of cost efficiency by using FDH 
DEA method proposed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) and FDH method 
pioneered by Deprins, Simar and Tulkens (1984) are linear programming based 
techniques that allow to assess relative performance of producers (henceforth decision 
making units, DMU, as the jargon goes). ' The idea of the methods is to determine which 
of the DMU's of the sample are efficient - i. e. which of the DMU's determine the 
envelopment surface (best practice frontier) on which DMUs performance is compared 
with. DMU's that lie on the best practice frontier are considered efficient, while those 
DMU's that do not lie on the surface are doomed inefficient. In other words, the method 
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does not set an absolute value for efficient production, but defines the most efficient 
DMU's that form the best practice frontier and then uses this best practice frontier to 
assess the performance of the other DMU's. The fundamental presumption behind the 
method is that of Pareto-efficiency: if a given DMU, k, is capable of producing Y(k) 
units of output with X(k) inputs, then an other DMU should also be capable of the same 
production schedule were it to operate efficiently. ' 
Theoretically, productive efficiency of a DMU can be assessed by comparing the 
productivity of the DMU to the best practice productivity at the same time period. In a 
simple single-output single-input case productivity is generally measured as the ratio of 
output to input, and in a multi-output multi-input case the ratio is given by: 
E5r=1 Ur Yr / ri=1 Vi Xi = (Uly1 + U2y2 + ... 
+ Usys)/ (V1X1 + V2X2 + ... 
+ VsXs) (1) 
in which Ur equals the weights of the outputs yr, v; represent the weights of the inputs 
x;, s is the number of outputs and m represents the number of inputs. 
Thus, the question is how to choose weights (ur and v; ) for the inputs and outputs, since 
the productivity of a DMU changes in accordance of the weights chosen. For for-profit 
firms it is customary to use market prices as the weights, but such a practice can not 
necessarily be applied in the case of publicly subsidised not-for-profit firms that do not 
sell their outputs or buy their inputs from reasonably competitive markets. The linear 
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programming method developed by Charnes, Cooper and Rhodes (1978) provides a 
solution to this problem. The method calculates the efficiency score X of a given DMU 
k by using the following non-linear model: 
Max X= Lr=1 Ur Yrk / ri=1 Vi Xik ý2ý 
subject to 
rr=l ur Yn / Emi=l v; x,; <_ 1, i-1,2,..., k,... n (2.1) 
ur, v; z0 Vrand i (2.2) 
in which yj is the output r produced by the j`h DMU, xlj is the input i used by the j`h 
DMU, uT equals the weights of the outputs yr, v; represent the weights of the inputs x;, 
s is the number of outputs, m represents the number of inputs, and n is the number of 
DMU's. 
The model (2) calculates the productivity score (1) as the ratio of weighted outputs and 
weighted inputs. In this the weights of the outputs and inputs are chosen as to maximise 
the productivity, but subject to the two constraints (2.1) and (2.2) of which the first 
constraint (2.1) restricts the weights so that when calculating the maximum productivity 
score of the kthDMU in relation to other DMU's, the productivity score of each DMU 
is less or equal to one. The latter constraint simply restricts the weights to be non- 
negative. 
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As a result, the above procedure yields a score - scaled between 0 and 1- of maximum 
productivity of the kt' DMU with respect to other DMU's, that actually is the efficiency 
score X of kt' DMU. The model (2), thus, emphasises that the weights of outputs and 
inputs are not set a priori, but the method maximises the efficiency score for each DMU 
by screening through each possible weight, and chooses such weights for outputs and 
inputs that the productivity of the given DMU is the highest possible with respect to 
other DMU's. This implies, that a DMU that is best with respective to any possible 
input-output combination gets an efficiency score of 1. However, if a DMU is found 
inefficient when using the best possible weights, the DMU is deemed inefficient with 
any other weights for inputs and outputs. 
In order to employ (2) to examine the cost efficiency of museums few alterations are 
required, namely rewriting the non-linear problem (2) as a linear problem, second, 
changing (2) form the output oriented (output expansion) approach to input (cost) 
oriented approach, and third, connected to the second alteration, changing the 
maximisation problem into a minimisation problem. 
As is well known, due to duality of maximisation and minimisation problem a problem 
can be written in either way without loosing any information. The non-linearity of the 
model, in turn, can be dealt with by scaling either the weighted sum of outputs or 
weighted sum of inputs as one. The cost oriented approach can be derived by assuming 
that total operating costs of a DMU capture the resources (inputs) used to produce the 
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services. This implies that in the rewritten formulation (3) the services provided by 
museums are taken as given and the total costs they induce are of interest. The 
assumption seems appropriate bearing in mind that the programmes of museums (e. g. 
exhibitions, publications and large scale conservation projects) are scheduled years in 
advance, and hence, can be taken as given at any time point. 
Hence, the linear minimisation problem with total cost - multi output orientation can be 
written as: ' 
Min Äk (3 ) 
{X, z,,..., z} 
subject to 
1k Ck - 'j=l zI Cj 
L'; 
_, zj yjr 
>_ yki r=1,..., s (3.2) 
Xk, zz >0j=1,..., n (3.3) 
in which Ck and Cj are the total spendings of the museums k and j, y,,, and yjr are the 
amounts of the rh output of the museums and zz, j=1,..., n are weights that indicate 
which of the efficient DMU's form the envelopment surface (best practice frontier) for 
each DMU. The value of the objective function Xkyields, as noted, at the optimum the 
cost-efficiency degree of a given museum k (value between 0 and 1). 
The first constraint (3.1) postulates that DMU k's optimal total costs (adjusted to be 
efficient) are equal or greater than total costs of the DMU with which its performance 
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is compared with. The second constraint implies that a DMU lying on the envelopment 
surface and dominating the kt' DMU must produce at least the same amount of output 
than k. The last constraint (3.3) necessitates both the weights (zý-) and the value of the 
objective function (Xk) to be non-negative. 
As shown e. g. by Eeckaut et al. (1993), further constraints on the weights zy (3.3) can 
be used to postulate assumptions on the production technology. ' The formulation (3) with 
its assumption of non-negativity of the weights z1 (3.3) represents a case of constant 




describes a mathematical program that implies constant and decreasing returns to scale 
(DEA-CD): the reference frontier is a convex set that includes the origin and satisfies 
the assumption of free disposability of inputs. The free disposability of inputs implies 
in a traditional input oriented approach, and case of two inputs (x,, x), that any increase 
of input xl either reduces output or requires an increase in x2 in order to maintain the 
level of output. If neither a reduction of output nor an increase of an other input are free 
the case is that of weak (free) disposability. If a reduction of output or alternatively an 
increase of an other input would not induce costs the case would be that of strong 
disposability (free disposability). ' 
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Adding to the non-negativity of the weights zz restriction (3.3), instead of (a) the 
following: 
L' 1 ý; -1 (b) 
represents, in turn, a case with variable returns-to-scale (DEA-V). A program with the 
variable returns-to-scale assumption suggests increasing returns of scale for low values 
of outputs and decreasing returns for high values of output. In such a case the 
enveloping reference frontier is still convex, it satisfies the free disposability of inputs, 
but it does not contain the origin. 
Adding to (3)-(3.3), instead of c, the following: 
E'j_, zj = 1, zz E {0,1}, j=1,..., n (c) 
suggests that the enveloping reference frontier satisfies the assumption of free 
disposability, but no other assumption is made on the reference cost-output relation. As 
proven by Tulkens (1993) a linear model (3)-(3.3) supplemented by (c), henceforth (3. c), 
corresponds the FDH model proposed by Deprins, Simar, and Tulkens (1984). This 
implies that the FDH and the variants of DEA are "nested" in one other. '° 
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4 FDH measures of relative efficiency 
The linear program (3. c) is repeated for each of the 129 museums in the data set. The 
calculations are, first, carried out for each museum type (art, culture historical, special, 
nature historical and regional museums as well as combined art/culture historical 
museums), and hence, the measures for outputs vary to some extend. The output 
measures for each museum type are following: 
Table 2: Output measures by museum type 
Museum type measures for outputs 
Art yearly open hours, number of visitors, acquisition of documents, 
number of exhibitions, number of publications (a 
Culture historical yearly open hours, number of visitors, acquisition of items, 
acquisition of documents, number of exhibitions, number of 
publications 
Special yearly open hours, number of visitors, number of exhibitions, 
number of publications 
Nature historical yearly open hours, number of visitors, acquisition of specimen, 
acquisition of documents, number of exhibitions, number of 
publications 
Regional yearly open hours, number of visitors, acquisition of documents, 
number of exhibitions, number of publications 
Art&culture hist. yearly open hours, number of visitors, acquisition of items, 
acquisition of documents, number of exhibitions, number of 
publications 
a) Acquisitions of new art objects was not included as an output measure because the ways to finance new 
acquisitions wary across museums 
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Table 3 and Figures 1 and 2 summarise the results. Table 3 shows the number (per 
centage) of inefficient museums among each museum type and the level of excess 
spending of the inefficient museums. Figure 1 portrays the distribution of the efficiency 
degrees for the inefficient museums and Figure 2 graphs the excess spendings. 
Table 3: Efficiency and excess spending among different museum types 







FIM million % TC 
Art museum (27) 124 15 (56 %) 12 (44 %) 28 23 % 
Culture histor. (31) 58 26(84 %) 5 (16 %) 1.2 2% 
Special mus. (34) 76 21(62 %) 13 (38 %) 20 25 % 
Nature historical (8) 26 8 (100 %) 0 - - - 
Regional mus. (20) 154 19 (95 %) 1 (5 %) 1.3 1% 
Art&culture hist. (9) 22 9(100 %) 0 - - - 
Total (129) 462 98 (76 %) 31 (24 %) 50.5 11 % 
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Figure 2: Excess spending, analysis I 
Table 3 demonstrates, first, that some 24% of the museums (all museum types) are cost- 
inefficient. According to 3. c a museum is declared cost-inefficient if it is dominated by 
one or more production units - total spendings of other DMUs' are less than equal to 
museums own total spendings and output indicators of other DMUs' are greater than or 
equal to the museum's output indicators. " The proportion of inefficient museums, 
however, vary considerably between different museum types. The proportion of 
inefficient museums is considerable among art and special museums, some 40% of 
museums in both categories are inefficient, while all nature historical and combined 
art/culture historical museums are declared efficient. (See Appendix 2) 
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The average degree of cost efficiency - calculated as the ratio of its own expenditures 
to the expenses of the production unit that dominates it most - is on average 0.88. This 
ratio is, by definition, less than 1 and greater than 0- for the efficient museums the 
degree of cost efficiency equals to 1, while the inefficient museums have degrees 
between 0 and 1. (See Appendix 2) 
The level of excess spending of the inefficient museums, calculated by multiplying the 
complement to unity of its cost efficiency degree by its total current expenses, reiterate 
the inefficiency of art and special museums. The level of excess spending is at its 
highest in special and art museums: in special museums the excess spending is some 
25% of total costs (FIM 20 million, that is about FIM 1.6 million/museum) and in art 
museums the excess spending amount to FIM 28 million (about FIM 2.3 
million/museum), that represents some 23% of total costs. The amount of spending that 
all the museums would have saved, had they been cost-efficient, amount to FIM 50.5 
million, i. e. 11 % of the total spendings of the museums. (See Appendix 2) 
4.1 Effects of sparsity bias, efficiency by default and outliers on results 
As pointed out by Eeckaut, Tulkens and Jamar (1993), three characteristic of the FDH 
method may affect the efficiency considerations: first, DMU's with relatively few DMU's 
to compare with may be declared efficient due to so called sparsity bias, second, some 
DMU's may be defined efficient by default, and third, outliers may affect the results. 
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The sparsity bias arises from the fact that FDH method declares a DMU efficient in 
absence of observed better performing DIM with at least as high levels of outputs. E. g. 
if the number of particularly large museums is small compared to the, say middle range 
sized museums, the relatively large museums are more likely to be declared efficient 
than the middle range museums due to lack of DMU's to be compared with. Thus, the 
method may induce a bias in favour of those production units that lie in the range where 


















Figure 3: FDH efficiency scores (efficient museums omitted), analysis II 
To test whether such sparcity bias takes place in the case of Finnish museums the linear 
program (3. c) is re-run for each 129 museums without consideration of the museum type. 
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In the calculations outputs are measured by yearly open hours, number of visitors, 
number of exhibitions and number of publications. The reason for this is that these four 
output measures are comparable across all museum types. Table 4 and Figures 3 and 4 
summarise the results. 12 (See Appendix 2) 
Figure 4: Excess spending (an "outlier" with appr. FIM 14 million excess spending omitted), 
analysis II 












FIM million % TC 
10+ 9 193 6( 67%) 3 (33%) 17 9% 
5-10 13 86 10 (77%) 3 (23%) 1.6 2% 
1-5 66 161 30 (45%) 36 (55%) 39 24% 
0.5 - 1 24 17 13 (54%) 11 (46%) 1.2 8% 
- 0.5 17 5 13 (76%) 4 (24%) 0.3 7% 
Total 129 462 72 (56%) 57 (44%) 59.5 13% 
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Table 4 demonstrates that according to re-run (3. c) 44% of the museums are declared 
inefficient, and that the total of excess spending amount to FIM 59.5 million, i. e. 13% 
of the total spendings of the museums. The proportion of inefficient museums is greatest 
in museums in which total costs range from FIM 1 to 5 million, some 55 % of museums 
in the category are inefficient. The proportion of inefficient museums is high also in the 
FIM 500 000 to 1 million range, some 46% of the museums are inefficient. The level 
of excess spending is highest in museums in the range from FIM 1 to 5 million (on 
average some FIM 1.1 million/museum) in which the excess spending represents some 
24% of the total costs. 
Thus, the assessment without consideration of museum type yields a more pessimistic 
view on the cost-efficiency, given the more restricted measures of output, than the 
assessment of efficiency by museum type: the first analysis declared 24 % of the 
museums to be cost-inefficient, while the latter analysis found 44% of the museums to 
be cost-inefficient. The two analyses give contradicting verdicts in 39 cases (30% of 
museums): the museums declared efficient according to the first analysis are declared 
inefficient in 32 cases of the latter analysis and in 7 cases the declarations contradicted 
the other way a round. Of these museums with contradicting efficiency statuses 6 are 
those within the range of total spendings FIM 5+ million (27% of museums in that 
range), and the rest are those with total spendings ranging from FIM 0.5 to 5 million 
(37% of museums in that range). Thus, rather than having lack of comparison in only 
the relatively high total spending category, there is a sparsity bias also in the lower total 
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spending categories. However, in altogether 90 cases (70% of museums) the two 
analyses declare a given museum similarly efficient/inefficient indicating that the FDH 
method seems to be able to identify the most obvious cases of efficiency/inefficiency. 
The analysis of cost efficiency is also affected by some of the museums being declared 
efficient by default - the methodology induces by definition some observations efficient. 
Museums that are declared efficient by default include those museums that have the 
lowest expenses among a museum type or all museums, as well as those museums that 
have the highest value of at least one output. Moreover, in the data set there are 
museums that are declared efficient because they are not subjugate to comparison: these 
include museums that are not dominated by any other museum (hence efficient), and that 
also do not dominate any other museum. In the first analysis - with consideration of 
museum types - the number of museums that are efficient by default is 22 museums 
(17% of all museums), while in the latter analysis 17 museums (13% of all museums) 
are declared efficient by default. In the first analysis 22% of the efficient museums are 
efficient by default, whereas in the latter analysis the figure is 24%. In both analyses the 
museums declared efficient by default include museums in all total spending categories 
as well as all museum types. 
Besides the sparsity bias and efficiency by default, outliers in data set may affect the 
efficiency considerations. For example Wilson (1993) has pointed out that outliers, 
atypical observations arising from measurement errors, are likely to yield biased 
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assessments of efficiency when a non-parametric mathematical programming method is 
employed - FDH is particularly prone to measurement errors and production of biased 
efficiency results since the method envelops the data closely. 
Various attempts have been made to develop statistics to detect the possible outliers - 
e. g. Andrews and Pregibon (1978), Grosskopf and Valdmanis (1987) as well as Eeckaut 
et al. (1993) have proposed statistics to be used together with non-parametric 
applications. " Of these three methods Eeckaut et al. (1993) approach is the most 
convenient one. The method identifies two types of outliers - outliers that appear 
systematically as the (most) dominating production units and outliers that are dominated 
by several production units - and then assesses the effect of these observations on the 
results. This method does not, however, account the possibility of measurement errors. 
As to the first analysis (efficiency by museum types), the method by Eeckaut et al. 
(1993) find two observations as obvious outliers, namely Rovaniemen taidemuseo (art 
museum) and Ilmatorjuntamuseo (special museum). The first outlier, Rovaniemen 
taidemuseo, is the most dominating production unit in eight cases implying that without 
the given museum (Rovaniemen taidemuseo) the proportion of inefficient art museums 
would decrease from 44% (12 museums) to 19% (5 museums). The second outlier, 
Ilmatorjuntamuseo, by contrast, is dominated by 17 other special museums. This 
observation does not, however, have implications on the results, but the omission of the 
outlier would result only one inefficient museum less. 
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The second analysis (omitting the museum types) includes more cases of outliers: 
altogether 9 museums are dominated by more than ten DMU's, and moreover, two 
museums (Rovaniemen taidemuseo and Kajaanin taidemuseo) appear as the most 
dominating DMU's in 19 cases: Rovaniemen taidemuseo (art museum) is most 
dominating in eight cases within the total spending category FIM I to 5 million and 
Kajaanin taidemuseo (art museum) is the most dominating DMU within the same total 
spending range in 11 cases. The omission of these two museums would not, however, 
alter the results because the museums dominated either by Rovaniemi or Kajaani art 
museums are dominated also by other DNW's. 
4.2 Ownership as an explanation of differences in cost efficiency 
The museums of the data set can be further categorised with respect to the owner of the 
museum: 48 (37%) of the museums are owned by a private association, foundation, or 
firm, and hence private, whereas 81 (63%) of the museums are owned either by the state, 
municipality, or town, and hence, public. 
The effect of ownership on cost efficiency is demonstrated by rewriting the results of the 
two previous analyses with respect to ownership: EFF (I) and INEFF(I) denote the 
proportion of efficient and respectively inefficient DMU's within each museum type, 
whereas EFFI (H) and INEFF(II) refer to the latter analysis in which the museum type 
was not taken into account. Table 5 summarises the results: 
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Table 5: Ownership as an explanation to efficiency differentials 
Owner(n) TC EFF (I) INEFF (I) EFF (II) INEFF (II) 
FIM million n (%) n (%) n (%) n (%) 
Public (81) 361 68 (84%) 13 (16%) 47 (58%) 34 (42%) 
Private (48) 101 30 (63%) 18 (37%) 25 (52%) 23 (48%) 
Total (129) 462 98 (76%) 31 (24%) 72 (56%) 57 (44%) 
Table 5 demonstrates that in both accounts public museums are more cost-efficient than 
private institutions. The difference between the private and public institutions is 
considerable, particularly when cost-efficiency is assessed by museum type (EFF (I), 
INEFF (I)): while 84% of public museums are efficient, solely 63% of private 
museums are efficient. 
As shown in Table 6 the difference between public and private museums is clear also 
with respect to the average number of dominations (DO I denotes the first analysis and 
DO II refers to the latter analysis), as well as the degrees of cost-efficiency (DCE I and 
DCE II, respectively): the average degree of cost efficiency is higher, and the average 
number of dominating DMU is lower among the public than among the private ones: 
Table 6: Average number of dominations and degrees of cost efficiency 
Owner DO (I) DCE (I) DO (II) DCE (II) 
Public 0.25 0.93 1.5 0.89 
Private 1.54 0.80 3.7 0.83 
A more detailed account of the private and public producers demonstrates possible 
origins of the finding. First, as to the first analysis by museum type the uneven 
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distribution of private and public museums among different museum types may effect 
the results: comparison of Table 7 and Table 1 reveals that those museum types that 
exhibit relatively low proportions of cost-inefficient DMU's include relatively more 
public producers. An opposite example is provided by the special museums of which 
solely 38% are cost-inefficient, while 91% of them are privately owned. 
Table 7: Proportion of private and public museums within each museum type 






Art museum 27 4.6 21 (78%) 6( 22%) 
Culture historical 31 1.9 24 (77%) 7( 23%) 
Special museums 34 2.3 3 (9%) 31 (91%) 
Nature historical 8 3.3 7( 88%) 1( 12%) 
Regional museums 20 7.7 19 (95%) 1 (5%) 
Art & culture hist. 9 2.5 7( 78%) 2( 22%) 
Total 129 3.6 81 (63%) 48 (37%) 
Furthermore, as to the total spendings of the museums, the average total spendings of 
public museums are FIM 4.5 million (total costs account to FIM 361 million), whereas 
the average spendings of private museums are FIM 2.1 million (total costs account to 
FIM 101 million). Almost all . private museums are 
in the under FIM 5 million range, 
whereas the public museums are mostly in the range of FIM 5+ million. Since the 
proportions of inefficient/efficient museums in the range of relatively high total 
spendings and "middle range" museums do not vary considerably, the almost equal 




This article has examined cost-efficiency of museums and focused on three main 
questions: the relative cost efficiency of different types of museums (art, culture 
historical, special, nature historical and regional museums as well as combined art/culture 
historical museums), the effects of sparcity bias, efficiency by default and outliers on 
efficiency measurement, and lastly, the strength of ownership as an explanation of 
efficiency differentials between museums. 
The analysis demonstrated, first, that the production of Finnish museums is characterised 
by cost inefficiency. The analysis by museum type suggested that on average some 24% 
of museums are cost inefficient (76% efficient) whereas the analysis across all museums 
indicated that 44% of museums are inefficient (56% efficient). Notwithstanding the 
relatively high proportion of inefficient museums in both accounts, the Finnish museums 
seem to fare well: as noted, Paulus (1995) found altogether 86% of 125 French museums 
and Mairesse (1997) 77% of 82 Belgian museums to be technically inefficient. The 
difference in the results is striking, particularly since cost inefficiency entails both 
allocative and technical inefficiency (i. e. cost efficient museums choose from technically 
efficient options the input mix that minimises the cost), and hence, the efficiency scores 
of Finnish museums include both technical and allocative inefficiency. 
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Given that the analyses by Paulus (1995) and Mairesse (1997) do not include biases 
arising from sparsity bias, efficiency by default or outliers, a possible explanation of the 
striking difference of the results could be, first, that the continental museums indeed are 
less technically efficient than their Finnish counterparts. 14 Second, the difference may 
originate from the choice of variables and orientation (output vs. cost-orientation), and 
third, the difference between DEA and FDH methods may contribute to the differing 
results. As is well known, DEA is generally more strict in declaring a DMLJ efficient 
while FDH is powerful in depicting the most obvious cases of inefficiency. " 
Besides the relatively low proportion of cost inefficient museums on average, the first 
analysis by museum type revealed great variation between museum types: nature 
historical, regional and combined art/culture historical museums were all more or less 
cost-efficient, 85 % of the culture historical museums were cost-efficient, while the 
proportion of cost-efficient museums among art and special museums is some 60 %. 16 
The relatively high proportion of inefficient institutions among the special museums is 
partly explained by the fact that the output proxies do not fully capture the specialty of 
the museums' output, and thus, the comparison is made between different kind of DMU's 
unlike in the case of other museum types in which the DMU's conform to each other. 
The relatively high proportion of cost-inefficient museums (44%) among the art 
museums is partly explained by an outlier, namely the highly cost efficient Rovaniemen 
taidemuseo, that appears the most dominating DMU in 7 cases: without the museum the 
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proportion of cost-inefficient art museums would drop from 44% to 19%. In this case 
the art museums would be in line with the culture historical museums among which 16% 
are cost inefficient. As to the proportion of inefficient museums across all museums, this 
would imply also that on average only 19% of museums would be declared cost 
inefficient. 
The analysis without considerations of museum types revealed that also the sparsity bias 
- lack of DMU's of similar size to compare with - affect the results: altogether 44% of 
the museums were doomed cost-inefficient. Of interest is, however, that both analyses 
resulted similar propositions on the level of excess spending of the museums. The first 
analysis suggested that 11% of total costs could be saved, were all museums cost 
efficient, whereas in the second analysis the corresponding figure was 13%. The second 
analysis, furthermore, showed that among the middle sized museums (total costs ranging 
form FIM 1 to 5 million) the proportion of cost inefficient museums is relatively high, 
while among museums with either smaller or larger total spendings the proportion of 
inefficient museums is relatively small. The levels of excess spending vary also 
considerably in different total spending categories: in the middle sized museums excess 
spending amount to 24%, whereas in the largest museums savings add up to FIM 17 
million (9% of total costs) and in the smallest museums the level of excess spending is 
some 7%. The analysis by museum type, in turn, indicate that possibilities of cost 
savings are highest among art and special museums. 
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The efficiency differentials of museums were investigated also from the view point of 
ownership. The rewritten results of the two analyses - the first analysis by museum type 
and the second without the museum type considerations - suggest that there are 
differences in cost-efficiency of private museums owned by associations, foundations or 
firms and public museums that are run by the state, municipality or town. In the analysis 
by museum type 16% of the public and 37% of the private museums were cost 
inefficient, and in the latter analysis 42% of the public and 48% of the private museums 
were cost inefficient. By and large this suggests, that the publicly run museums are on 
average more cost efficient than their private counterparts. '7 
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Endnotes 
1. See e. g. Seiford and Thrall (1990) - in a special supplement of Journal of 
Econometrics on parametric and non-parametric approaches to frontier analysis - as well 
as All and Seiford (1993) and Athanassopoulos (1994) for a review and recent 
developments of the non-parametric frontier analysis. 
2. See Lovell (1993) for theoretical discussion of the pros and cons of the parametric 
(econometric) and non-parametric methods. See Banker et al. (1986), Sengupta and Sfeir 
(1988), Ferrier and Lovell (1990) as well as Thanassoulis (1993) for comparisons by 
using empirical data sets. In general, the articles suggest that DEA outperforms the 
traditional econometric regression analyses. 
3. Since the seminal studies in late 1970's, numerous DEA models have appeared in the 
literature as well as host of studies employing the technique on producers of services. 
This can be clearly seen form the extensive bibliographies of Data Envelopment 
Analysis by Emrouznejad and Thanassoulis (1996a, 1996b) who list over 1500 journal 
papers and some 300 working papers. 
4. These "priority variables" were measured by the cost shares of promotional 
expenditure, exhibition expenses, conservation and preservation expenses and 
membership activity expenses. 
5. See Lovell (1993), All and Seiford (1993) as well as Boussofiane et al. (1991) for 
condensed and clear presentations of the mathematical programming approach to 
efficiency analysis. 
6. Alternatively, if a DMU is capable of producing Y(j) units of output with X(j) inputs, 
then other efficient producers should also be able to do the same. 
7. A similar model was used by Eeckaut et al. (1993) in a case of Belgian municipalities. 
8. See Eeckaut et al. (1993) as well as Lovell (1993) for discussion on the constraints 
defining returns to scale. 
9. See Fare et al. (1985) for a detailed discussion on both output and input disposability. 
10. Because FDH and the variants of DEA are "nested" it is possible to evaluate 
quantitatively how far each of them lie from the data, and hence, from one other (the 
degree of closeness is generally expressed as the number of observations that are 
declared efficient by the corresponding method). This property has been utilised e. g. by 
Eeckaut et al. (1993) who have analysed the relative performance of the two methods 
in measurement of cost efficiency. 
11. If a DMU is cost inefficient and dominated by more than one other production unit, 
the dominating one with the lowest expenses is called the most dominating DMU. 
12. Even if the mathematical program (3. c) was carried out as a "continuous" analysis 
(reference set was based on all museums, not museums in one museum type) the results 
are presented in decreasing order of five museum spending categories. 
13. As is well known, various methods have been developed to detect outliers in linear 
regression models that employ ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals. These methods 
cannot, however, be employed in relation to non-parametric methods since the methods 
do not produce OLS residuals. 
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14. Neither Paulus (1995) nor Mairesse (1997) account for possible sparsity bias, 
efficiency by default or outliers. 
15. This point has been made by Eeckaut et al. (1993) when comparing DEA and FDH 
in assessment of cost efficiency in Belgian municipalities. 
16. It is of interest that also this result is "contrary" to the findings by Paulus (1995): in 
her study art museums appeared to be technically most efficient, then historical 
museums, and lastly other types of museums. Mairesse (1997) do not account for 
differences between museum types. 
17. It should be noted, that as to the first analysis by museum type that private museums 
include 91% of the special museums of which 38% are cost-inefficient, and as to the 
latter analysis that almost all private museums are in the under FIM 5 million range, 
whereas the public museums are mostly in the range of FIM 5+ million, thus, evening 
out the efficiency differentials between private and public museums. 
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APPENDIX I 
Table A: Descriptive statistics of the data set, 1996, n= 129 museums, in FIM 
Art museums (excluding central art museums), n= 15 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 
OWNER 1.33 0.49 0.24 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 1.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
MANYEAR 11.73 23.45 549.78 1.00 95.00 
TC 0.47875E+07 0.96785E+07 0.93674E+14 0.42636E+06 0.39000E+08 
OPEN 2118.90 1168.00 0.13642E+07 109.00 4969.00 
VISITORS 36890.00 77479.00 0.60031E+10 5072.00 0.31343E+06 
ITEMS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AQUIITEMS 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ART 3392.70 5599.50 0.31354E+08 488.00 22629.00 
AQUTART 128.00 211.34 44665.00 2.00 706.00 
SPECIMEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AQUISPECI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DOKUMENTS 20254.00 63709.00 0.40588E+10 0.00 0.25000E+06 
AQUIDOKU 2849.50 10279.00 0.10566E+09 0.00 40000.00 
EXHIBITIONS 8.80 5.71 32.60 1.00 22.00 
OWNEXHIB 6.00 4.83 23.29 1.00 20.00 
OTHEREXHIB 











Art museums (central art museums), n= 12 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 

















































OWNEXHIB 9.83 5.37 







































Culture historical museums, n= 31 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 
OWNER 1.23 0.43 0.18 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 2.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.00 
MANYEAR 7.90 21.13 446.49 1.00 120.00 
TC 0.18912E+07 0.44662E+07 0.19947E+14 0.21915E+06 0.25000E+08 
OPEN 2104.30 3024.00 0.91447E+07 106.00 16846.00 
VISITORS 25092.00 72082.00 0.51959E+10 282.00 0.39934E+06 
ITEMS 32100.00 86176.00 0.74263E+10 0.00 0.48547E+06 
AQUIITEMS 462.74 719.86 0.51820E+06 0.00 3602.00 
ART 249.00 785.71 0.61735E+06 0.00 3969.00 
AQUTART 4.97 20.64 425.83 0.00 106.00 
SPECIMEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AQUISPECI 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DOKUMENTS 27883.00 38299.00 0.14668E+10 0.00 0.16000E+06 
AQUIDOKU 1296.20 3100.90 0.96156E+07 0.00 14877.00 
EXHIBITIONS 6.06 5.35 28.60 0.00 23.00 
OWNEXHIB 3.10 3.22 10.36 0.00 14.00 
OTHEREXHIB 











Special museums, n= 34 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 
OWNER 1.91 0.29 0.82888E-01 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 3.00 0.00 0.00 3.00 3.00 
MANYEAR 7.82 6.68 44.64 1.00 26.00 
TC 0.22627E+07 0.21905E+07 0.47981E+13 0.28774E+06 0.11000E+08 
OPEN 1876.90 960.92 0.92336E+06 156.00 5050.00 
VISITORS 20353.00 27382.00 0.74976E+09 1900.00 0.15928E+06 
ITEMS 0.17802E+06 0.88372E+06 0.78095E+12 800.00 0.51645E+07 
AQUIITEMS 2250.70 7213.60 0.52037E+08 0.00 37967.00 
ART 89.50 363.90 0.13242E+06 0.00 1600.00 
AQUIART 6.56 30.63 938.38 0.00 173.00 
SPECIMEN 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AQUISPECI 352.94 2058.00 0.42353E+07 0.00 12000.00 
DOKUMENTS 48915.00 68764.00 0.47285E+10 0.00 0.25000E+06 
AQUIDOKU 3501.30 12144.00 0.14748E+09 0.00 70000.00 
EXHIBITIONS 6.47 5.47 29.95 0.00 22.00 













Nature historical museums, n=8 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 
OWNER 1.13 0.35 0.125 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 4.00 0.00 0.00 4.00 4.00 
MANYEAR 13.88 22.26 495.55 1.00 68.00 
TC 0.32524E+07 0.60502E+07 0.36605E+14 0.25500E+06 0.18000E+08 
OPEN 1492.60 1086.10 0.11796E+07 140.00 2706.0 
VISITORS 19310.00 32387.00 0.10489E+10 100.00 95386.00 
ITEMS 3000.00 8485.30 0.72000E+08 0.00 24000.00 
AQUIITEMS 250.00 707.11 0.50000E+06 0.00 2000.00 
ART 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
AQUIART 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SPECIMEN 0.20543E+07 0.35178E+07 0.12375E+14 0.00 0.10400E+08 
AQUISPECI 31111.00 60569.00 0.36686E+10 0.00 0.17752E+06 
DOCUMENTS 3031.20 5977.70 0.35732E+08 0.00 16000.00 
AQUIDOCU 128.87 352.15 0.12401E+06 0.00 1000.00 
EXHIBITIONS 2.38 1.41 1.98 1.00 5.00 
OWNEXHIB 1.50 1.41 2.00 0.00 4.00 
OTHEREXHIB 











Regional museums, n= 20 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 
OWNER 1.05 0.22 0.50000E- 1 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 5.00 0.00 0.00 5.00 5.00 
MANYEAR 24.75 27.81 773.25 7.00 121.00 
TC 0.76706E+07 0.78620E+07 0.61811E+14 0.20276E+07 0.26000E+08 
OPEN 4157.90 2990.90 0.89455E+07 1094.00 12050.00 
VISITORS 46172.00 65025.00 0.42283E+10 3171.00 0.30363E+06 
ITEMS 55038.00 63401.00 0.40197E+10 0.00 0.25400E+06 
AQUIITEMS 711.50 644.60 0.41551E+06 0.00 2355.00 
ART 3361.70 13269.00 0.17607E+09 0.00 59484.00 
AQUIART 85.25 352.31 0.12413E+06 0.00 1580.00 
SPECIMEN 9779.50 26521.00 0.70339E+09 0.00 95200.00 
AQUISPECI 71.65 259.21 67190.00 0.00 1161.00 
DOKUMENTS 0.17442E+06 0.21025E+06 0.44206E+1 1 0.00 0.73455E+06 
AQUIDOKU 5000.00 6101.80 0.37232E+08 0.00 25000.00 
EXHIBITIONS 8.90 6.09 37.04 2.00 25.00 
OWNEXHIB 5.30 3.60 12.96 1.00 16.00 
OTHEREXHIB 











Combined art & culture historical museums, n=9 
variable mean std. dev. variance min. max. 
OWNER 1.22 0.44 0.19 1.00 2.00 
TYPE 7.00 0.00 0.00 7.00 7.00 
MANYEAR 6.11 3.69 13.61 2.00 15.00 
TC 0.25359E+07 0.26030E+07 0.67758E+13 0.10084E+07 0.93530E+07 
OPEN 2455.30 1074.90 0.11554E+07 1200.00 4215.00 
VISITORS 24255.00 28610.00 0.81854E+09 5000.00 97400.00 
ITEMS 14499.00 10896.00 0.11871E+09 500.00 40000.00 
AQUIITEMS 279.11 259.68 67434.00 0.00 646.00 
ART 950.56 792.15 0.62750E+06 216.00 2846.00 
AQUIART 60.89 107.10 11470.00 8.00 341.00 
SPECIMEN 215.89 647.67 0.41947E+06 0.00 1943.00 
AQUISPECI 38.11 114.33 13072.00 0.00 343.00 
DOCUMENTS 35404.00 49941.00 0.24941E+10 800.00 0.16102E+06 
AQUIDOUCU 1839.70 4148.90 0.17213E+08 93.00 12848.00 
EXHIBITIONS 13.00 4.39 19.25 6.00 18.00 
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VI Conclusions 
This thesis has analysed empirically production of cultural services in four self-contained 
articles. The four articles have each focused on a different facet of production and 
applied different methodologies. Together they contribute to the two main themes of the 
thesis: features of production of cultural services and factors affecting methodological 
choices. 
As to methodological choices, this thesis has pointed out the lack of clarity in previous 
empirical assessments of production of cultural services. The four articles tackle the 
problem by first employing four different data sets together with four different 
methodologies - namely neo-classical and non-linear cost functions, Structural Equation 
Modeling (SEM), index numbers, and Free Disposal Hull (FDH) approaches - and then 
assessing the strengths and weaknesses of each methodology. These assessments reveal 
three main caveats of empirical analysis. The first caveat stems from measurement 
problems, the second danger lurks in definition of production technology, while the third 
problem arises from availability and quality of data. This thesis has explored several 
ways to circumvent or mitigate these three caveats. 
Out of the measurement problems the most fundamental ones are connected to 
measurement of inputs and output(s). In terms of output, two problems are overriding: 
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how to measure artistic experiences and how to take into account the quality aspect. This 
thesis tackles the first problem by measuring the output of theatres as number of visitors 
and the output of orchestras as number of performances. The multiplicity of museums 
activities, in turn, demands multiple proxies for output, and hence, empirical analyses of 
museums require methodologies that allow multi-output framework. In general, this 
thesis advocates increasing sensitivity towards single vs. multiple output issue in 
analyses of cultural institutions. 
The four articles have also illustrated that developing a uniform measure for the quality 
of output is problematic - the very definition of quality is elusive, operationalisations 
vary, and implications differ between institutions. The problem does not, however, 
concern solely the empirical analyses of cultural institutions, but troubles empirical 
analyses of all service industries in varying degrees. This thesis has suggested a 
pragmatic approach to the problem, and as a consequence underlines expediency of 
different dimensions of quality in interpretation of results. For example, the article on 
orchestras suggests that fluctuations in technical change derive partly from changes in 
quality, i. e. choice of repertoire and artistic personnel. 
In measurement of inputs, definition of capital input has been shown to be particularly 
problematic. Because of this, this thesis proposes - for both performing arts institutions 
and museums - specific measures of capital 
input price which reflect the particularity of 
capital stock. The proposed capital input price of performing arts is defined as a ratio 
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of capital costs to the seating capacity of the permanent venue of the institution, thus, 
directly relating capacity of each institution and attendance to the unit price of capital. 
Basing on a similar logic, the capital input price of museums is designed to take into 
account the importance of collection: the capital input price is defined as a sum of the 
ratio of cost of new acquisitions to number of new acquisitions and the ratio of real 
estate costs to magnitude of collection, and thus, the proxy reflects costs of existing 
capital stock as well as costs of new capital. 
Caveats deriving from definition of production technology can be largely avoided by 
minimising the a priori assumptions on technology. In terms of parametric (econometric) 
methods this implies use of flexible functional forms instead of functional forms that a 
priori impose restrictions on technology. Alternatively, non-parametric methods (e. g. 
FDH and DEA) can be used. These methods do not require a functional form, and thus, 
altogether avoid mis-specification of technology, but prevent testing the properties of 
production technology. The trade-off between the two methods is, thus, in the testability 
of properties of technology vs. possibility of mis-specifcations. 
This thesis has demonstrated that testability is of particular interest in analyses of 
orchestras and theatres, while complexity of production technology speaks in favour of 
non-parametric methods in analyses of museums. The empirical results of this thesis 
have, moreover, pointed out that both parametric and non-parametric methods should 
incorporate possible inefficiencies, since neither production of orchestras nor museums 
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was a result of best practice. This indicates a need to use methods based on frontiers or 
methods that incorporate inefficiencies e. g. by utilising shadow prices. 
As to the problems connected to data, availability of data can be significantly promoted 
by preferring methods that operate in a price-quantity space. The reason for this is that 
data on economic aspects of production is more often available than data on technical 
aspects. In a parametric framework this implies that cost functions are preferred to 
production functions and in a non-parametric setting cost oriented FDH and DEA are 
favoured instead of input/output oriented approaches. Problems related to quality of data 
can be mitigated by employing parametric methods. This is because in parametric 
methods measurement errors are captured by error terms, whereas non-parametric 
methods, e. g. FDH and DEA, consider measurement errors as inefficiency. 
Besides methodological discussion, this thesis has endeavored to establish the central 
features of production in orchestras, theatres and museums. Three features are of 
particular interest: scale properties, utilisation of inputs and efficiency. 
The scale properties of production vary significantly across institution types. Museums 
are characterised by substantial scale economies: in a single-output setting, output 
measured either by number of visitors or exhibitions, the average cost flexibility ranges 
from 0.49 to 0.38. Also theatres exhibit size economies, albeit not as substantial as 
museums - the average cost 
flexibility in theatres is 0.75. Orchestras, in turn, are 
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characterised by considerable dis-economies of size with average cost flexibility of 25.0. 
A likely explanation to this is the restricted demand of "high brow" classical music - 
with limited potential audience orchestras cannot rely on re-runs, but are forced to re- 
new their repertoire relatively often. In order to increase their output orchestras must 
rehearse a new piece that require additional practice and possibly extra musicians, maybe 
even of "super star" quality. 
The three institution types vary also with respect to input utilisation. Museums are, in 
a single-output framework, moderately labour intensive (57% labour), while theatres 
exhibit significant labour intensity (89 % labour). Interestingly, orchestras prove to be 
moderately capital intensive (55% capital) challenging the received view, but confirming 
the findings by Gapinski (1979). Besides these findings, this thesis underlines importance 
of biases of scale - reflecting changes in cost shares of inputs as responses to changes 
in output - when assessing the relative utilisation of inputs. In museums the relative use 
of inputs remain constant as output expands implying that production technology is 
homothetic. In orchestras and theatres production exhibit non-homotheticity and relative 
cost shares of labour and capital vary as output expands. In orchestras the relative 
utilisation of labour increase significantly when output expands, whereas in theatres there 
was a small increase in relative use of capital. 
The results on efficiency suggest that production of cultural services is characterised by 
inefficiencies. This thesis has put an emphasis on cost-efficiency instead of technical 
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efficiency due to importance of cost-efficiency in terms of management and policy 
making and the fact that technical efficiency is sine qua non for cost-efficiency. The 
analyses of this thesis suggest that altogether 24 % of museums are cost-inefficient 
resulting excess spending of 10 % (assessed by museum type). Theatres, in turn, are 
allocatively inefficient - inputs are not combined in optimal proportions with respect to 
market prices: capital input is over-utilised some 6% and labour some 5 %. As a result, 
the actual costs exceed the minimum costs on average by 5 %. Even if efficiency of 
orchestras has not been examined, the results on productivity growth suggest that also 
orchestras are likely to be inefficient. The relatively high fluctuations of technical change 
and particularly its spectacular falls hint to this direction. 
The features of production, established in this thesis, have important implications on 
policy making. Most importantly, the findings emphasise the need to shift discussion 
from legitimisations and level of public subsidies to efficient allocation of resources - 
whether the resources allocated to production of cultural services are in their most 
efficient use and what kind of incentives could be used to ensure efficiency. 
The results on scale properties of production in museums and theatres suggest that large 
scale production should be encouraged. This does not necessarily imply fusion of small 
institutions, but points out the need of closer co-operation between institutions. A more 
widespread use of shared services - e. g. administration, marketing and technical services 
- and increased engagement 
in joint projects - e. g. circulating exhibitions and 
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performances - would induce cost savings. Hence, policies should foster co-operation 
both among theatres and museums. Orchestras, in turn, would profit from small scale 
production due to considerable diseconomies of size. A small chamber orchestra is 
undoubtedly cheaper to run than a full scale symphony orchestra, but performances of 
the two are not surely alike. Thus, a straight forward recommendation to advocate small 
scale production is hazardous. 
Policy implications of input utilisation are most relevant with respect to investment 
decisions. Labour intensity of museums and theatres suggests that new investments in 
capital, e. g. buildings or collection, entail also increasing contributions to labour. 
Spending on capital has to be matched with spending on labour of roughly the same 
magnitude because capital cannot easily substitute labour. In the case of orchestras an 
increase in output requires a significantly larger increase in labour than in capital input, 
implying a need of even larger "matching effect" than in the case of museums and 
theatres. The results, thus, strongly point out that investment decisions must include a 
careful assessment of future operating costs. A case in point is the opening of the new 
museum of contemporary an, Kiasma, in Helsinki. 
The results on efficiency of production have pointed out, most importantly, the need to 
introduce incentives to enhance efficiency. The results on productivity growth in 
orchestras suggest that with the right incentives orchestras could reap the benefits of 
productivity growth and possibly increase efficiency. The findings on theatres and 
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museums, in turn, reveal that production is inefficient, but to a lesser extend than often 
claimed. In terms of policy making this indicates that there are no efficiency based 
grounds to substantial cuts of public subsidies at industry level. Notwithstanding this, 
individual institutions could, in some cases, significantly improve their performance. The 
challenge is again in finding the right incentives. 
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